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End-to-end link power control in optical networks using Nash bargaining solution

Published: 22 October 2007 Publication History

Abstract

An efficient and intelligent resource allocation mechanism is the heart of any communication networks. Based on previous work on non-cooperative game approach and direct centralized optimization, this paper addresses the issue of efficiency and fairness in optical network power control. We use Nash bargaining solution (NBS) to achieve a fair and efficient solution for optical network power control at the end-to-end optical link level. We study different formulations based on Nash bargaining model and characterize their solutions.

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            cover image ACM Conferences
            ValueTools '07: Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Performance evaluation methodologies and tools
            October 2007
            708 pages
            ISBN:9789639799004

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            ICST (Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering)

            Brussels, Belgium

            Publication History

            Published: 22 October 2007

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            Author Tags

            1. Nash bargaining solution
            2. centralized optimization
            3. game theory
            4. optical networks
            5. power control

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