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Mathematical Social Sciences, Volume 64
Volume 64, Number 1, July 2012
- Felix Brandt, William S. Zwicker:
Special Issue on Computational Foundations of Social Choice. 1 - Olivier Hudry:
On the computation of median linear orders, of median complete preorders and of median weak orders. 2-10 - Davide P. Cervone, Ronghua Dai, Daniel Gnoutcheff, Grant Lanterman, Andrew Mackenzie, Ari Morse, Nikhil Srivastava, William S. Zwicker:
Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings. 11-27 - Alnur Ali, Marina Meila:
Experiments with Kemeny ranking: What works when? 28-40 - Frederik Herzberg, Daniel Eckert:
The model-theoretic approach to aggregation: Impossibility results for finite and infinite electorates. 41-47 - Christian Klamler, Ulrich Pferschy, Stefan Ruzika:
Committee selection under weight constraints. 48-56 - Mostapha Diss, Ahmed Louichi, Vincent Merlin, Hatem Smaoui:
An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: The stability of scoring rules. 57-66 - Fuad Aleskerov, Daniel Karabekyan, M. Remzi Sanver, Vyacheslav Yakuba:
On the manipulability of voting rules: The case of 4 and 5 alternatives. 67-73 - Yann Chevaleyre, Jérôme Lang, Nicolas Maudet, Jérôme Monnot, Lirong Xia:
New candidates welcome! Possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates. 74-88 - Josep Freixas:
Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention. 89-99 - Vincent Conitzer:
Should social network structure be taken into account in elections? 100-102
Volume 64, Number 2, September 2012
- Francis Bloch, Sudipta Sarangi:
Bargaining, Evolution and Networks: A Special Issue in Honor of Hans Haller. v-vi - Bram Driesen, Andrés Perea, Hans Peters:
Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion. 103-118 - Adam Dominiak, Jürgen Eichberger, Jean-Philippe Lefort:
Agreeable trade with optimism and pessimism. 119-126 - Edwin Lohmann, Peter Borm, P. Jean-Jacques Herings:
Minimal exact balancedness. 127-135 - Youngsub Chun, Joosung Lee:
Sequential contributions rules for minimum cost spanning tree problems. 136-143 - Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal:
Weighted component fairness for forest games. 144-151 - Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard, Sudipta Sarangi:
Existence of Nash networks and partner heterogeneity. 152-158 - Robert P. Gilles, Subhadip Chakrabarti, Sudipta Sarangi:
Nash equilibria of network formation games under consent. 159-165 - Hans Haller:
Network extension. 166-172 - Hans Gersbach, Maik T. Schneider:
Tax contracts, party bargaining, and government formation. 173-192 - Yannis M. Ioannides:
Complexity and organizational architecture. 193-202
Volume 64, Number 3, November 2012
- Michael P. Atkinson, Moshe Kress, Roberto Szechtman:
Carrots, sticks and fog during insurgencies. 203-213 - Juan J. Vidal-Puga:
The Harsanyi paradox and the "right to talk" in bargaining among coalitions. 214-224 - Kazuo Mino, Yasuhiro Nakamoto:
Consumption externalities and equilibrium dynamics with heterogeneous agents. 225-233 - Taketo Kawagishi:
Endogenous time preference, investment externalities, and equilibrium indeterminacy. 234-241 - Tsogbadral Galaabaatar, Edi Karni:
Expected multi-utility representations. 242-246 - Stefan Napel, Andreas Nohn, José María Alonso-Meijide:
Monotonicity of power in weighted voting games with restricted communication. 247-257 - Walter Bossert, Kotaro Suzumura:
Product filters, acyclicity and Suzumura consistency. 258-262 - Donald E. Campbell, Jack E. Graver, Jerry S. Kelly:
There are more strategy-proof procedures than you think. 263-265 - Anne van den Nouweland, Marco Slikker:
An axiomatic characterization of the position value for network situations. 266-271 - Holger Strulik:
The voracity effect revisited. 272-276 - Joseph E. Harrington Jr., Wei Zhao:
Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma. 277-289
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