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Financial Regulation. (1994). Litan, Robert ; Taylor, William ; Isaac, William .
In: NBER Chapters.
RePEc:nbr:nberch:7759.

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  2. The economic impact of merger control legislation. (2015). Ongena, Steven ; Carletti, Elena ; Hartmann, Philipp.
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  3. The role of time-critical liquidity in financial markets. (2013). Marshall, David ; Steigerwald, Robert .
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  4. The role of time-critical liquidity in financial markets. (2013). Steigerwald, Robert ; Marshall, David.
    In: Economic Perspectives.
    RePEc:fip:fedhep:y:2013:i:qii:p:30-46:n:v.37no.2.

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  5. International financial integration of Mediterranean economies : A bird’s-eye view. (2012). sabri, nidal ; Peeters, Marga.
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  6. Getting it Right: What to Reform in International Financial Markets. (2012). Hausmann, Ricardo ; Fernandez-Arias, Eduardo ; Fernandez -Arias, Eduardo .
    In: IDB Publications (Working Papers).
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  7. Building the Innovation Union: Lessons from the 2008 Financial Crisis. (2012). Nakamura, Masao.
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  8. The Economic Impact of Merger Control Legislation. (2012). Ongena, Steven ; CARLETTI, Elena HARTMANN .
    In: Economics Working Papers.
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  9. International Initiatives to Bring Stability to Financial Integration. (2011). Hausmann, Ricardo ; Fernandez-Arias, Eduardo ; Fernandez -Arias, Eduardo .
    In: IDB Publications (Working Papers).
    RePEc:idb:brikps:1304.

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  10. The Economic Impact of Merger Control Legislation. (2011). Ongena, Steven ; Carletti, Elena ; Hartmann, Philipp.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8447.

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  11. How to Avoid the Next Taxpayer Bailout of the Financial System: The Narrow Banking Proposal. (2009). Phillips, Ronnie ; Roselli, Alessandro .
    In: NFI Policy Briefs.
    RePEc:nfi:nfipbs:2009-pb-05.

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  12. The consolidation of financial market regulation : pros, cons, and implications for the United States. (2009). Walter, John ; Pellerin, Sabrina R. ; Wescott, Patricia E..
    In: Working Paper.
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  13. The consolidation of financial regulation: pros, cons, and implications for the United States. (2009). Walter, John R. ; Pellerin, Sabrina R. ; Wescott, Patricia E..
    In: Economic Quarterly.
    RePEc:fip:fedreq:y:2009:i:spr:p:121-160:n:v.95no.2.

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  14. The Economic Impact of Merger Control Legislation. (2008). Ongena, Steven ; Carletti, Elena ; Hartmann, P..
    In: Discussion Paper.
    RePEc:tiu:tiutil:32141353-cba1-4335-bf6c-0b393552af99.

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  15. The economic impact of merger control legislation. (2007). Carletti, Elena ; Onega, Steven ; Hartmann, Philipp.
    In: CFS Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:zbw:cfswop:200804.

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  16. The transition to market-based monetary policy: What can China learn from the European experience?. (2007). Oxelheim, Lars ; Forssbæck, Jens ; Forssbaeck, Jens .
    In: Journal of Asian Economics.
    RePEc:eee:asieco:v:18:y:2007:i:2:p:257-283.

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  17. Can financial innovation help to explain the reduced volatility of economic activity?. (2006). Sichel, Daniel ; Elmendorf, Douglas ; Dynan, Karen E..
    In: Journal of Monetary Economics.
    RePEc:eee:moneco:v:53:y:2006:i:1:p:123-150.

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  18. Architects of stability? International cooperation among financial supervisors. (2006). Kapstein, Ethan B.
    In: BIS Working Papers.
    RePEc:bis:biswps:199.

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  19. Electronic Safety and Soundness : Securing Finance in a New Age. (2004). Glaessner, Thomas C. ; McNevin, Valerie ; Kellermann, Tom.
    In: World Bank Publications.
    RePEc:wbk:wbpubs:15029.

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  20. The subordinated debt alternative to Basel II. (2004). Herring, Richard J..
    In: Journal of Financial Stability.
    RePEc:eee:finsta:v:1:y:2004:i:2:p:137-155.

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  21. Regulation and Competition in German Banking: An Assessment. (2003). Pfeil, Christian ; Fischer, Karl-Hermann .
    In: CFS Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:zbw:cfswop:200319.

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  22. An overall perspective on banking regulation. (2003). FREIXAS, XAVIER.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:upf:upfgen:664.

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  23. Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability. (2002). Quintyn, Marc ; Taylor, Michael W.
    In: IMF Working Papers.
    RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2002/046.

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  24. An overall perspective on banking regulation. (2002). FREIXAS, XAVIER ; Santomero, Anthony M..
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedpwp:02-1.

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  25. Umbaupläne und Reparaturarbeiten an der internationalen Finanzarchitektur: eine Zwischenbilanz aus deutscher Perspektive. (2001). Nunnenkamp, Peter.
    In: Kiel Working Papers.
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  26. Liquidity Shocks, Systemic Risk, and Market Collapse: Theory and Application to the Market for Perps. (2001). Fernando, Chitru S. ; Herring, Richard J..
    In: Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers.
    RePEc:wop:pennin:01-34.

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  27. Banking Regulation versus Securities Market Regulation. (2001). Allen, Franklin ; Herring, Richard.
    In: Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers.
    RePEc:wop:pennin:01-29.

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  28. What Is Optimal Financial Regulation?. (2000). Santomero, Anthony M. ; Herring, Richard J..
    In: Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers.
    RePEc:wop:pennin:00-34.

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  29. Financial Market Regulation: The Case of Italy and a Proposal for the Euro Area. (2000). Di Giorgio, Giorgio ; Di Noia, Carmine ; Piatti, Laura .
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  30. El rediseño de la arquitectura financiera internacional desde la perspectiva latinoamericana: ¿quién paga la cuenta?. (2000). Hausmann, Ricardo ; Fernandez-Arias, Eduardo ; Ricardo Hausmann Author-X-Name_First: Ricardo Auth, .
    In: Research Department Publications.
    RePEc:idb:wpaper:4246.

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  31. The Redesign of the International Financial Architecture from a Latin American Perspective: Who Pays the Bill?. (2000). Hausmann, Ricardo ; Fernandez-Arias, Eduardo ; Ricardo Hausmann Author-X-Name_First: Ricardo Auth, .
    In: Research Department Publications.
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  32. Cómo hacerlo bien: qué reformar en los mercados financieros internacionales. (2000). Hausmann, Ricardo ; Fernandez-Arias, Eduardo ; Ricardo Hausmann Author-X-Name_First: Ricardo Auth, .
    In: Research Department Publications.
    RePEc:idb:wpaper:4224.

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  33. Getting it Right: What to Reform in International Financial Markets. (2000). Hausmann, Ricardo ; Fernandez-Arias, Eduardo ; Ricardo Hausmann Author-X-Name_First: Ricardo Auth, .
    In: Research Department Publications.
    RePEc:idb:wpaper:4223.

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  34. Das European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee: Ein Beitrag zur Regulierungskultur in Europa. (2000). Schmidt, Reinhard ; Benink, Harald A..
    In: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik.
    RePEc:bla:perwir:v:1:y:2000:i:3:p:319-335.

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  35. Iniciativas internacionales para darle estabilidad a la integración financiera. (1999). Hausmann, Ricardo ; Fernandez-Arias, Eduardo ; Ricardo Hausmann Author-X-Name_First: Ricardo Auth, .
    In: Research Department Publications.
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  36. International Initiatives to Bring Stability to Financial Integration. (1999). Hausmann, Ricardo ; Fernandez-Arias, Eduardo ; Ricardo Hausmann Author-X-Name_First: Ricardo Auth, .
    In: Research Department Publications.
    RePEc:idb:wpaper:4174.

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  37. Policy making in an integrated world: from surveillance to ...?. (1999). Eichengreen, Barry.
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    RePEc:fip:fedbcp:y:1999:i:jun:p:205-241:n:43.

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  38. THE NEW ECONOMICS OF DISTANCE: LONG-TERM TRENDS IN INDEXES OF SPATIAL FRICTION. (1999). Ward, William ; Bhattarai, Madhusudan ; Huang, Pei.
    In: Working Papers.
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  39. Central bank policy in a more perfect financial system. (1998). von Hagen, Juergen ; Fender, Ingo.
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  40. Wenn Banken sich vergessen ...: Risikoregulierung im internationalen Mehr-Ebenen-System. (1998). Lutz, Susanne .
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  41. The Asian Disease: Plausible Diagnoses, Possible Remedies. (1998). Mayer, Martin .
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  42. Regulatory Issues in Electronic Money: A Legal-Economics Analysis.. (1998). Lee, B. C. ; Longe-Akindemowo, O..
    In: Economics Working Papers.
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  43. The Legacy of Deposit Insurance: The Growth, Spread, and Cost of Insuring Financial Intermediaries. (1998). White, Eugene N..
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    RePEc:kap:openec:v:9:y:1998:i:1:p:493-532.

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  46. Foreign operations of U.S. banks: Impact of environmental differences and ownership advantages on organizational form preferences. (1998). Parkhe, Arvind ; Miller, Stewart R..
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    RePEc:eee:intman:v:4:y:1998:i:1:p:59-83.

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    RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_341_98.

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  52. Integración Financiera en América Latina. (1997). Corbo, Vittorio.
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  53. Institutions and policies for maintaining financial stability. (1997). Litan, Robert.
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References

References cited by this document

  1. . 1990. Finger pointers rewriting history of S&L crisis. American Banker; 22 White, L. J. 1991. The S&L debacle: Public policy lessons for banks and thrifts. OxAugust, 5, 19,26-27. ford: OxfordUniversityPress. 2. WilliamA .Isaac It is a distincthonor and privilege for me to be invited to appear before such a distinguished group of scholars. My friend Marty Feldstein has asked that I address the collapse of the savings and loan (S&L) industry.
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  4. Another reason was colossal ignorance on the part of legislators-analysts simply had no credibilityrelative to a local thrift owner who was decryinghis troubles.Thriftsreally had a wonderful image in the 1980s.
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  5. Barth, J. R., and P. F. Bartholomew. 1990. The thrift-industry crisis: Revealed weaknesses in the federaldepositinsurancesystem. Paperpresentedto a StanfordUniversity conference,Washington,D.C., 18-19 May.
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  6. Barth, J. R., P. E Bartholomew,and M. G. Bradley. 1989. Reforming federal deposit insurance:What can be learnedfrom private insurancepractices?Reserve Paper no. 161. Washington, D.C.: Office of Policy and Economic Research, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, June.
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  7. Benston, G. J. 1990a. The separation of commercial and investment banking: The Glass-SteagallAct revisited and reconsidered. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  8. Carron, A. S., and R. D. Brumbaugh, Jr. 1991. Viability of the thrift industry. Housing Crabbe, L. E., M. H. Pickering, and S. D. F’rowse. 1990.Recent developments in corpoFederal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 1988. FDIC annual report. WashingForeign bank growth: Are U.S. fears justified? 1990. WashingtonPost, 24 June, H1.
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  9. Congressbelatedly authorizedderegulationof interestrates in 1980.But, by then, much damage had already been done. Thrifts had amassed huge port559 Financial Regulation folios of long-term, fixed-rate loans, and banks and thrifts alike had invested heavily in staffs and bricks and mortar to enable them to engage in the only form of competition previously allowed: nonprice competition. Banks and thriftsshouldhave been provided a lengthy phase-in period to adjustto interest rate deregulation, as would have been the case if Congress had acted in the early 1970s when the Hunt Commission made its recommendations.Instead, they were thrust into a deregulatedenvironment virtually overnight.
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  10. For example, prior to 1980, the Federal Reserve approved no more than a few mergers or acquisitionsby bank holding companieswhere the target company or bank had more than $1 billion dollars in assets. In the 1980s,on the other hand, almost 100such mergers or acquisitionswere approved. As a result, the number of banking organizationsin the country, as measured by the sum of bank holding companies plus the number of independentbanks, was reducedby almost25 percent.So, while many view the deregulationof interest rates and the liberalizationof powers as the big developments of the 1980s,I would offer that at least as much impact resulted from the policy decisions pertaining to structureand competition.
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  11. General Accounting Office (GAO). 1988. Financial markets: Issuers, purchasers and purposes of high yield, non-investment grade bonds. Washington, D.C., February.
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  12. Greenspan, A. 1990.Testimonybefore the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the U.S. Senate. 12July.
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  14. Hale, D. 1990. Global finance and the retreat to managed trade. Harvard Business Review (January-February), 150-62.
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  15. In 1982, Congress, with the support of the Reagan administration,passed the Garn-St. Germain Act. That law sanctioned the policies being pursued by the Bank Board and the FSLIC. It broadened the lending and investment authorities of S&Ls and reduced capital standards for thrifts by mandating a net worth certificateprogram. From this point forward, S&Ls began a tremendous growth spurt, with much of the growth in higher-risk activities.
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  16. In 1983, the FDIC issued a study calling for significant reforms in the deposit insurance system to instill greaterdepositordisciplinein an environment of deregulated interest rates. The study, which was ignored by the Congress and the administration, concluded that the de facto system of full depositor protection, to which we had evolved, was fundamentally inconsistentwith in561 Financial Regulation terest rate deregulation. If changes were not made to put depositors at risk, a disproportionate amount of the funds would flow to the marginal institutions willing to pay the highest rates.
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  17. In 1985,Gray proposed to limit the investment authority of S&Ls. He met with stiff opposition from the S&Lindustry, the administration, and key members of Congress, so he had to trim his proposal. The administration finally began to pay some attention to the S&Lproblems in 1986and proposed to recapitalize the FSLIC to the tune of $15 billion. The measure was strongly opposed by the U.S. League of Savings Institutions and by key members of Congress, such as the then speaker of the House, Jim Wright, and was cut back to $5 billion.
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  18. In the meantime, in response to the banking collapse of the 1930s,the government had intervened with a series of measures designed to limit competition. Interest rate controls were put in place to restrict price competition. A rate differential was established to encourage the flow of funds to thrifts. A deposit insurance system was created to maintain stability and to preserve a diverse (and uneconomic) banking structure. Laws were passed mandating 558 William M. Isaac that thrifts function as nondiversifiedlenders. Branching restrictions severely curtailed geographic expansion and diversification.And other fences, such as the Glass-Steagall Act, were erected to keep the various types of financial intermediarieson their own distinct playing fields.
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  21. Kaufman, G. 1989.Are some banks too large to fail? Myth and reality. Working paper. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, June.

  22. Largely in response to these pressures, in 1971 the Hunt Commission recommended that deposit interest rate controls be phased out, that thrifts and other lenders be allowed to offer variable-rate mortgages, and that mutual thrifts be permitted to convert to stock form of ownership. The recommendations were ignored by the administrationand Congress.
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  24. My old agency-the FDIC-committed what I believe was a major public policy mistake in 1972when it greatly expanded the scope of coverage of the depositinsurancesystem:rather than allowingthe Bank of the Commonwealth in Detroitto fail, theFDICinfusedcapitalintoit. All creditorswere alsobailed out by the FDIC at U.S. National in San Diego in 1973 and Franklin National in New York in 1974.
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  25. Occasionally, a proposed merger will raise competitiveissues, such as the recent case in Hawaii,but for the most part oppositionto concentratingand consolidating the banking industry is now considerablydiminished from what it was at the start of the 1980s.
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  27. On the questionof the overall level of premiums, the FDIC had not believed that deposit insurance coverage was underpriced.There seemed to be enough premium income to deal with the problems that arose. Isaac believed that one reason that the FDIC is running short of money now is that they are not handling failures as efficiently as they should.In 1984,theFDIC had handled Continental Illinois’s$40billion failure with an $800 million expenditure;the way that failures are being resolved now, a $40 billion failure would probably cost the FDIC $4 or $5 billion. Another reason that the FDIC is running short of money is the aftereffectsof the savings and loan crisis. Many real estate loans that went sourfor commercialbanks did sobecause so much overbuildinghad been funded by poorly run savings and loans.
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  28. Paper presented at the American Enterprise Institute conference “International Competitiveness in Financial Services,” Washington, D.C. Brumbaugh, R. D., Jr. 1988. Thrifts under siege. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger.
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  31. PresidentRoosevelthad been opposedto a federal depositinsurance system when it was proposed in the 1930s.He believed that it would be unduly expensive and doomed to fail because it would force the well-managed banks to subsidize the high flyers. A compromise was reached calling for very limited depositor protection plan-initially only $2,500 per account. Amounts above the insurancelimits were to be exposed to the risk of loss. The FDIC’s actions in 1972, 1973, and 1974 represented a vast expansionof the scope of the deposit insuranceprogramand, I’mconvinced,began the process of undermining disciplinein our financial system.
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  32. Rosenthal, J. A., and J. M. Ocampo. 1988.Securitization ofcredit: Inside the new technology ofjinance. New York: Wiley.
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  35. The Federal Reserve Board committed a significant mistake in 1977 when it ruled that bank holding companies could not acquire healthy thrifts. Somehow the Fed managed to find that the operation of a thrift was not sufficiently related to banking to allow bank holding companiesto enter the business. The real reasonswere political: the Fed did not want to offend the thrift industryor the smallerbanks, which viewed bank holding company acquisitionsof thrifts with alarm because they would permit the largerbanks to bypass the restraints on geographic expansion. This decision by the Fed was critically important because it prevented the thrifts from becomingpart of diversified financial institutions. Inflationraged during the Carter administration,with the prime rate soaring above 21 percent. Thrifts-both S&Ls and savings banks-suffered massive disintermediationand began to hemorrhage red ink owing to their long-term, fixed-rate loan portfolios.
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  36. The first signs of tension in this rather comfortableschemebegan to appear in the 1960s. The Johnson administration’s“guns and butter” fiscal policy in the mid-1960ssetoff inflationarypressuresthat led to higherand more volatile interestrates, which impairedthe viability of long-termlenders such as thrifts.
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  37. tindustry crisis: Causes and soluBrumbaugh, R. D., Jr., A. S. Carron, and R. E. Litan. 1989.Cleaning up the depository Brumbaugh, R. D., Jr., and R. E. Litan. 1990. The banks are weaker than you think.

  38. ton, D.C. . 1987b. What should banks do? Washington, D.C.: Brookings.
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Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. The effects of regulatory and contracting costs on banks choice of accounting method for other postretirement employee benefits. (2000). Ramesh, K. ; Revsine, Lawrence.
    In: Journal of Accounting and Economics.
    RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:30:y:2000:i:2:p:159-186.

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  2. Response of uninsured depositors to impending S&L failures: Evidence of depositor discipline. (1996). Goldberg, Lawrence G. ; Hudgins, Sylvia C..
    In: The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance.
    RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:36:y:1996:i:3:p:311-325.

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  3. The influence on Congress by the thrift industry. (1996). Colburn, Christopher ; Hudgins, Sylvia C..
    In: Journal of Banking & Finance.
    RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:20:y:1996:i:3:p:473-494.

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  4. Pricing Deposit Insurance in the United Kingdom. (1995). Perraudin, William ; Maude, David.
    In: Bank of England working papers.
    RePEc:boe:boeewp:29.

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  5. Financial Regulation. (1994). Litan, Robert ; Taylor, William ; Isaac, William .
    In: NBER Chapters.
    RePEc:nbr:nberch:7759.

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  6. Government, Financial Markets, and Economic Development. (1991). Stiglitz, Joseph.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3669.

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  7. The Risks of Financial Crises. (1991). Friedman, Benjamin A. ; Grundfest, Joseph A. ; Sprague, Irvine H. ; Corrigan, Gerald E..
    In: NBER Chapters.
    RePEc:nbr:nberch:6229.

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  8. Political Foundations of the Thrift Debacle. (1991). Weingast, Barry R. ; Romer, Thomas.
    In: NBER Chapters.
    RePEc:nbr:nberch:5418.

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  9. The stealth budget: unfunded liabilities of the federal government. (1991). Webb, Roy H..
    In: Economic Review.
    RePEc:fip:fedrer:y:1991:i:may:p:23-33:n:v.77no.3.

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  10. Views on the Likelihood of Financial Crisis. (1990). Friedman, Benjamin M..
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3407.

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  11. Implications of Corporate Indebtedness for Monetary Policy. (1990). Friedman, Benjamin M..
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3266.

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  12. AFTERMATH OF THE THRIFT CRISIS: BALANCING THE ECONOMYS BOOKS. (1990). MASCARO, ANGELO R..
    In: Contemporary Economic Policy.
    RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:8:y:1990:i:2:p:95-106.

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