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Redesigning the Israeli Medical Internship Match

Authors:

Slava Bronfman,

Avinatan Hassidim,

Assaf RommAuthors Info & Claims

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), Volume 6, Issue 3-4

Article No.: 21, Pages 1 - 18

https://doi.org/10.1145/3274646

Published: 24 September 2018 Publication History

Abstract

The final step in getting an Israeli MD is performing a year-long internship in one of the hospitals in Israel. Internships are decided upon by a lottery, which is known as the Internship Lottery. In 2014, we redesigned the lottery, replacing it with a more efficient one. This article presents the market, the redesign process, and the new mechanism that is now in use. In this article, we describe the redesign and focus on two-body problems that we faced in the new mechanism. Specifically, we show that decomposing stochastic assignment matrices to deterministic allocations is NP-hard in the presence of couples, and present a polynomial-time algorithm with the optimal worst case guarantee. We also study the performance of our algorithm on real-world and simulated data.

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Slava Bronfman, Avinatan Hassidim, Arnon Afek, Assaf Romm, Rony Sherberk, Ayal Hassidim, and Anda Massler. 2015. Assigning Israeli medical graduates to internships. Israel Journal of Health Policy Research (2015).

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Cited By

Sonmez TÜnver M(2024)Matching under Non-transferable Utility: ApplicationsSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.4796721Online publication date: 2024
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4796721
Feizi M(2024)Notions of Rank Efficiency for the Random Assignment ProblemJournal of Public Economic Theory10.1111/jpet.7000826:6Online publication date: 20-Nov-2024
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70008
Demeulemeester TGoossens DHermans BLeus R(2023)A pessimist’s approach to one-sided matchingEuropean Journal of Operational Research10.1016/j.ejor.2022.07.013305:3(1087-1099)Online publication date: Mar-2023
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2022.07.013
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

Redesigning the Israeli Medical Internship Match
1. Theory of computation
  1. Design and analysis of algorithms
    1. Approximation algorithms analysis
  2. Theory and algorithms for application domains
    1. Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
      1. Algorithmic mechanism design

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Information

Published In

cover image ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Volume 6, Issue 3-4

Special Issue on EC'15

November 2018

249 pages

ISSN:2167-8375

EISSN:2167-8383

DOI:10.1145/3281297

Editors:
David Pennock
Microsoft
,
Ilya Segal
Stanford University

Issue’s Table of Contents

Copyright © 2018 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 24 September 2018

Accepted: 01 March 2018

Revised: 01 January 2018

Received: 01 March 2016

Published in TEAC Volume 6, Issue 3-4

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ISF
Falk Institute
Israel Binational Science Foundation (BSF), Jerusalem, Israel
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Cited By

Sonmez TÜnver M(2024)Matching under Non-transferable Utility: ApplicationsSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.4796721Online publication date: 2024
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4796721
Feizi M(2024)Notions of Rank Efficiency for the Random Assignment ProblemJournal of Public Economic Theory10.1111/jpet.7000826:6Online publication date: 20-Nov-2024
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70008
Demeulemeester TGoossens DHermans BLeus R(2023)A pessimist’s approach to one-sided matchingEuropean Journal of Operational Research10.1016/j.ejor.2022.07.013305:3(1087-1099)Online publication date: Mar-2023
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2022.07.013
Bavly GHeller YSchreiber A(2022)Social welfare in search games with asymmetric informationJournal of Economic Theory10.1016/j.jet.2022.105462202(105462)Online publication date: Jun-2022
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105462
Caragiannis IFilos-Ratsikas AKanellopoulos PVaish R(2020)Stable Fractional MatchingsArtificial Intelligence10.1016/j.artint.2020.103416(103416)Online publication date: Nov-2020
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2020.103416
Bavly GHeller YSchreiber A(undefined)Social Welfare in Search Games with Asymmetric InformationSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.3545184
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3545184

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