Competition: CRYSTAL

In “Robust Auctions for Revenue via Enhanced Competition,” T. Roughgarden, I. Talgam-Cohen, and Q. Yan revisit the classic Bulow–Klemperer result. This result compares the revenues of two well-known auction formats: the welfare-maximizing Vickrey auction ...

Most results in revenue-maximizing mechanism design hinge on “getting the price right”—selling goods to bidders at prices low enough to encourage a sale but high enough to garner nontrivial revenue. This approach is difficult to implement when the seller ...

In various markets where sellers compete in price, price oscillations are observed rather than convergence to equilibrium. Such fluctuations have been empirically observed in the retail market for gasoline, in airline pricing and in the online sale of ...

Motivated by the market for display advertisement over the Internet, we study competition between firms with a fixed supply whose size cannot be changed, and analyze the resulting revenue. We are most interested in studying the asymmetric case in which ...