[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/
  EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Does public investment reduce private investment risk ? A real option approach

Bruno Cruz and Aude Pommeret ()
Additional contact information
Bruno Cruz: UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

No 2002039, LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: In this paper, the public investment provision takes place in a stochastic environnement. The role of the government is to remove a part of the uncertainty faced by the firm. If the government simply maximizes the value of the firm, then the optimal tax is smaller under imperfect competition then it is under perfect competition since more public capital reduces the selling price. But if the government seeks to maximize the consumer surplus, tax and public capital provision are a mean to correct the market and the optimal tax is then higher

Keywords: irreversible investment; public capital; uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E22 E62 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26
Date: 2002-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin and nep-mac
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2002-39.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvir:2002039

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Virginie LEBLANC ().

 
Page updated 2024-12-28
Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:2002039