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Strongly stable matchings in time O(nm) and extension to the hospitals-residents problem

Published: 01 May 2007 Publication History

Abstract

An instance of the stable marriage problem is an undirected bipartite graph G = (XW, E) with linearly ordered adjacency lists with ties allowed in the ordering. A matching M is a set of edges, no two of which share an endpoint. An edge e = (a, b) ∈ EM is a blocking edge for M if a is either unmatched or strictly prefers b to its partner in M, and b is unmatched, strictly prefers a to its partner in M, or is indifferent between them. A matching is strongly stable if there is no blocking edge with respect to it. We give an O(nm) algorithm for computing strongly stable matchings, where n is the number of vertices and m the number of edges. The previous best algorithm had running time O(m2). We also study this problem in the hospitals-residents setting, which is a many-to-one extension of the aforementioned problem. We give an O(mh∈Hph) algorithm for computing a strongly stable matching in the hospitals-residents problem, where ph is the quota of a hospital h. The previous best algorithm had running time O(m2).

References

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Irving, R. W., Manlove, D. F., and Scott, S. 2003. Strong stability in the hospitals/residents problem. In Proceedings of the Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2607. Springer Verlag, Berlin. 439--450.
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Kavitha, T., Mehlhorn, K., Michail, D., and Paluch, K. E. 2004. Strongly stable matchings in time O(nm) and extension to the hospitals-residents problem. In Proceedings of the Annual Symposium of Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2996. Springer Verlag, Berlin. 222--232.
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    cover image ACM Transactions on Algorithms
    ACM Transactions on Algorithms  Volume 3, Issue 2
    May 2007
    338 pages
    ISSN:1549-6325
    EISSN:1549-6333
    DOI:10.1145/1240233
    Issue’s Table of Contents

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    Association for Computing Machinery

    New York, NY, United States

    Publication History

    Published: 01 May 2007
    Published in TALG Volume 3, Issue 2

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    Author Tags

    1. Bipartite matching
    2. level maximal
    3. stable marriage
    4. strong stability

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    • (2022)Balancing stability and efficiency in team formation as a generalized roommate problemNaval Research Logistics (NRL)10.1002/nav.2208470:1(72-88)Online publication date: 8-Dec-2022
    • (2021)Pairwise Preferences in the Stable Marriage ProblemACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/34344279:1(1-28)Online publication date: 2-Jan-2021
    • (2021)Improving solution times for stable matching problems through preprocessingComputers & Operations Research10.1016/j.cor.2020.105128128(105128)Online publication date: Apr-2021
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    • (2019)Many-to-Many Stable Matchings with Ties, Master Preference Lists, and Matroid ConstraintsProceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3306127.3331743(583-591)Online publication date: 8-May-2019
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