Bureaucrats in parliament: theory and evidence on its determinants in Germany

Thomas Brändle () and Alois Stutzer
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Thomas Brändle: University of Basel
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Philipp Bauer ()

Working papers from Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel

Abstract: This paper addresses the personal linkages between the public administration and the legislature that emerge because public servants pursue a political mandate. There are concerns that the strong representation of bureaucrats in many Western parliaments compromises the constitutionally proposed political neutrality of the public service and generates a conflict of interest. We present a cost-benefit calculus and analyze specific legal provisions for the German Laender to understand the selection of public servants into parliaments. Based on a novel data set, we find that incompatibility rules decrease and abeyance compensation increases the fraction of public servants in Laender parliaments.

Keywords: Political selection; parliamentary election; public servants; incompatibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H11 H83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Working Paper: Bureaucrats in Parliament: Theory and Evidence on Its Determinants in Germany (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2008/07

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