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Creating High Confidence in a Separation Kernel

Published: 01 August 2002 Publication History

Abstract

Separation of processes is the foundation for security and safety properties of systems. This paper reports on a collaborative effort of Government, Industry and Academia to achieve high confidence in the separation of processes. To this end, this paper will discuss (1) what a separation kernel is, (2) why the separation of processes is fundamental to security systems, (3) how high confidence in the separation property of the kernel was obtained, and (4) some of the ways government, industry, and academia cooperated to achieve high confidence in a separation kernel.
i>What is separation Strict separation is the inability of one process to interfere with another. In a separation kernel, the word i>separation is interpreted very strictly. Any means for one process to disturb another, be it by communication primitives, by sharing of data, or by subtle uses of kernel primitives not intended for communication, is ruled out when two processes are separated.
i>Why is separation fundamental Strict separation between processes enables the evaluation of a system to check that the system meets its security policy. For example, if a red process is strictly separated from a black process, then it can be concluded that there is no flow of information from red to black.
i>How was high confidence achieved We have collaborated and shared our expertise in the use of SPECWARE. SPECWARE is a i>correct by construction method, in which high level specifications are built up from modules using specification combinators. Refinements of the specifications are made until an implementation is achieved. These refinements are also subject to combinators. The high confidence in the separation property of the kernel stems from the use of formal methods in the development of the kernel.
i>How did we collaborate Staff from the Kestrel Institute (developers of SPECWARE), the Department of Defense (DoD), and Motorola (developers of the kernel) cooperated in the creation of the Mathematically Analyzed Separation Kernel (MASK). DoD provided the separation kernel concept, and expertise in computer security and high confidence development. Kestrel provided expertise in SPECWARE. Motorola combined its own the expertise with that of DoD and Kestrel in creating MASK.

References

[1]
Kestrel Institute, 3260 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, California 94304. Specware Language Manual , 2.0.3 edn., March 1998.
[2]
Pierce, B. C. 1991. Basic Category Theory for Computer Scientists . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[3]
Rushby, J. 1981. Design and verification of secure systems. In Proceedings of the Eighth Symposium on Operating Systems Principles , Vol. 15.

Cited By

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  • (2018)High-assurance timing analysis for a high-assurance real-time operating systemReal-Time Systems10.1007/s11241-017-9286-353:5(812-853)Online publication date: 28-Dec-2018
  • (2017)A survey on formal specification and verification of separation kernelsFrontiers of Computer Science: Selected Publications from Chinese Universities10.5555/3128671.312868111:4(585-607)Online publication date: 1-Aug-2017
  • (2014)Comprehensive formal verification of an OS microkernelACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)10.1145/256053732:1(1-70)Online publication date: 26-Feb-2014
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Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

cover image Automated Software Engineering
Automated Software Engineering  Volume 9, Issue 3
August 2002
123 pages

Publisher

Kluwer Academic Publishers

United States

Publication History

Published: 01 August 2002

Author Tags

  1. data isolation
  2. formal specification
  3. information flow
  4. refinement
  5. separation kernel

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Cited By

View all
  • (2018)High-assurance timing analysis for a high-assurance real-time operating systemReal-Time Systems10.1007/s11241-017-9286-353:5(812-853)Online publication date: 28-Dec-2018
  • (2017)A survey on formal specification and verification of separation kernelsFrontiers of Computer Science: Selected Publications from Chinese Universities10.5555/3128671.312868111:4(585-607)Online publication date: 1-Aug-2017
  • (2014)Comprehensive formal verification of an OS microkernelACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)10.1145/256053732:1(1-70)Online publication date: 26-Feb-2014
  • (2009)Modeling Trusted Computing Support in a Protection Profile for High Assurance Security KernelsProceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Trusted Computing10.1007/978-3-642-00587-9_4(45-62)Online publication date: 19-Feb-2009

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