APPROXIMATE ROBUSTNESS OF EQUILIBRIUM TO INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

Ori Haimanko and Atsushi Kajii

No 1209, Working Papers from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics

Abstract: We relax the Kajii and Morris (1997a) notion of equilibrium ro- bustness by allowing approximate equilibria in close incomplete infor- mation games. The new notion is termed "approximate robustness". The approximately robust equilibrium correspondence turns out to be upper hemicontinuous, unlike the (exactly) robust equilibrium corre- spondence. As a corollary of the upper hemicontinuity, it is shown that approximately robust equilibria exist in all two-player zero-sum games and all two-player two-strategy games, whereas (exactly) robust equilibria may fail to exist for some games in these categories.

Keywords: incomplete information; robustness; Bayesian Nash equi- librium; ?-equilibrium; upper hemicontinuity; zero-sum games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Approximate robustness of equilibrium to incomplete information (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1209

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