Eine neue wissenschaftliche Wahrheit pflegt sich nicht in der Weise durchzusetzen, daß ihre Gegner überzeugt werden und sich als belehrt erklären, sondern vielmehr dadurch, daß die Gegner allmählich aussterben und daß die heranwachsende Generation von vornherein mit der Wahrheit vertraut gemacht ist. Max Planck (1948, p. 22)
[A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.] Footnote 1
I suppose the process of acceptance will pass through the usual four stages:
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i) this is worthless nonsense;
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ii) this is an interesting, but perverse, point of view;
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iii) this is true, but quite unimportant; iv) I always said so.
J. B. S. Haldane (1963, p. 464)
1 Introduction
Does a sense of recognition play a pre-eminent role when it comes to people’s inferences and choices? Many studies have investigated how people make decisions based on their previous encounters with an object or situation. To illustrate this, researchers have examined how consumers rely on their familiarity with brand names when deciding which consumer goods to buy (Reference Bröder and EichlerCoates, Butler, & Berry, 2004, 2006). Several related concepts have been investigated: recognition (e.g., Reference CokelyGoldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Reference GalefSchooler & Hertwig, 2005), which we use here to distinguish between alternatives, such as brands people believe they have heard of before and those they have not; familiarity(e.g., Dougherty, Franco-Watkins, & Thomas, 2008; Reference MandlerMandler, 1980), which is frequently used to denote the degree of recognition or knowledge a person has of an alternative; and accessibility(e.g., Bruner, 1957), fluency (e.g., Reference Jacoby and DallasJacoby & Dallas, 1981), or availability (e.g., Reference Tversky and KahnemanTversky & Kahneman, 1973), which often refers to the ease or speed with which mental content comes to mind.
2 The Recognition Heuristic and the Fast and Frugal Heuristics Framework
One model that operates on a sense of recognition is the recognition heuristic (Reference Gigerenzer and GoldsteinGoldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999, 2002; see also Reference Coates, Butler and BerryGigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). This simple, noncompensatory decision strategy can be applied to infer which of N alternatives, some recognized others not, has a larger value on a given criterion.Footnote 2 According to the heuristic, such inferences can be based solely on a sense of recognition, ignoring other probabilistic cues (i.e., knowledge about alternatives’ attributes) a person may be able to retrieve from memory. The heuristic reads as follows: If there are N alternatives, then rank all n recognized alternatives higher on the criterion than the N–n unrecognized ones.
To illustrate this, if a reader of this issue wanted to know who of the authors has published more journal articles in the past (or who has a higher h-index), she could rely on the recognition heuristic and infer that those authors whose names she recognizes will have published more papers than those whose names she has never heard of before. Of course, recognition may not always help her make a correct inference. Some authors who have published a lot, but were less often cited, may remain unrecognized, while others who have published only a few but heavily cited papers may be recognized. In other words, recognition can be treated as a probabilistic cue that is more or less helpful in this and other judgment domains.
The recognition heuristic is only one of several simple decision strategies that have been developed within the fast and frugal heuristics framework (Reference Coates, Butler and BerryGigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999; for recent overviews, see Gigerenzer & Brighton 2009; Reference Marewski, Gaissmaier and GigerenzerMarewski, Gaissmaier, Gigerenzer, 2010a; for critical discussions, see Bröder & B. Newell, 2008; Reference Beach and MitchellDougherty et al., 2008; Reference Evans and OverEvans & Over, 2010; Reference HaldaneHilbig, in press; for replies see Reference Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and GoldsteinGigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Goldstein, 2008; Reference Marewski, Gaissmaier and GigerenzerMarewski, Gaissmaier, Gigerenzer, 2010b). In keeping with many other frameworks (e.g., Reference Beach and MitchellBeach & Mitchell, 1978; Reference Hilbig and PohlHogarth & Karelaia, 2007; Reference Kahneman, Slovic and TverskyPayne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988, 1993), this approach to judgment and decision making assumes that the mind comes equipped with a repertoire of strategies. Metaphorically speaking, this repertoire forms an “adaptive toolbox” of heuristics, each of which is hypothesized to exploit how basic cognitive capacities, such as recognition memory, represent regularities in the structure of our environment. This exploitation of basic cognitive capacities and environmental structure enables the heuristics to yield accurate judgments based on little information, say, a sense of recognition.
The recognition heuristic, for instance, can help a person make accurate inferences about an alternative’s (e.g., a brand) criterion value (e.g., product quality), when a person’s memories of encounters with alternatives (e.g., brand names) correlate with the criterion values of the alternatives. This is the case, for example, for our recognition of soccer teams and tennis players, which can be used to forecast their future success in sports competitions (e.g., Reference GalefPachur & Biele, 2007; Reference Gigerenzer and ToddSerwe & Frings, 2006), as well as for our recognition of billionaires and musicians, which reflects their fortunes, and record sales, respectively (Reference Coates, Butler and BerryHertwig, Herzog, Schooler, & Reimer, 2008). Also scientists’ familiarity with scientific topics and concepts can be used to predict what journal articles they find interesting to read (Reference Van Maanen, Marewski, Taatgen and van RijnVan Maanen & Marewski, 2009). Besides being useful in many domains, recognition is also easily accessible and surprisingly lasting (e.g., Reference Gigerenzer and GoldsteinPachur & Hertwig, 2006; Reference Gigerenzer and RegierShepard, 1967; Reference StandingStanding, 1973). As has been suggested by Reference CokelyGoldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) and others (e.g., Reference Gigerenzer and GoldsteinPachur & Hertwig, 2006), these remarkable characteristics make it likely that a sense of recognition plays an important role in a multitude of tasks, and in fact, there is evidence that reasoning by recognition is a common strategy not only in humans (Reference GalefGalef, 1987).
However, although there is some consensus in the literature that a sense of recognition represents an important psychological variable (see Pachur, Bröder, & Marewski, 2008, for an overview), the recognition heuristic, as originally formulated by Goldstein and Gigerenzer, has triggered a number of highly controversial debates about methodological, normative, and descriptive questions (e.g., Reference Coates, Butler and BerryBorges, Goldstein, Ortmann, & Gigerenzer, 1999; Reference Borges, Goldstein, Ortmann, Gigerenzer, Gigerenzer and ToddBröder & Eichler, 2006; Reference Beach and MitchellDougherty et al., 2008; Reference Frings, Holling and SerweFrings, Holling, & Serwe, 2003; Reference Cokely, Parpart, Schooler, Taatgen and van RijnFrosch et al., 2007; Reference Dougherty, Franco-Watkins and ThomasGigerenzer et al., 2008; Reference Coates, Butler and BerryHertwig et al., 2008; Reference HaldaneHilbig, in press; Reference Hauser and WernerfeltHilbig, Erdfelder & Pohl, 2010; Hilbig & Pohl,2008, 2009; Marewski, Gaissmaier et al., 2009, 2010; Reference CokelyMcCloy et al., 2008; B. Reference Frings, Holling and SerweNewell & Fernandez, 2006; B. Reference Frosch, Beaman and McCloyNewell & Shanks, 2004; Reference Fum, Missier and StoccoOppenheimer, 2003; Reference EvansPachur, in press; Reference Ortmann, Gigerenzer, Borges, Goldstein, Plott and SmithOrtmann, Gigerenzer, Borges & Goldstein, 2008; Reference GalefPachur & Biele, 2007; Reference Gigerenzer and BrightonPachur et al., 2008; Reference Gigerenzer and GoldsteinPachur & Hertwig, 2006; Reference Evans and OverPachur, Mata, & Schooler, 2009; Reference Frosch, Beaman and McCloyPleskac, 2007; Reference Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and GoldsteinPohl, 2006; Reference PachurReimer & Katsikopoulos, 2004; Reference Gigerenzer and RegierRichter & Späth, 2006; Reference HilbigScheibehenne & Bröder, 2007; Reference GalefSchooler & Hertwig, 2005; Reference Gigerenzer and ToddSerwe & Frings, 2006; Reference Gigerenzer and BrightonSnook & Cullen, 2006; Reference Gigerenzer and GoldsteinVolz et al., 2006). Some of the main questions that are under debate concern the following topics.
(1) How should the adequacy of the recognition heuristic as a model of behavior be assessed? For instance, (a) when is contradictory empirical evidence alone enough to refute this model, and when should alternative models be specified and tested against it, with the models being each other’s benchmark in assessing how well each model predicts behavior, (b) how should corresponding comparative model tests be conducted, (c) what measures are valid to assess people’s reliance on the recognition heuristic, (d) how can the recognition heuristic be implemented in models of memory and other models of cognition, including detailed cognitive architectures, and (e) how do such implementations specify or amend the predictions being made by the recognition heuristic?
(2) On what sort of recognition process does the recognition heuristic operate? For example, at what levels of analysis should the underlying memory variable considered to be binary or continuous?
(3) When will the recognition heuristic help decision makers to make accurate inferences about unknown quantities; for instance, (a) when will recognizing fewer alternatives be beneficial, and (b) when can the heuristic be used as a forecasting tool?
(4) When will people rely on the noncompensatory recognition heuristic, ignoring other knowledge about alternatives’ attributes, and when will people switch to other decision strategies instead; for example to compensatory strategies that integrate other knowledge by weighting and adding it? To illustrate this, are people more likely to rely on the recognition heuristic when they have to retrieve all available information from memory as opposed to reading it off a computer screen or a piece of paper?
(5) How do people know when to choose which decision strategy, and how many strategies are available that people choose from in a given situation?
(6) What are alternative conceptions to the fast and frugal heuristics framework that do not assume people to make use of a repertoire of decision strategies, or that assume fewer strategies than the fast and frugal heuristics framework, and how can such alternative conceptions’ potential as descriptive and normative models be adequately tested? For instance, recent alternative approaches include the Adjustable Spanner metaphor proposed by B. Newell (2005), or the Parallel Constraint Satisfaction model proposed by Glöckner and Betsch (2008; see Marewski, in press, for a critique; see Glöckner & Betsch, in press, for a reply), but naturally, there are many other frameworks that may as well be conceived of as alternative approaches to the fast and frugal heuristics framework, including decision field theory (e.g., Reference Dougherty, Franco-Watkins and ThomasBusemeyer & Townsend, 1993), or the heuristics-and-biases program (e.g., Reference Kahneman, Slovic and TverskyKahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Reference Tversky and KahnemanTversky & Kahneman, 1974), to name just two.
The idea to dedicate a special issue to the recognition heuristic, and recognition-based or familiarity-based judgments and decisions more generally, was born out of these debates. Our goal was to bring together advocates and critics of the various positions, thereby highlighting and potentially resolving some of the controversial issues.
Importantly, we are not neutral in these debates. Julian Marewski tries to tie recognition heuristic research, and more generally, the fast and frugal heuristics program to detailed quantitative architectural models of cognition such as Anderson and colleagues’ (e.g., Anderson et al., 2004) ACT-R cognitive architecture (e.g., Marewski, Gaissmaier et al., 2009, 2010; Reference Evans and OverMarewski & Schooler, 2010; Reference Van Maanen, Marewski, Taatgen and van RijnVan Maanen & Marewski, 2009). With respect to testing the recognition heuristic and other decision strategies, he has emphasized that they should be cast into precise, formal models and tested comparatively against each other, using formal model selection procedures such as cross validation or the minimum description length principle to compare how well each model predicts behavior. Ideally, such tests should come accompanied by models of strategy selection that allow predicting when people will use each of the decision strategies, as well as models of the memory, perceptual, motor, and other lower-level cognitive processes on which the decision strategies depend (Reference Marewski and OlssonMarewski & Olsson, 2009; Reference Evans and OverMarewski, Schooler, & Gigerenzer, 2010).
Rüdiger Pohl, in contrast, considers himself a critic of the recognition heuristic and the fast and frugal heuristics program. In recent years, much of his research has focused on experimentally testing the recognition heuristic (e.g., Reference HilbigHilbig & Pohl, 2009; Reference HilbigHilbig, Pohl, & Bröder, 2009; Reference Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and GoldsteinPohl, 2006). He argues, for example, that in many situations, people do not ignore further knowledge beyond recognition, thus he questions the hypothesis that people base decisions on recognition alone by using the noncompensatory recognition heuristic. Accordingly, he has strived to develop measurement tools to assess to what extent people may actually use the recognition heuristic (e.g., Reference Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, Goldstein, Gigerenzer and ToddHilbig & Pohl, 2008; Reference Hauser and WernerfeltHilbig, Erdfelder et al., 2010). He also considers evidence-accumulation models (Reference Hochman, Ayal and GlöcknerLee & Cummins, 2004; B. Newell, 2005; B. Reference Newell, Collins, Lee, McNamara and TraftonNewell, Collins, & Lee, 2007) as a viable alternative to the fast and frugal heuristics framework. According to these models, decisions are generally not based on one cue (although they could be), but rather on the difference in evidence for the available options (Reference HilbigHilbig & Pohl, 2009).
Oliver Vitouch has been recruited as a catalyst and mediator for this project. After the fast and frugal heuristics program had been developed, he spent two years as a member of the fast and frugal heuristics research group (also known as ABC Research Group), where he was also in charge of moderating the group’s reading and debate club. At that time, he began empirical work on the recognition heuristic himself (e.g., Zdrahal-Urbanek & Vitouch, 2006). While being convinced about the paradigmatic impact of the fast and frugal heuristics program, he holds a mixed view on its strong assumptions on how decision processes actually work in humans. At the same time, he believes that people’s decision strategies will show much adaptive variability (even in the sense of protean behavior, i.e., advantageous unpredictability). Altogether, he aims to take an integrative stance, with an emphasis on the epistemic implications of the debate.
3 Surprises and lessons learned
Collaborating on compiling this special issue entailed two surprises for us. First, while we knew that the recognition heuristic represents a focus of hot debates for many researchers, we were overwhelmed by the number of submissions to the special issue. What was originally planned as one issue consisting of about 6 contributions turned into two volumes with about 20 submitted articles, some of which are still under review. All submissions were and are subject to Judgment and Decision Making’s peer review process, under the direction of the journal’s editor, Jonathan Baron, and us. We give an overview of the two issues and the contents of this first issue below.
Second, while we knew that the special issue would represent an adversarial collaboration, we were surprised at how much we disagreed on theoretical, methodological, and editorial issues. This made it not always easy to settle on our evaluations of submitted papers and accordingly on the editorial feedback to the authors. In fact, our (and/or the reviewers’) respective evaluations of the contents of some articles have been very much opposed, making it impossible to reach a consensus. In such situations, we have ended up to provide editorial feedback by following the evaluations embraced by the majority of us and the reviewers. While this policy has more or less worked for us, it has at times led to frustrating results for those of us who have been outvoted in the process. Even writing this editorial together turned out to represent a challenge, resulting in a text that reflects a compromise between our various positions.
Hopefully, we have learned a few things from our joint editing efforts. Of course, we knew about the specific controversies regarding the recognition heuristic and the fast-and-frugal approach in advance, and we also knew each other to some extent, but we were nevertheless surprised by our own resoluteness in several matters. We had believed that there would have been more common ground among us three on which to settle controversial issues. But rather, we were confronted with several, long-lasting, fierce debates on theoretical, methodological, and editorial issues. And instead of finding compromise positions, we sometimes defended our own positions even more strongly than before. These experiences made it clear to us that there is more to this “debate” than just different opinions on certain aspects. The debate very much resembles what is known from the traditional schools of psychology (like, e.g., psychoanalysis, behaviorism, or gestalt psychology), in which theoretical convictions were turned into dogmas that had to be defended by all means. Critical researchers were expelled. Scientists either belonged to the school or were against it. There was no common ground.
For the time being, it appears to us that the recognition heuristic and the associated fast and frugal heuristics framework will continue to be debated, not just among ourselves, but also, of course, among most involved authors and reviewers. We believe that much of the heat in the debate stems from mainly hidden sources, at least hidden to the public. These could be personal communications with critics from one or the other side, overlooked and thus not cited studies, selective reporting of contradictory results, and the like; but maybe most importantly, rather one-sided reviews. We believe this to hold true in equal degrees for all involved camps. We will take up this topic in the forthcoming second volume of the special issue, where we will discuss the various topics with more detail than in this short editorial. We thereby aim to disentangle the different sources of disagreement and still hope to thus somewhat calm the debate.
Perhaps one lesson we could all learn from our endeavor to make this adversarial collaboration happen (which was at times more adversarial than collaborative) could be to step back a little and see what the other side has to offer. This advice sounds simple, but is very hard to accomplish, as we have experienced ourselves. But at least we tried.Footnote 3
4 Overview of the two special issues
Let us briefly provide an overview of the contents of the two issues. The first issue presents 8 articles with a range of new mathematical analyses and theoretical developments on questions such as when the recognition heuristic will help people to make accurate inferences; as well as experimental and methodological work that tackles descriptive questions; for example, whether the recognition heuristic is a good model of consumer choice.
The forthcoming second issue strives to give an overview of the past, current, and likely future debates on the recognition heuristic, featuring comments on the debates by some of those authors who have been heavily involved, early experiments on the recognition heuristic that were run decades ago, but thus far never published, as well as new experimental tests of the recognition heuristic and alternative approaches. Finally, in the second issue, we will also provide a discussion of all papers in the two issues, and speculate about what we should possibly learn from these papers.
In allocating accepted articles to the two issues, we strove to strike a balance between the order of submission, the order of acceptance, and the topical fit of the papers. We apologize to those authors who feel disfavored by our attempts to establish such a balance; either because they preferred to see their contributions appear in the first, or alternatively, in the second issue.
5 Contents of the first issue
Tackling a normative question, Davis-Stober, Dana, and Budescu (2010) mathematically lay out foundations for the recognition heuristic and related single-variable heuristics as an optimal decision strategy in a linear modeling framework. They conclude that the recognition heuristic does not merely represent a poor substitute for linear weighted-additive models that integrate many variables but closely approximates an optimal decision strategy when a decision maker has finite data about the world. Davis-Stober et al.’s article thus not only contributes to the recognition heuristic literature but also to the broader literature on the performance of decision heuristics that integrate one or only a few cues (e.g., Reference Beach and MitchellBaucells, Carrasco, & Hogarth, 2008; Reference Brighton, Lebiere and WrayBrighton, 2006; Reference Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, Goldstein, Gigerenzer and ToddCzerlinski, Gigerenzer, & Goldstein, 1999; Reference Busemeyer and TownsendGigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; Reference Coates, Butler and BerryGigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Reference Cokely, Parpart, Schooler, Taatgen and van RijnHogarth & Karelaia, 2005, 2007; Reference Davis-Stober, Dana and BudescuKatsikopoulos & Martignon, 2006; Reference Katsikopoulos, Schooler and HertwigKatsikopoulos, Schooler, & Hertwig, in press; Reference Gigerenzer and ToddMartignon & Hoffrage, 2002).
Also Smithson (2010), Katsikopoulos (2010), as well as Beaman, Smith, Frosch, and McCloy (2010) focus on what may be considered normative questions. They study the intricacies of the less-is-more effect, extending and clarifying the conditions under which this effect could be expected. The less-is-more effect was first described and formalized by Goldstein and Gigerenzer (1999, 2002). It entails that recognizing more alternatives (e.g., brand names) may lead to less accurate inferences about these alternatives (e.g., about the brands’ quality) than recognizing fewer alternatives. Whether and when this effect will occur has so far been investigated in several experimental studies (e.g., Frosch et al., 2007; Reference GalefPachur & Biele, 2007; Reference Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and GoldsteinPohl, 2006; Reference HilbigScheibehenne & Bröder, 2007; Reference Gigerenzer and ToddSerwe & Frings, 2006; Reference Gigerenzer and BrightonSnook & Cullen, 2006), as well as in mathematical analyses and computer simulations (e.g., Dougherty et al., 2008; Reference Dougherty, Franco-Watkins and ThomasGigerenzer et al., 2008; Reference CokelyMcCloy et al., 2008; Reference EvansPachur, in press; Reference Frosch, Beaman and McCloyPleskac, 2007; Reference PachurReimer & Katsikopoulos, 2004; Reference GalefSchooler & Hertwig, 2005)
Using mathematical analyses, Smithson (2010) argues that the original conditions for the emergence of the less-is-more effect that have been proposed by Reference CokelyGoldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) are insufficient. In doing so, he derives a more general characterization of this effect, carving out new conditions when this effect will occur and when not; for instance, when memory is imperfect. These analyses have important implications for future experimental tests of less-is-more effects.
Also Katsikopoulos (2010) mathematically derives a more general characterization of this effect by assuming an imperfect recognition memory. He argues that the effect can be found even if involved heuristics have low validity. In addition, he shows by simulation that the effect is predicted to be small (as has empirically been found so far). Finally, he discusses methodological problems concerning appropriate tests of the less-is-more effect and suggests a new method to examine this effect.
Beaman et al. (2010) take a closer look at the less-is-more effect, too. They derive their predictions analytically through means of a model termed LINDA (Limited INformation and Differential Access), assuming that people possess limited but relevant knowledge for recognized objects and that their access to subsets of objects may be different for different subsets. With this model, Beaman et al. provide evidence that a less-is-more effect is not necessarily an outcome of recognition-driven inferences but may also spring from knowledge-driven processes.
Taking up recent methodological discussions on how people’s reliance on the recognition heuristic should be assessed (Reference HaldaneHilbig, in press; Reference Hauser and WernerfeltHilbig, Erdfelder, et al., 2010; Reference Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, Goldstein, Gigerenzer and ToddHilbig & Pohl, 2008; Reference Evans and OverMarewski, Gaissmaier et al., 2010; Reference Evans and OverMarewski, Schooler et al., 2010; Reference Gigerenzer and BrightonPachur et al., 2008), Hilbig (2010) compares four different approaches using both computer simulations and a re-analysis of existing empirical data. Focusing on a paradigm where both recognition and other knowledge is acquired naturally (i.e., outside the laboratory) and where all information has to be retrieved from memory, he intends to find a measure which provides a sufficiently unbiased estimation of the proportion of recognition heuristic use. Hilbig concludes that a multinomial processing tree model does fulfill this criterion and thus allows an adequate estimation of recognition heuristic use, while the frequently-used proportions of inferences consistent with the recognition heuristic do not.
Hochman, Ayal, and Glöckner (2010), Reference Hilbig, Scholl and PohlHilbig, Scholl, and Pohl (2010), and Reference Oeusoonthornwattana and ShanksOeusoonthornwattana and Shanks (2010) follow the tradition of experimental papers on the recognition heuristic, investigating how good the heuristic describes behavior (Reference Borges, Goldstein, Ortmann, Gigerenzer, Gigerenzer and ToddBröder & Eichler, 2006; Reference Coates, Butler and BerryHertwig et al., 2008; Reference Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, Goldstein, Gigerenzer and ToddHilbig & Pohl, 2008, 2009; Marewski, Gaissmaier, Schooler et al., 2009, 2010; B. Reference Frings, Holling and SerweNewell & Fernandez, 2006; B. Reference Frosch, Beaman and McCloyNewell & Shanks, 2004; Reference Fum, Missier and StoccoOppenheimer, 2003; Reference Gigerenzer and BrightonPachur et al., 2008; Reference Gigerenzer and GoldsteinPachur & Hertwig, 2006; Reference Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and GoldsteinPohl, 2006; Reference Gigerenzer and RegierRichter & Späth, 2006; Reference Gigerenzer and GoldsteinVolz et al., 2006). Specifically, Hochman et al. (2010) use psychophysiological (finger plethysmography as a marker of arousal) and behavioral measures (choice proportions, response times, and confidence ratings) to further elucidate an already classic part of the debate, asking the question whether the recognition cue is used in a noncompensatory way, or whether additional information is integrated in a compensatory manner. They argue that their results are more in line with models that conceptualize decision processes as compensatory in nature, such as the Parallel Constraint Satisfaction model (Reference Frosch, Beaman and McCloyGlöckner & Betsch, 2008).
Hilbig, Scholl et al. (2010) focus on one feature that has been proposed to be central to heuristics, namely the reduction of cognitive effort (e.g., Reference MandlerShah & Oppenheimer, 2008). Thus, the authors conjecture, heuristics like the recognition heuristic should be most beneficial in situations of deliberative thinking, which has been considered to be slow, stepwise, and effortful. They test this hypothesis in two experiments with two groups each, differing in their mode of thinking: intuitively versus deliberatively. In both experiments, the probability of using the recognition heuristic was higher when participants were instructed to think deliberatively rather than to think intuitively. This finding thus sheds light on the question whether heuristics should be understood as tools of intuitive thinking, adding to the ongoing debates with respect to dual system theories of reasoning (e.g., Cokely, 2009; Reference Cokely, Parpart, Schooler, Taatgen and van RijnCokely, Parpart, & Schooler, 2009; Reference Coates, Butler and BerryEvans, 2008; Reference Gigerenzer and RegierGigerenzer & Regier, 1996; Reference Hilbig, Scholl and PohlKahneman, 2003; Reference Keren and SchulKeren & Schul, 2009; Reference ReynaReyna, 2004; Reference SlomanSloman, 1996).
Reference CokelyGoldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) proposed the recognition heuristic as a model of inference, and thus far, all experimental studies on the heuristic have focused on inference. Oeusoonthornwattana and Shanks (2010) investigate the recognition heuristic for the first time in preference. In two experiments, they test whether this heuristic is a good descriptive model of consumer choice. They conclude that most of their participants make choices that are inconsistent with the noncompensatory recognition heuristic; interestingly, however, a minority does seem to make choices in line with the heuristic. The article thus also contributes to the marketing and consumer choice literatures, where both compensatory and noncompensatory models of product choice are discussed (e.g., Goldstein, 2007; Reference Hauser and WernerfeltHauser & Wernerfelt, 1990; Reference Yee, Dahan, Hauser and OrlinYee, Dahan, Hauser, & Orlin, 2007).
At the close of this editorial note to the first issue, we would like to express our gratitude to the many authors sharing their impressive work with us and thus accepting the intricacies of our attempt of an “adversarial collaboration”. We also thank all those who have acted as reviewers for the special issues, and especially Jon Baron. He has been a tremendous source of help, offering reliable, fast, thoughtful editorial advice and support throughout the entire process.