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Aggregate Wind Power Production via Coalitional Games and Optimal Control

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Abstract

In this paper, benefits from aggregating independent wind power producers are analyzed in a scenario, in which the producers willingly form coalitions to increase their expected profits. For every deviation from the declared contract, the coalition is penalized and a cost is paid, if the producers want to update their contract. The underlying idea is that coalitions reduce the risk of being penalized. The main contribution of this paper is a new market model and an allocation mechanism based on optimal control and coalitional games with transferable utilities. Optimal control is used to obtain the optimal contract size, while coalitional games provide an insight on stable revenue allocations, namely allocations, that make the grand coalition preferable to all producers.

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Acknowledgements

The work of D. Bauso was supported in part by Innovate UK under the Grant “ADvanced multi-Energy management and oPTimisation time shifting platform (ADEPT),” Project Reference: 103910.

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Correspondence to Dario Bauso.

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Communicated by Kyriakos G. Vamvoudakis.

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Eiyike, J., Bauso, D. Aggregate Wind Power Production via Coalitional Games and Optimal Control. J Optim Theory Appl 178, 289–303 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-018-1282-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-018-1282-9

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