Sequential decisions with several agents

Marco Scarsini and Bruno Bassan

Abstract: We consider k agents who have different subjective probabilities and are utility maximizers. A planner, who knows the beliefs of the agents, maximizes the social expected utility, which is increasing and symmetric in the utilities of the agents. She does that by optimally stopping the flow of information released to the agents. The explicit form of the optimal stopping time is given.

Keywords: sequential decisions; agents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Published in Economic Theory, 1998, Vol. 12, N°2, pp. 371-391. ⟨10.2307/25055128⟩

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Journal Article: Sequential decisions with several agents (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00541747

DOI: 10.2307/25055128

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