default search action
Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 66
Volume 66, Number 1, May 2009
- Daron Acemoglu, Kostas Bimpikis, Asuman E. Ozdaglar:
Price and capacity competition. 1-26 - Han Bleichrodt, Kirsten I. M. Rohde
, Peter P. Wakker:
Non-hyperbolic time inconsistency. 27-38 - Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta:
Communication networks with endogenous link strength. 39-56 - Marco Dall'Aglio
Disputed lands. 57-77 - Kfir Eliaz, Ran Spiegler:
Bargaining over bets. 78-97 - Glenn Ellison, Drew Fudenberg, Lorens A. Imhof:
Random matching in adaptive dynamics. 98-114 - Amir Epstein, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour:
Efficient graph topologies in network routing games. 115-125 - János Flesch, Andrés Perea:
Repeated games with voluntary information purchase. 126-145 - Qiang Fu, Jingfeng Lu:
The beauty of "bigness": On optimal design of multi-winner contests. 146-161 - Alex Gershkov, Motty Perry:
Tournaments with midterm reviews. 162-190 - Ziv Gorodeisky:
Deterministic approximation of best-response dynamics for the Matching Pennies game. 191-201 - Veronika Grimm, Friederike Mengel
Cooperation in viscous populations - Experimental evidence. 202-220 - John H. Kagel, Dan Levin:
Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents. 221-237 - Toshiji Kawagoe, Hirokazu Takizawa:
Equilibrium refinement vs. level-k analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information. 238-255 - Kai A. Konrad, Dan Kovenock:
Multi-battle contests. 256-274 - Stefan Krasa, Mattias Polborn
Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting? 275-291 - Barton L. Lipman, Ruqu Wang:
Switching costs in infinitely repeated games. 292-314 - Shie Mannor
Approachability in repeated games: Computational aspects and a Stackelberg variant. 315-325 - Debasis Mishra, David C. Parkes:
Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions. 326-347 - John Morgan, Henrik Orzen, Martin Sefton
Network architecture and traffic flows: Experiments on the Pigou-Knight-Downs and Braess Paradoxes. 348-372 - Wieland Müller
Oligopoly limit-pricing in the lab. 373-393 - William S. Neilson
A theory of kindness, reluctance, and shame for social preferences. 394-403 - Abraham Neyman, Daijiro Okada:
Growth of strategy sets, entropy, and nonstationary bounded recall. 404-425 - Irit Nowik:
The game motoneurons play. 426-461 - Frank H. Page Jr., Myrna Holtz Wooders:
Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games. 462-487 - Ludovic Renou
Commitment games. 488-505 - Matthias Sutter
Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments - An experimental study. 506-525 - Guoqiang Tian:
Implementation in economies with non-convex production technologies unknown to the designer. 526-545 - Özgür Yilmaz:
Random assignment under weak preferences. 546-558
- László Á. Kóczy
Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities. 559-565 - Matteo Triossi
Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability. 566-575
Volume 66, Number 2, July 2009
- Joel Sobel
In memoriam: David Gale (1921-2008). 581 - Alan Weinstein, Harold Kuhn, Leo A. Goodman, Dan McFadden, Joel Sobel, Ilan Adler, Jacob Feldman, Ahmet Alkan, Katharine Gale, Elizabeth Dunning, Samara Watkiss, Roger Gilbert, Jonathan Birt, Graham Ingham, Sandra M. Gilbert:
The Berkeley Memorial. 582-593 - Michel Balinski, Rida Laraki, Sylvain Sorin:
David Gale in Paris. 594-597 - Elwyn R. Berlekamp:
The Galetron. 598 - William A. "Buz" Brock:
More Gale Tales. 599 - Martin Davis:
Sex and the mathematician: The High School Prom Theorem. 600 - Gabrielle Demange:
David in Paris. 601-602 - Monique Florenzano:
Two lemmas that changed general equilibrium theory. 603-605 - Richard M. Karp:
My memories of David Gale. 606 - Mukul Majumdar:
Equilibrium and optimality: Some imprints of David Gale. 607-626 - John F. Nash Jr.:
Gale at Princeton. 627 - Robert Osserman:
Remembering David Gale. 628-629 - Herbert E. Scarf:
My introduction to top-trading cycles. 630-631 - Joel Sobel
ReGale: Some memorable results. 632-642 - Marilda Sotomayor:
My encounters with David Gale. 643-646 - David Gale:
Topological games at Princeton, a mathematical memoir. 647-656
- Moshe Babaioff, Noam Nisan, Elan Pavlov:
Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market. 660-684 - Dan Bernhardt, Larissa Campuzano, Francesco Squintani
On the benefits of party competition. 685-707 - Venkataraman Bhaskar:
Commitment and observability in a contracting environment. 708-720 - Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta:
Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations. 721-728 - Andreas Blume, Paul Heidhues, Jonathan Lafky, Johannes Münster, Meixia Zhang:
All equilibria of the multi-unit Vickrey auction. 729-741 - Pedro Calleja
The aggregate-monotonic core. 742-748 - Guilherme Carmona
Existence of equilibrium in common agency games with adverse selection. 749-760 - John P. Conley, William S. Neilson
Endogenous games and equilibrium adoption of social norms and ethical constraints. 761-774 - Francesco De Sinopoli, Carlos Pimienta
Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games. 775-784 - John Duffy
Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction. 785-812 - Daniel Friedman, Nirvikar Singh:
Equilibrium vengeance. 813-829 - Julian Jamison, Dean S. Karlan
When curiosity kills the profits: An experimental examination. 830-840 - Ayça Kaya
Repeated signaling games. 841-854 - Claudio Mezzetti
Auctions in which losers set the price. 855-864 - Thomas W. L. Norman:
Rapid evolution under inertia. 865-879 - Selçuk Özyurt
A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions. 880-892 - Pierre Picard:
Costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets. 893-919 - Carlos Pimienta
Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games. 920-927 - Carolyn Pitchik:
Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information. 928-949 - Arkadi Predtetchinski
A general structure theorem for the Nash equilibrium correspondence. 950-958 - Michael T. Rauh:
Strategic complementarities and search market equilibrium. 959-978 - Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan
Informational externalities and emergence of consensus. 979-994 - Ehud Lehrer, Eilon Solan
Approachability with bounded memory. 995-1004
manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.
last updated on 2024-12-19 22:03 CET by the dblp team
all metadata released as open data under CC0 1.0 license
see also: Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Imprint
dblp was originally created in 1993 at:
since 2018, dblp has been operated and maintained by:
the dblp computer science bibliography is funded and supported by: