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Mathematical Social Sciences, Volume 101
Volume 101, September 2019
- Jong Jae Lee:
Common certainty and efficiency with incomplete information. 1-5 - Ethem Akyol:
Effects of resale in second-price auctions with private participation costs. 6-19 - Maurice Koster, Tim J. Boonen:
Constrained stochastic cost allocation. 20-30 - Umut Mert Dur:
The modified Boston mechanism. 31-40 - R. Vijay Krishna, Philipp Sadowski:
Preferences with taste shock representations: Price volatility and the liquidity premium. 41-46 - Yoshifumi Hino:
An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization. 47-53 - Ádám Galambos:
Descriptive complexity and revealed preference theory. 54-64 - Francis Edward Su, Shira Zerbib:
Piercing numbers in approval voting. 65-71 - Dezso Bednay, Anna Moskalenko, Attila Tasnádi:
Dictatorship versus manipulability. 72-76 - Yuta Nakamura:
Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains. 77-87 - Oumar Mbodji, A. Nguyen-Huu, Traian A. Pirvu:
Optimal sharing rule for a household with a portfolio management problem. 88-98 - Van Kolpin:
Apolitical SALT-free Tax Equilibria. 99-103 - Jiarui Gan, Warut Suksompong, Alexandros A. Voudouris:
Envy-freeness in house allocation problems. 104-106 - Dominik Karos, Shiran Rachmilevitch:
The midpoint-constrained egalitarian bargaining solution. 107-112 - W. Henry Chiu:
Comparative statics in an ordinal theory of choice under risk. 113-123 - Makoto Hagiwara:
Double implementation without no-veto-power. 124-130
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