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Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information. (2000). Volij, Oscar.
In: Staff General Research Papers Archive.
RePEc:isu:genres:5140.

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  1. An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information: a correction. (2019). Askoura, Youcef.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:1903.09867.

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  2. The farsighted core in a political game with asymmetric information. (2017). Miyakawa, Toshiji.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:49:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1057-5.

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  3. An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information. (2015). ASKOURA, Youcef.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:58:y:2015:i:c:p:38-45.

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  4. Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core. (2012). Okada, Akira.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:3:p:1165-1190.

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  5. The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information. (2007). de Clippel, Geoffroy.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:135:y:2007:i:1:p:144-158.

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  6. Information transmission in coalitional voting games. (2007). Vohra, Rajiv ; Serrano, Roberto.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:134:y:2007:i:1:p:117-137.

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  7. Incomplete information, credibility and the core. (2005). Vohra, Rajiv ; Dutta, Bhaskar.
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:50:y:2005:i:2:p:148-165.

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  8. Information transmission in coalitional voting games. (2005). Vohra, Rajiv ; Serrano, Roberto.
    In: UC3M Working papers. Economics.
    RePEc:cte:werepe:we055726.

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  9. Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games. (2005). Vohra, Rajiv ; Serrano, Roberto.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bro:econwp:2005-01.

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  10. Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games. (2005). Vohra, Rajiv ; Serrano, Roberto.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:ads:wpaper:0050.

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  11. Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core. (2003). Vohra, Rajiv ; Dutta, Bhaskar.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-21.

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  12. The core of economies with asymmetric information: an axiomatic approach. (2002). Volij, Oscar ; Lee, Darin.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:38:y:2002:i:1-2:p:43-63.

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  13. Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey. (2002). Vohra, Rajiv ; minelli, enrico ; Forges, Francoise.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:38:y:2002:i:1-2:p:1-41.

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  14. The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects. (2002). Forges, Franoise ; Vohra, Rajiv ; Mertens, Jean-Franois .
    In: Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine.
    RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/5454.

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  15. Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey. (2001). Vohra, Rajiv ; minelli, enrico ; Forges, Francoise.
    In: CORE Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cor:louvco:2001043.

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  16. The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects. (2001). Vohra, Rajiv ; Mertens, Jean-François ; Forges, Francoise.
    In: CORE Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cor:louvco:2001001.

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  17. The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects. (2001). Vohra, Rajiv ; Mertens, Jean-François ; Forges, Francoise.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bro:econwp:2001-01.

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  18. On the Core of an Economy with Differential Information. (2000). Moreno, Diego ; Shitovitz, Benyamin ; Einy, Ezra.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:94:y:2000:i:2:p:262-270.

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  19. Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey. (2000). Vohra, Rajiv ; minelli, enrico ; Forges, Francoise.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-22.

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