default search action
19th ACM-EC 2018: Ithaca, NY, USA
- Éva Tardos, Edith Elkind, Rakesh Vohra:
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Ithaca, NY, USA, June 18-22, 2018. ACM 2018
Invited talk
- Sendhil Mullainathan:
Algorithmic Fairness and the Social Welfare Function. 1
1a: Sharing Economy
- Alice Lu, Peter I. Frazier, Oren Kislev:
Surge Pricing Moves Uber's Driver-Partners. 3 - Kyle Barron, Edward Kung, Davide Proserpio:
The Sharing Economy and Housing Affordability: Evidence from Airbnb. 5 - Brett Hollenbeck
, Sridhar Moorthy, Davide Proserpio:
Advertising Strategy in the Presence of Reviews: An Empirical Analysis. 7
1b: Information Acquisition I
- Yiling Chen, Chara Podimata, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah:
Strategyproof Linear Regression in High Dimensions. 9-26 - Yiling Chen, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Juba Ziani:
Optimal Data Acquisition for Statistical Estimation. 27-44 - Annie Liang, Xiaosheng Mu, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Optimal and Myopic Information Acquisition. 45-46
2a: Social Choice and Pricing
- Martin Lackner
Consistent Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules. 47-48 - Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes:
Social Choice with Non Quasi-linear Utilities. 49 - Ian A. Kash, Peter B. Key, Spyros I. Zoumpoulis:
Optimal Pricing and Introduction Timing of New Virtual Machines. 51-52
2b: Information Acquisition II
- Pathikrit Basu, Federico Echenique:
Learnability and Models of Decision Making under Uncertainty. 53 - Jinshuo Dong, Aaron Roth
Strategic Classification from Revealed Preferences. 55-70 - Annie Liang, Xiaosheng Mu:
Overabundant Information and Learning Traps. 71-72
3a: Combinatorial Auctions
- Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren:
Combinatorial Auctions with Endowment Effect. 73-90 - Max Dupré la Tour, Adrian Vetta:
The Combinatorial Clock Auction: the Effects of Strategic Behaviour and the Price Increment Rule on Social Welfare. 91-108 - Benedikt Bünz, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken:
Designing Core-selecting Payment Rules: A Computational Search Approach. 109 - Jason D. Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Reza Khani, Brendan Lucier, Rad Niazadeh
Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions. 111-112
3b: Equilibrium Computation
- Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen
Computational Complexity of Proper Equilibrium. 113-130 - Yasushi Kawase, Yutaro Yamaguchi, Yu Yokoi:
Computing a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of a Sequential Matching Game. 131-148 - Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen
The Big Match with a Clock and a Bit of Memory. 149-150 - Jakub Cerný, Branislav Bosanský, Christopher Kiekintveld:
Incremental Strategy Generation for Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games. 151-168
4a: Mechanism Design I
- Vahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Non-clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design. 169 - Shipra Agrawal, Constantinos Daskalakis, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Balasubramanian Sivan:
Robust Repeated Auctions under Heterogeneous Buyer Behavior. 171 - Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
A General Theory of Sample Complexity for Multi-Item Profit Maximization. 173-174 - Moshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Yishay Mansour, Shay Moran:
Are Two (Samples) Really Better Than One? 175
4b: Information Acquisition and Rationality
- Yuqing Kong, Grant Schoenebeck
Water from Two Rocks: Maximizing the Mutual Information. 177-194 - Yuqing Kong, Grant Schoenebeck
Eliciting Expertise without Verification. 195-212 - Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky:
The One-Shot Crowdfunding Game. 213-214 - Elissa M. Redmiles, Michelle L. Mazurek, John P. Dickerson:
Dancing Pigs or Externalities?: Measuring the Rationality of Security Decisions. 215-232
Invited Talk
- Eric Budish
Keynote Talk: High-Frequency Trading and the Design of Financial Exchanges: Will the Market Fix the Market? 233-234
5a: Matching
- Soheil Behnezhad, Nima Reyhani:
Almost Optimal Stochastic Weighted Matching with Few Queries. 235-249 - Umut Mert Dur
First-Choice Maximal and First-Choice Stable School Choice Mechanisms. 251-268 - Jiehua Chen, Rolf Niedermeier, Piotr Skowron
Stable Marriage with Multi-Modal Preferences. 269-286
5b: Prophet Inequalities
- Jon M. Kleinberg, Robert Kleinberg
Delegated Search Approximates Efficient Search. 287-302 - Yossi Azar, Ashish Chiplunkar, Haim Kaplan:
Prophet Secretary: Surpassing the 1-1/e Barrier. 303-318 - Tomer Ezra
Prophets and Secretaries with Overbooking. 319-320
6a: Equilibrium Dynamics
- James P. Bailey, Georgios Piliouras:
Multiplicative Weights Update in Zero-Sum Games. 321-338 - Tung Mai, Milena Mihail, Ioannis Panageas, Will Ratcliff, Vijay V. Vazirani, Peter Yunker
Cycles in Zero-Sum Differential Games and Biological Diversity. 339-350 - Yun Kuen Cheung, Richard Cole, Yixin Tao:
Dynamics of Distributed Updating in Fisher Markets. 351-368
6b: Mechanism Design II
- Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner
Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing. 369 - Mohammad Akbarpour, Shengwu Li:
Credible Mechanisms. 371 - Moshe Babaioff, Yang Cai
The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Trade. 373
7a: Equilibrium Analysis
- José Correa, Cristóbal Guzmán, Thanasis Lianeas, Evdokia Nikolova, Marc Schröder
Network Pricing: How to Induce Optimal Flows Under Strategic Link Operators. 375-392 - Costas Busch, Rajgopal Kannan:
Polynomial Time Equilibria in Bottleneck Congestion Games. 393-409 - Soheil Behnezhad, Mahsa Derakhshan, Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Saeed Seddighin:
Spatio-Temporal Games Beyond One Dimension. 411-428
7b: Mechanism Design III
- Moshe Babaioff, Noam Nisan
Optimal Deterministic Mechanisms for an Additive Buyer. 429 - Shahar Dobzinski, Nitzan Uziely:
Revenue Loss in Shrinking Markets. 431-442 - Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Aviad Rubinstein:
99% Revenue via Enhanced Competition. 443-460
8a: Market Experiments
- Eduardo M. Azevedo, Alex Deng, Jose Luis Montiel Olea, Justin Rao, E. Glen Weyl:
The A/B Testing Problem. 461-462 - Imanol Arrieta Ibarra, Johan Ugander:
A Personalized BDM Mechanism for Efficient Market Intervention Experiments. 463-480 - Hyunjin Kim, Michael Luca:
The Costs of Entering through Tying: Experimental Evidence. 481-482 - Apostolos Filippas, John Joseph Horton, Joseph M. Golden:
Reputation Inflation. 483-484
8b: Mechanism Design IV
- Pingzhong Tang, Yulong Zeng:
The Price of Prior Dependence in Auctions. 485-502 - Amine Allouah, Omar Besbes
Prior-Independent Optimal Auctions. 503 - Zhe Feng, Chara Podimata, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Learning to Bid Without Knowing your Value. 505-522 - Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, Jon Schneider, S. Matthew Weinberg
Selling to a No-Regret Buyer. 523-538
9a: Fair Allocation
- Mohammad Ghodsi, Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Masoud Seddighin
Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods: Improvements and Generalizations. 539-556 - Siddharth Barman, Sanath Kumar Krishnamurthy, Rohit Vaish:
Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations. 557-574 - Brandon Fain, Kamesh Munagala
Fair Allocation of Indivisible Public Goods. 575-592 - Gerdus Benade, Aleksandr M. Kazachkov
How to Make Envy Vanish Over Time. 593-610
9b: Markets and Networks
- Piotr Dworczak, Scott Duke Kominers, Mohammad Akbarpour:
Redistribution through Markets. 611 - John R. Birge
Optimal Commissions and Subscriptions in Networked Markets. 613-614 - Tamás Fleiner, Ravi Jagadeesan, Zsuzsanna Jankó, Alexander Teytelboym:
Trading Networks with Frictions. 615 - John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, Alexander Westkamp:
Chain Stability in Trading Networks. 617-618
10a: Learning and Social Networks
- Jerry Anunrojwong
Naive Bayesian Learning in Social Networks. 619-636 - Krishna Dasaratha, Benjamin Golub, Nir Hak:
Bayesian Social Learning in a Dynamic Environment. 637 - Elchanan Mossel, Manuel Mueller-Frank, Allan Sly, Omer Tamuz:
Social Learning Equilibria. 639 - Mohammad Akbarpour, Suraj Malladi, Amin Saberi:
Diffusion, Seeding, and the Value of Network Information. 641
10b: Mechanism Design V
- Eric Balkanski, Renato Paes Leme:
On the Construction of Substitutes. 643 - Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Mohammad Reza Khani, Saeed Seddighin:
Frugal Auction Design for Set Systems: Vertex Cover and Knapsack. 645-662 - Ruggiero Cavallo, Maxim Sviridenko, Christopher A. Wilkens:
Matching Auctions for Search and Native Ads. 663-680 - Ioannis Caragiannis, Alexandros A. Voudouris
The Efficiency of Resource Allocation Mechanisms for Budget-Constrained Users. 681-698
manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.
last updated on 2024-12-31 21:32 CET by the dblp team
all metadata released as open data under CC0 1.0 license
see also: Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Imprint
dblp was originally created in 1993 at:
since 2018, dblp has been operated and maintained by:
the dblp computer science bibliography is funded and supported by: