default search action
Rica Gonen
Person information
Refine list
refinements active!
zoomed in on ?? of ?? records
view refined list in
export refined list as
2020 – today
- 2024
- [j14]C. Brady, Rica Gonen
, G. Rabinovich:
Deep Reinforcement Learning and Influenced Games. IEEE Access 12: 114086-114099 (2024) - 2023
- [j13]Dvir Gilor, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets. Artif. Intell. 325: 104022 (2023) - [j12]Piotr Faliszewski, Rica Gonen, Martin Koutecký, Nimrod Talmon:
Correction to: Opinion diffusion and campaigning on society graphs. J. Log. Comput. 33(3): 706 (2023) - [c28]Rica Gonen
Heuristics for Opinion Diffusion via Local Elections. SOFSEM 2023: 144-158 - 2022
- [j11]Piotr Faliszewski
Opinion diffusion and campaigning on society graphs. J. Log. Comput. 32(6): 1162-1194 (2022) - 2021
- [j10]Itay Shtechman
Fair cake-cutting algorithms with real land-value data. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 35(2): 39 (2021) - [j9]Dvir Gilor, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets. Artif. Intell. 300: 103548 (2021) - [c27]Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi:
A Global Multi-Sided Market with Ascending-Price Mechanism. AAMAS 2021: 1515-1517 - [c26]Dvir Gilor
Ascending-Price Mechanism for General Multi-sided Markets. EUMAS 2021: 1-18 - 2020
- [j8]Rica Gonen, Ozi Egri:
COMBIMA: truthful, budget maintaining, dynamic combinatorial market. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 34(1): 14 (2020) - [c25]Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Strongly Budget Balanced Auctions for Multi-Sided Markets. AAAI 2020: 1998-2005 - [c24]Itay Shtechman, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Fair Cake-Cutting Algorithms with Real Land-Value Data. AAMAS 2020: 2005-2007 - [c23]Rica Gonen, Ozi Egri:
COMBIMA: Truthful, Budget Maintaining, Dynamic Combinatorial Market. AAMAS 2020: 2140-2142 - [i6]Piotr Faliszewski, Rica Gonen, Martin Koutecký, Nimrod Talmon:
Opinion Diffusion and Campaigning on Society Graphs. CoRR abs/2010.00651 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [c22]Rica Gonen, Anat Lerner
Towards Characterizing the Deterministic Combinatorial Constrained Efficient Space. ADT 2019: 32-48 - [i5]Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Strongly Budget Balanced Auctions for Multi-Sided Markets. CoRR abs/1911.08094 (2019) - 2018
- [c21]Rica Gonen, Ozi Egri:
Two-Sided Markets: Mapping Social Welfare to Gain from Trade. EUMAS 2018: 109-126 - [c20]Moran Feldman
Multi-sided Advertising Markets: Dynamic Mechanisms and Incremental User Compensations. GameSec 2018: 227-247 - [c19]Piotr Faliszewski
Opinion Diffusion and Campaigning on Society Graphs. IJCAI 2018: 219-225 - [c18]Moran Feldman
Removal and Threshold Pricing: Truthful Two-Sided Markets with Multi-dimensional Participants. SAGT 2018: 163-175 - 2017
- [j7]Rica Gonen, Anat Lerner
Characterizing incentive compatible, Pareto optimal and sufficiently anonymous constrained combinatorial mechanisms - Two players case. Comput. 6(2): 183-208 (2017) - [c17]Rica Gonen, Ozi Egri:
DYCOM: A Dynamic Truthful Budget Balanced Double-sided Combinatorial Market. AAMAS 2017: 1556-1558 - [c16]Rica Gonen:
Databroker System: A New Online Advertising System That Keeps Users Engaged While Preserving Their Privacy. AAMAS 2017: 1787-1789 - 2016
- [j6]Anat Lerner
Efficient Constrained Combinatorial Auctions. IGTR 18(3): 1650007:1-1650007:10 (2016) - [c15]Rica Gonen, Tamir Tassa:
Privacy Preserving Computations for Viral Marketing: The Case of Rational Players. ARES 2016: 677-686 - [i4]Moran Feldman, Rica Gonen:
Markets with Strategic Multi-minded Mediators. CoRR abs/1603.08717 (2016) - [i3]Moran Feldman, Rica Gonen:
Online Truthful Mechanisms for Multi-sided Markets. CoRR abs/1604.04859 (2016) - 2015
- [j5]Niv Buchbinder
Incentive Compatible Mulit-Unit Combinatorial Auctions: A Primal Dual Approach. Algorithmica 72(1): 167-190 (2015) - [j4]Anat Lerner
Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions. IGTR 17(4): 1550010:1-1550010:25 (2015) - 2014
- [j3]Anat Lerner
Characterizing the Incentive Compatible and Pareto Optimal Efficiency Space for Two Players, k Items, Public Budget and Quasilinear Utilities. Games 5(2): 97-115 (2014) - 2013
- [j2]Rica Gonen, Anat Lerner
The Incompatibility of Pareto Optimality and Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatibility in Sufficiently-Anonymous Budget-Constrained Quasilinear Settings. Games 4(4): 690-710 (2013) - 2010
- [j1]Yiling Chen, Stanko Dimitrov
Gaming Prediction Markets: Equilibrium Strategies with a Market Maker. Algorithmica 58(4): 930-969 (2010) - [c14]Nitza Geri, Rica Gonen:
Managing Heterogeneity in Search-advertisers' Objectives. MCIS 2010: 37
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [c13]Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov:
Adaptive Incentive-Compatible Sponsored Search Auction. SOFSEM 2009: 303-316 - 2008
- [c12]Rica Gonen:
On the Hardness of Truthful Online Auctions with Multidimensional Constraints. CiE 2008: 221-230 - [c11]Rica Gonen, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
Sponsored Search Auctions with Reserve Prices: Going Beyond Separability. WINE 2008: 597-608 - 2007
- [c10]Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov:
An incentive-compatible multi-armed bandit mechanism. PODC 2007: 362-363 - [c9]Mira Gonen, Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov:
Generalized trade reduction mechanisms. EC 2007: 20-29 - [c8]Yiling Chen, Daniel M. Reeves, David M. Pennock, Robin D. Hanson, Lance Fortnow, Rica Gonen:
Bluffing and Strategic Reticence in Prediction Markets. WINE 2007: 70-81 - [c7]Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov:
An Adaptive Sponsored Search Mechanism delta -Gain Truthful in Valuation, Time, and Budget. WINE 2007: 341-346 - [c6]Mira Gonen, Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov:
Characterizing Truthful Market Design. WINE 2007: 590-595 - 2006
- [c5]Ittai Abraham, Danny Dolev, Rica Gonen, Joseph Y. Halpern:
Distributed computing meets game theory: robust mechanisms for rational secret sharing and multiparty computation. PODC 2006: 53-62 - 2005
- [b1]Rica Gonen:
Non-VCG schemes and coalition resistant mechanisms (סכימות שאינן VCG ומכניזמים חסיניי קואליציות.). Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, 2005 - 2004
- [c4]Rica Gonen:
Negotiation-Range Mechanisms: Coalition-Resistant Markets. ESA 2004: 383-394 - [c3]Yair Bartal, Rica Gonen, Pierfrancesco La Mura
Negotiation-range mechanisms: exploring the limits of truthful efficient markets. EC 2004: 1-8 - 2003
- [c2]Yair Bartal, Rica Gonen, Noam Nisan
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions. TARK 2003: 72-87 - 2002
- [i2]Rica Gonen, Daniel Lehmann:
Linear Programming helps solving large multi-unit combinatorial auctions. CoRR cs.GT/0202016 (2002) - [i1]Rica Gonen, Daniel Lehmann:
Optimal Solutions for Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions: Branch and Bound Heuristics. CoRR cs.GT/0202032 (2002) - 2000
- [c1]Rica Gonen, Daniel Lehmann:
Optimal solutions for multi-unit combinatorial auctions: branch and bound heuristics. EC 2000: 13-20
Coauthor Index
manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.
Unpaywalled article links
Add open access links from to the list of external document links (if available).
Privacy notice: By enabling the option above, your browser will contact the API of unpaywall.org to load hyperlinks to open access articles. Although we do not have any reason to believe that your call will be tracked, we do not have any control over how the remote server uses your data. So please proceed with care and consider checking the Unpaywall privacy policy.
Archived links via Wayback Machine
For web page which are no longer available, try to retrieve content from the of the Internet Archive (if available).
Privacy notice: By enabling the option above, your browser will contact the API of archive.org to check for archived content of web pages that are no longer available. Although we do not have any reason to believe that your call will be tracked, we do not have any control over how the remote server uses your data. So please proceed with care and consider checking the Internet Archive privacy policy.
Reference lists
Add a list of references from ,
, and
to record detail pages.
load references from crossref.org and opencitations.net
Privacy notice: By enabling the option above, your browser will contact the APIs of crossref.org, opencitations.net, and semanticscholar.org to load article reference information. Although we do not have any reason to believe that your call will be tracked, we do not have any control over how the remote server uses your data. So please proceed with care and consider checking the Crossref privacy policy and the OpenCitations privacy policy, as well as the AI2 Privacy Policy covering Semantic Scholar.
Citation data
Add a list of citing articles from and
to record detail pages.
load citations from opencitations.net
Privacy notice: By enabling the option above, your browser will contact the API of opencitations.net and semanticscholar.org to load citation information. Although we do not have any reason to believe that your call will be tracked, we do not have any control over how the remote server uses your data. So please proceed with care and consider checking the OpenCitations privacy policy as well as the AI2 Privacy Policy covering Semantic Scholar.
OpenAlex data
Load additional information about publications from .
Privacy notice: By enabling the option above, your browser will contact the API of openalex.org to load additional information. Although we do not have any reason to believe that your call will be tracked, we do not have any control over how the remote server uses your data. So please proceed with care and consider checking the information given by OpenAlex.
last updated on 2024-09-10 01:12 CEST by the dblp team
all metadata released as open data under CC0 1.0 license
see also: Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Imprint
dblp was originally created in 1993 at:
since 2018, dblp has been operated and maintained by:
the dblp computer science bibliography is funded and supported by: