Economic Theory

1991 - 2024

Current editor(s): Nichoals Yanneils

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Springer
Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET)
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Volume 70, issue 4, 2020

Special Issue: Supermodularity and Monotonicity in Economics pp. 907-911

Rabah Amir

Aversion to risk of regret and preference for positively skewed risks pp. 913-941

Christian Gollier

Complementary Monopolies with asymmetric information pp. 943-981

Didier Laussel and Joana Resende

Super- and submodularity of stopping games with random observations pp. 983-1022

Svetlana Boyarchenko

The value of a draw pp. 1023-1044

Casilda Lasso de la Vega and Oscar Volij

Characterizing monotone games pp. 1045-1068

Anne-Christine Barthel and Eric Hoffmann

Ordinal potentials in smooth games pp. 1069-1100

Christian Ewerhart

The social value of information and the competition motive: price versus quantity games pp. 1101-1137

Camille Cornand and Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira

Entry and mergers in oligopoly with firm-specific network effects pp. 1139-1164

Adriana Gama, Rim Lahmandi-Ayed and Ana Elisa Pereira

Volume 70, issue 3, 2020

Costly self-control and limited willpower pp. 607-632

Meng-Yu Liang, Simon Grant and Sung-Lin Hsieh

Social preference under twofold uncertainty pp. 633-663

Philippe Mongin and Marcus Pivato

Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices pp. 665-684

Bettina Klaus and Alexandru Nichifor

A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory pp. 685-721

Christoph Kuzmics and Daniel Rodenburger

Expected utility theory with probability grids and preference formation pp. 723-764

Mamoru Kaneko

Ex ante heterogeneity in all-pay many-player auctions with Pareto distribution of costs pp. 765-783

Sérgio O. Parreiras and Anna Rubinchik

Optimal consumption with time-inconsistent preferences pp. 785-815

Liya Liu, Yingjie Niu, Yuanping Wang and Jinqiang Yang

Profit-sharing and efficient time allocation pp. 817-846

Ruben Juarez, Kohei Nitta and Miguel Vargas

Emergence of price-taking Behavior pp. 847-870

Sjur Didrik Flåm

Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization pp. 871-904

Michele Lombardi and Naoki Yoshihara

Correction to: Perfect information games where each player acts only once pp. 905-906

Kutay Cingiz, János Flesch, P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Arkadi Predtetchinski

Volume 70, issue 2, 2020

Interbank borrowing and lending between financially constrained banks pp. 347-385

Diemo Dietrich and Achim Hauck

Sustaining Ramsey plans with one-period bonds pp. 387-410

Begoña Domínguez

On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley–Scarf model pp. 411-435

Patrick Harless and William Phan

Iterated elimination procedures pp. 437-465

Xiao Luo, Xuewen Qian and Chen Qu

Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects pp. 467-502

Yan Long

Defaulting firms and systemic risks in financial networks: a normative approach pp. 503-526

Nicolas Houy, Frédéric Jouneau and François Le Grand

Recourse loans and Ponzi schemes pp. 527-550

Mário R. Páscoa and Abdelkrim Seghir

On recursive utilities with non-affine aggregator and conditional certainty equivalent pp. 551-577

Łukasz Balbus

Debt collateralization, capital structure, and maximal leverage pp. 579-605

Feixue Gong and Gregory Phelan

Volume 70, issue 1, 2020

Infectious diseases, human capital and economic growth pp. 1-47

Aditya Goenka and Lin Liu

On the characterization of linear habit formation pp. 49-93

Gerelt Tserenjigmid

A general model of price competition with soft capacity constraints pp. 95-120

Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin and Nicolas Drouhin

Crisis Contracts pp. 121-164

Elias Aptus, Volker Britz and Hans Gersbach

Interbank market friction-induced holdings of precautionary liquidity: implications for bank loan supply and monetary policy implementation pp. 165-222

Monika Bucher, Achim Hauck and Ulrike Neyer

Moral hazard and compensation packages: does reshuffling matter? pp. 223-241

Alessandro Fedele and Luca Panaccione

Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information pp. 243-271

Christian Ewerhart and Federico Quartieri

Political selection and the optimal concentration of political power pp. 273-311

Andreas Grunewald, Emanuel Hansen and Gert Pönitzsch

Global gains from reduction in trade costs pp. 313-345

Edwin Lai, Haichao Fan and Han Steffan Qi

Volume 69, issue 4, 2020

Rank-additive population ethics pp. 861-918

Marcus Pivato

Bank capital, fire sales, and the social value of deposits pp. 919-963

Douglas Gale and Tanju Yorulmazer

Perfect information games where each player acts only once pp. 965-985

Kutay Cingiz, János Flesch, P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Arkadi Predtetchinski

Myopic and farsighted stability in network formation games: an experimental study pp. 987-1021

Mariya Teteryatnikova and James Tremewan

Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions pp. 1023-1047

Bo Chen, Yu Chen and David Rietzke

Monetary rules in a two-sector endogenous growth model pp. 1049-1100

Antoine Riche, Francesco Magris and Daria Onori

International trade with sequential production pp. 1101-1125

Udo Kreickemeier and Zhan Qu

On the equivalence of rational expectations equilibrium with perfect Bayesian equilibrium pp. 1127-1146

Cheng-Zhong Qin and Xintong Yang

Strategic experimentation with asymmetric players pp. 1147-1175

Kaustav Das, Nicolas Klein and Katharina Schmid

Volume 69, issue 3, 2020

Convergence, financial development, and policy analysis pp. 523-568

Justin Lin, Jianjun Miao and Pengfei Wang

Weak implementation pp. 569-594

Kym Pram

Purification and disambiguation of Ellsberg equilibria pp. 595-636

Benoît Decerf and Frank Riedel

Child labor and compulsory education: the effects of government education policy on economic growth and welfare pp. 637-666

Chia-Hui Lu

Irreversibility and the economics of forest conservation pp. 667-711

Adriana Piazza and Santanu Roy

An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave pp. 713-743

Andrew Mackenzie

Industrialization and the evolution of enforcement institutions pp. 745-788

Toshihiko Mukoyama and Latchezar Popov

Strategic advance sales, demand uncertainty and overcommitment pp. 789-828

Sebastien Mitraille and Henry Thille

Ideological extremism and primaries pp. 829-860

Agustin Casas

Volume 69, issue 2, 2020

Subjective expected utility with a spectral state space pp. 249-313

Marcus Pivato

The role of colleges within the higher education sector pp. 315-336

Bernhard Eckwert and Itzhak Zilcha

Stable unions pp. 337-365

Yaron Azrieli and Dan Levin

Targeted search, endogenous market segmentation, and wage inequality pp. 367-414

Huanxing Yang

Dissolving a partnership securely pp. 415-434

Matthew Van Essen and John Wooders

Uniqueness of equilibrium in a Bewley–Aiyagari model pp. 435-450

Bar Light

An axiomatization of the mixed utilitarian–maximin social welfare orderings pp. 451-473

Walter Bossert and Kohei Kamaga

The gambling effect of final-offer arbitration in bargaining pp. 475-496

King King Li and Kang Rong

The evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakes pp. 497-521

Ennio Bilancini and Leonardo Boncinelli

Volume 69, issue 1, 2020

Preferences with changing ambiguity aversion pp. 1-60

Jingyi Xue

Rational preference and rationalizable choice pp. 61-105

Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Alfio Giarlotta, Salvatore Greco, Fabio Maccheroni and Massimo Marinacci

Strict fairness of equilibria in asymmetric information economies and mixed markets pp. 107-124

Chiara Donnini and Marialaura Pesce

Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity pp. 125-147

Emma Moreno-García and Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez

Investment and financing in incomplete markets pp. 149-182

Camelia Bejan

Competing first-price and second-price auctions pp. 183-216

Joyce Delnoij and Kris Jaegher

A mechanism for the elicitation of second-order belief and subjective information structure pp. 217-232

Edi Karni

Set-valued capacities: multi-agenda decision making pp. 233-248

Ehud Lehrer and Roee Teper