Separation versus Integration in International Rail Markets: A Theoretical Investigation

Guido Friebel (), Marc Ivaldi and Jerome Pouyet

No 11-248, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: This paper investigates various options for the organization of the railway industry when network operators require the access to multiple national networks to provide international (freight or passenger) transport services. The EU rail system provides a framework for our analysis. Returns-to-scale and the intensity of competition are key to understanding the impact of vertical integration or separation between infrastructure and operation services within each country in the presence of international transport services. We also consider an option in which a transnational infrastructure manager is in charge of offering a coordinated access to the national networks. In our model, it turns out to be an optimal industry structure.

Keywords: Regulation; competition; vertical integration; rail passenger transportation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 L92 R48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07, Revised 2013-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cse, nep-ind, nep-net and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:24800

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