Intensional epistemic logics are not apt for handling properly the specification of communication and reasoning of resource-bounded agents in a multi-agent system. They oscillate between two unrealistic extremes: either the explicit knowledge of an ‘idiot’ agent, deprived of any inferential capabilities, or the implicit knowledge of an agent who is a logical/mathematical genius. The goal of this paper is to introduce the notion of inferable knowledge of a rational yet resource-bounded agent. The stock of inferable knowledge of such an agent a is the closure of a chain-of-knowledge sequence validly derivable from a's existing stock of explicit knowledge via one or more rules of inference that a masters. We are using Pavel Tichý's Transparent Intensional Logic as our framework. This logic models knowing as a relation-in-intension between an agent and a construction (a hyperintensional mode of presentation of a possible-world proposition) rather than a set of possible worlds or a piece of syntax. We motivate the restriction of the epistemic closure principle to inferable knowledge, present the theoretical framework, define the concept of inferable knowledge, and explain the technicalities of the so restricted closure principle.