| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1078.001 | Default Accounts |
| T1078.002 | Domain Accounts |
| T1078.003 | Local Accounts |
| T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes.[1][2][3]
Default accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen Private Keys or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via Remote Services.[4]
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G1003 | Ember Bear |
Ember Bear has abused default user names and passwords in externally-accessible IP cameras for initial access.[5] |
| G1016 | FIN13 |
FIN13 has leveraged default credentials for authenticating myWebMethods (WMS) and QLogic web management interface to gain initial access.[6] |
| C0038 | HomeLand Justice |
During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used the built-in administrator account to move laterally using RDP and Impacket.[7] |
| S0537 | HyperStack |
HyperStack can use default credentials to connect to IPC$ shares on remote machines.[8] |
| G0059 | Magic Hound |
Magic Hound enabled and used the default system managed account, DefaultAccount, via |
| S0603 | Stuxnet |
Stuxnet infected WinCC machines via a hardcoded database server password.[10] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1032 | Multi-factor Authentication |
Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for default accounts whenever possible to prevent unauthorized access, even if credentials for these accounts are compromised. MFA adds an additional layer of security that requires more than just a username and password, making it significantly harder for adversaries to exploit these accounts for initial access or lateral movement. |
| M1027 | Password Policies |
Applications and appliances that utilize default username and password should be changed immediately after the installation, and before deployment to a production environment. [11] |
| ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
|---|---|---|---|
| DS0028 | Logon Session | Logon Session Creation |
Monitor for newly constructed logon behavior across default accounts that have been activated or logged into. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately. |
| DS0002 | User Account | User Account Authentication |
Monitor for an attempt by a user to gain access to a network or computing resource, often by providing credentials |