Acconcia, A., Corsetti, G., Simonelli, S., 2014. Mafia and public spending: Evidence on the fiscal multiplier from a quasi-experiment. American Economic Review 104 (7), 2185–2209.
Acemoglu, D., Garcia-Jimeno, C., Robinson, J. A., 2015. State capacity and economic development: A network approach. American Economic Review 105 (8), 2364–2409.
Alesina, A., Tabellini, G., 2007. Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A single policy task. American Economic Review 97 (1), 169–179.
Altonji, J. G., Elder, T. E., Taber, C. R., 2005. Selection on observed and unobserved variables: Assessing the effectiveness of catholic schools. Journal of Political Economy 113 (1), 151–184.
- Anselin, L., 1988. Spatial Econometrics: Methods and Models. NATO Asi Series. Series E, Applied Sciences. Springer.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Arin, K. P., Chmelarova, V., Feess, E., Wohlschlegel, A., 2011. Why are corrupt countries less successful in consolidating their budgets? Journal of Public Economics 95 (7-8), 521–530.
Baicker, K., 2005. The spillover effects of state spending. Journal of Public Economics 89 (2-3), 529–544.
Bardhan, P., Mookherjee, D., 2006. Decentralization, corruption and government accountability. Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
Barone, G., Narciso, G., 2015. Organized crime and business subsidies: Where does the money go? Journal of Urban Economics 86, 98 – 110.
Becker, G. S., 1968. Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy 76, 169.
Becker, G. S., Stigler, G. J., 1974. Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of enforcers. The Journal of Legal Studies 3 (1), 1–18.
Besley, T., Case, A., 1995. Incumbent behavior: Vote-seeking, tax-setting, and yardstick competition. American Economic Review 85 (1), 25–45.
Besley, T., Coate, S., 2003. Elected versus appointed regulators: Theory and evidence.
Besley, T., Montalvo, J. G., Reynal-Querol, M., 2011. Do educated leaders matter? Economic Journal 121 (554), F205–.
Bordignon, M., Cerniglia, F., Revelli, F., 2003. In search of yardstick competition: A spatial analysis of Italian municipality property tax setting. Journal of Urban Economics 54 (2), 199–217.
Brueckner, J. K., 2000. Fiscal decentralization in developing countries: The effects of local corruption and tax evasion. Annals of Economics and Finance 1 (1), 1–18.
Buonanno, P., Durante, R., Prarolo, G., Vanin, P., 2015. Poor institutions, rich mines: Resource curse in the origins of the sicilian mafia. The Economic Journal 125 (586), F175–F202.
- Caneppele, S., Martocchia, S., 2014. Italian mafias, public procurement and public works in southern italy. In: Caneppele, S., Calderoni, F. (Eds.), Organized Crime, Corruption and Crime Prevention. Springer International Publishing, pp. 293–299.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Carozzi, F., Muço, A., 2015. Learn from thy neighbour: Do voters punish political parties?, mimeo.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Case, A. C., Rosen, H. S., Hines, J. J., 1993. Budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence : Evidence from the states. Journal of Public Economics 52 (3), 285–307.
Daniele, G., Geys, B., 2015. Organised crime, institutions and political quality: Empirical evidence from italian municipalities. The Economic Journal 125 (586), F233–F255.
Del Monte, A., Papagni, E., 2001. Public expenditure, corruption, and economic growth: the case of italy. European Journal of Political Economy 17 (1), 1–16.
Dell, M., 2015. Trafficking networks and the Mexican drug war. American Economic Review 105 (6), 1738–79.
Di Tella, R., Schargrodsky, E., 2003. The role of wages and auditing during a crackdown on corruption in the city of buenos aires. Journal of Law and Economics 46 (1), 269– 92.
Durante, R., Gutierrez, E., 2015. Fighting crime with a little help from my friends: Political alignment, inter-jurisdictional cooperation and crime in mexico. CEPR (Discussion Paper #10769).
Fan, C. S., Lin, C., Treisman, D., 2009. Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world. Journal of Public Economics 93 (1-2), 14–34.
Galasso, V., Nannicini, T., 2011. Competing on good politicians. American Political Science Review 105 (01).
Gibbons, S., Overman, H. G., 2012. Mostly pointless spatial econometrics? Journal of Regional Science 52 (2), 172–191.
Golden, M. A., Picci, L., 2005. Proposal for a new measure of corruption, illustrated with italian data. Economics and Politics 17, 37–75.
Hessami, Z., 2014. Political corruption, public procurement, and budget composition: Theory and evidence from oecd countries. European Journal of Political Economy 34 (C), 372–389.
Knight, B., 2013. State gun policy and cross-state externalities: Evidence from crime gun tracing. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 5 (4), 200–229.
Litschig, S., Zamboni, Y., 2011. Audit risk and rent extraction: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in Brazil. Economics working papers 1270.
Lyytikäinen, T., 2012. Tax competition among local governments: Evidence from a property tax reform in finland. Journal of Public Economics 96 (7-8), 584–595.
Mauro, P., 1995. Corruption and growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (3), 681–712.
Mauro, P., 1998. Corruption and the composition of government expenditure. Journal of Public Economics 69 (2), 263–279.
Olken, B. A., 2007. Monitoring corruption: Evidence from a field experiment in indonesia. Journal of Political Economy 115, 200–249.
- Oster, E., 2013. Psacalc: Stata module to calculate treatment effects or bounds under proportional selection of observables and unobservables.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Oster, E., 2015. Unobservable selection and coefficient stability: Theory and validation, mimeo.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Pinotti, P., 2015. The economic costs of organised crime: Evidence from Southern Italy. The Economic Journal 125 (586), F203–F232.
Rincke, J., Traxler, C., 2011. Enforcement spillovers. The Review of Economics and Statistics 93 (4), 1224–1234.
Sah, R. K., 1991. Social osmosis and patterns of crime. Journal of Political Economy 99 (6), 1272–95.
- Silva, P., 2010. Learning to fear the inspector-general: Measuring spillovers from anticorrupt policies, mimeo.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Solé-Ollé, A., 2006. Expenditure spillovers and fiscal interactions: Empirical evidence from local governments in spain. Journal of Urban Economics 59 (1), 32–53.
Tanzi, V., Davoodi, H. R., 2000. Corruption, growth, and public finances. IMF Working Papers.