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10th ACM-EC 2009: Stanford, California, USA
- John Chuang, Lance Fortnow, Pearl Pu:
Proceedings 10th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2009), Stanford, California, USA, July 6--10, 2009. ACM 2009, ISBN 978-1-60558-458-4
Session 1
- Vahab S. Mirrokni, Alexander Skopalik:
On the complexity of nash dynamics and sink equilibria. 1-10 - Tomasz P. Michalak
, Talal Rahwan
On representing coalitional games with externalities. 11-20 - Hervé Moulin:
Pricing traffic in a spanning network. 21-30 - Felix A. Fischer, Ariel D. Procaccia, Alex Samorodnitsky:
A new perspective on implementation by voting trees. 31-40
Session 2
- Nikhil R. Devanur, Jason D. Hartline:
Limited and online supply and the bayesian foundations of prior-free mechanism design. 41-50 - David Robert Martin Thompson, Kevin Leyton-Brown
Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions. 51-60 - Moshe Babaioff, Jason D. Hartline, Robert D. Kleinberg:
Selling ad campaigns: online algorithms with cancellations. 61-70 - Nikhil R. Devanur, Thomas P. Hayes:
The adwords problem: online keyword matching with budgeted bidders under random permutations. 71-78
Session 3
- Moshe Babaioff, Yogeshwer Sharma, Aleksandrs Slivkins:
Characterizing truthful multi-armed bandit mechanisms: extended abstract. 79-88 - Florin Constantin, David C. Parkes:
Self-correcting sampling-based dynamic multi-unit auctions. 89-98 - Nikhil R. Devanur, Sham M. Kakade:
The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions. 99-106 - Renato D. Gomes, Kane S. Sweeney:
Bayes-nash equilibria of the generalized second price auction. 107-108
Session 4
- Nicolas S. Lambert, Yoav Shoham:
Eliciting truthful answers to multiple-choice questions. 109-118 - Dominic DiPalantino, Milan Vojnovic:
Crowdsourcing and all-pay auctions. 119-128 - Shaili Jain, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes:
Designing incentives for online question and answer forums. 129-138 - Jiaqian Zheng, Xiaoyuan Wu, Junyu Niu, Alvaro Bolivar:
Substitutes or complements: another step forward in recommendations. 139-146
Session 5
- Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre
Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification. 147-156 - David M. Rahman:
But who will monitor the monitor? 157-158 - Tanmoy Chakraborty, Michael J. Kearns, Sanjeev Khanna:
Network bargaining: algorithms and structural results. 159-168 - Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms. 169-176
Session 6
- Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Approximate mechanism design without money. 177-186 - Saeed Alaei
On random sampling auctions for digital goods. 187-196 - Paul Harrenstein, Mathijs de Weerdt
A qualitative vickrey auction. 197-206 - Geoffroy de Clippel, Victor Naroditskiy, Amy Greenwald
Destroy to save. 207-214
Session 7
- Bobji Mungamuru, Hector Garcia-Molina:
Managing the quality of CPC traffic. 215-224 - Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden:
Simple versus optimal mechanisms. 225-234 - Gagan Aggarwal, Gagan Goel, Aranyak Mehta:
Efficiency of (revenue-)optimal mechanisms. 235-242 - Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan:
Revenue submodularity. 243-252
Session 8
- Michael Ostrovsky
Information aggregation in dynamic markets with strategic traders. 253-254 - Shipra Agrawal, Erick Delage, Mark Peters, Zizhuo Wang
A unified framework for dynamic pari-mutuel information market design. 255-264 - Sharad Goel, Daniel M. Reeves, David M. Pennock:
Collective revelation: a mechanism for self-verified, weighted, and truthful predictions. 265-274 - Nikolay Archak, Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis
Modeling volatility in prediction markets. 275-284
Session 9
- Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Yishay Mansour:
The price of uncertainty. 285-294 - Haoqi Zhang, David C. Parkes, Yiling Chen:
Policy teaching through reward function learning. 295-304 - Shuchi Chawla, Feng Niu:
The price of anarchy in bertrand games. 305-314 - Milan Bradonjic, Gunes Ercal-Ozkaya, Adam Meyerson, Alan Roytman:
On the price of mediation. 315-324
Session 10
- Eytan Bakshy, Brian Karrer, Lada A. Adamic:
Social influence and the diffusion of user-created content. 325-334 - Ning Chen, Arpita Ghosh, Nicolas S. Lambert:
Social lending. 335-344 - Paul Resnick, Rahul Sami:
Sybilproof transitive trust protocols. 345-354 - Oren Ben-Zwi, Danny Hermelin
An exact almost optimal algorithm for target set selection in social networks. 355-362
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