Ted Cruz Amicus Brief - LNG

USCA Case #23-1174 Document #2082376 Filed: 10/28/2024 Page 1 of 25
ORAL ARGUMENT HELD ON MAY 17, 2024

Nos. 23-1174 (L), 23-1221
________________________________________
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
________________________________________
CITY OF PORT ISABEL, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,
Respondent,
RIO BRAVO PIPELINE COMPANY, LLC AND RIO GRANDE
LNG, LLC,
Intervenors for Respondent.
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
On Petition for Review of Orders of the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE U.S. SENATOR TED CRUZ,

REPRESENTATIVE DAN CRENSHAW, AND BIPARTISAN
COALITION OF 13 OTHER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS IN
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT-INTERVENORS’ PETITIONS FOR
PANEL REHEARING OR REHEARING EN BANC
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Ivan L. London R. Trent McCotter

Counsel of Record Michael Buschbacher
MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL Andrew W. Smith
FOUNDATION BOYDEN GRAY PLLC
2596 South Lewis Way 800 Connecticut Ave. NW
Lakewood, Colorado 80227 Suite 900
(303) 292-2021 Washington, DC 20006
ilondon@mslegal.org (202) 706-5488
Counsel for Amici Curiae tmccotter@boydengray.com
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Per Fed. R. App. P. 26.1 and 29(a), and D.C. Circuit Rule 26.1, Amici
state that they are not corporations, and no further Rule 26.1 disclosure
statement is required.
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ..................................................................... i
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................ ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................iii
IDENTITIES AND INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE............................. 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................................... 3
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................... 4
I. Congress Codifies the Public Interest .............................................. 4
II. Congress Has Made Clear That Building LNG Facilities Is

Strongly in the Public Interest ......................................................... 5
III. NEPA Demands Processes, Not Outcomes ...................................... 6
IV. The Panel Mistakenly Put Other Interests over the Public
Interest............................................................................................... 7
V. Vacatur Was the Wrong Remedy...................................................... 8
VI. En Banc Review Is Warranted ....................................................... 13
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 14
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Case Page(s)
Allied-Signal v. NRC,
988 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1993) .................................................. 10
Checkosky v. SEC,
23 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994) .................................................... 12
Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey,

938 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1991) .................................................. 11
City of Oberlin, Ohio v. FERC,

39 F.4th 719 (D.C. Cir. 2022) .................................................. 6
Corner Post v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserv. Sys.,

144 S. Ct. 2440 (2024) .............................................................. 4, 13
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. FERC,

67 F.4th 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2023) ................................................ 5
Healthy Gulf v. FERC,

107 F.4th 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2024) .............................................. 11
Loving v. United States,

517 U.S. 748 (1996) .................................................................. 4
NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n,

425 U.S. 662 (1976) .................................................................. 6
Oglala Sioux Tribe v. NRC,

896 F.3d 520 (D.C. Cir. 2018) .................................................. 11
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,

490 U.S. 332 (1989) .................................................................. 7, 12
Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,

591 U.S. 197 (2020) .................................................................. 4
iii
Sierra Club v. Morton,

405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) .......................................................... 12
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,

985 F.3d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2021) ................................................ 11
Trump v. United States,

144 S. Ct. 2312 (2024) .............................................................. 4, 13
Vecinos para el Bienestar de la Comunidad Costera v. FERC,

6 F.4th 1321 (D.C. Cir. 2021) .................................................. 8, 9, 10
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,

343 U.S. 579 (1952) .................................................................. 5
Constitutional Provisions and Statutes
U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 .................................................................. 4
5 U.S.C. § 706 ............................................................................. 13
15 U.S.C. § 717b(a) ..................................................................... 5, 6, 14
15 U.S.C. § 717b(c)...................................................................... 6
15 U.S.C. § 717b(e) ..................................................................... 6
15 U.S.C. § 717r(b)...................................................................... 12, 13
15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(3) ................................................................. 13
42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) ..................................................................... 7
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) ................................................................ 7
Rules
D.C. Cir. R. 26.1 .......................................................................... i
D.C. Cir. R. 28(a)(1) .................................................................... 16
D.C. Cir. R. 29(d) ........................................................................ 18
iv
D.C. Cir. R. 35 ............................................................................. 16
Fed. R. App. P. 26.1 .................................................................... i
Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4) .............................................................. 17
Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) .............................................................. 17
Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) .............................................................. 17
Fed. R. App. P. 32(f).................................................................... 17
Fed. R. App. P. 35(a)(1) .............................................................. 13
Fed. R. App. P 35(a)(2) ............................................................... 14
v
IDENTITIES AND INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 1

Amici curiae are U.S. Senator Ted Cruz, Representative Dan
Crenshaw, and a bipartisan coalition of 13 other members of Congress.
The full list of Amici appears below.
Among his several assignments, Senator Cruz is Ranking Member
on the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation
and the Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution.
Representative Crenshaw is on the House Energy and Commerce
Committee.
As members of Congress, Amici have a strong interest in ensuring
that federal courts correctly interpret and apply the Natural Gas Act.
Congress passed the Act to encourage the development of natural gas
resources and infrastructure, considering such development to be in the
public interest. Congress accordingly imposed strong—and sometimes
irrebuttable—presumptions in favor of approving certain natural gas
infrastructure applications. But the panel decision here supplanted
Congress’s strong statement of the public interest with other goals and
vacated FERC’s approvals of the LNG facilities at issue here.
1No person other than Amici and their counsel assisted with or made a
monetary contribution for preparing or submitting this brief.
1
The panel opinion is incorrect and will have devastating effects:
freezing a distinctly important and job-creating South Texas project
years in the making, unsettling long-standing FERC project-approval
norms across the country, and weakening America’s national security by
making it less likely that the United States will continue to supply
natural gas to the Nation’s friends and allies while increasing our
Nation’s dependence on non-domestic energy sources.
Amici accordingly write separately asking for rehearing either by
the panel or en banc to correct the panel’s error.
The following is the full list of Amici:
United States Senate

Ted Cruz
John Barrasso John Kennedy
Bill Cassidy, M.D. Dan Sullivan
John Cornyn
United States House of Representatives
Dan Crenshaw
Maj. Leader Steve Scalise Vicente Gonzalez
Brian Babin, D.D.S Wesley Hunt
Michael C. Burgess, M.D. August Pfluger
Henry Cuellar Randy K. Weber, Sr.
2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The panel broke from this Court’s prior decisions, and it did so on a
question of exceptional importance. Congress—not the panel—has the
important job of deciding the public interest and codifying it through
legislation. As relevant to this case, Congress has decided that building
liquified natural gas (LNG) facilities is in the public interest. And while
Congress established a procedure for federal regulators to consider and
explain the environmental effects of building LNG facilities, those
procedural requirements do not empower interest groups to place their
own desired outcomes above Congress’s dictated public interest.
The panel’s error is especially egregious because the panel used the
flimsiest “environmental” whims to undermine the public interest in
building LNG facilities; and the panel chose the wrong remedy—
vacatur—to fix the regulators’ supposed mistake. Both the decision and
its use of vacatur are inconsistent with federal law and this Court’s
decisions. Together, they amount to a devastating, wrong answer to an
exceptionally important question: who gets to decide the public interest?
Under our Constitution, Congress gets to decide and codify the public
interest. Congress has made pellucidly clear that developing and
3
approving natural gas projects is a matter of utmost importance to the
economic development and national security of the United States.
This Court has previously issued precedent saying the same, but
the panel deviated from the Court’s decisions. To keep uniformity of the
Court’s decisions on this question of exceptional importance, the panel
should rehear the case or the full Court should review the decision.
ARGUMENT
I. Congress Codifies the Public Interest.
James Madison explained in Federalist 51 that checks and balances
are “essential to the preservation of liberty.” Among the checks and
balances, the “legislative Powers” to make law and define the public
interest are “vested in a Congress of the United States.” U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 1. And the Supreme Court has long recognized that “the lawmaking
function belongs to Congress . . . and may not be conveyed to another
branch or entity.” Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996).
While courts have the negative power to disregard an
unconstitutional enactment by Congress, they cannot re-write Congress’s
work. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 591 U.S. 197, 237–
38 (2020); see also Trump v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 2312, 2380, 219 L.
Ed. 2d 991 (2024) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (Congress “is the entity our
4
Constitution tasks with deciding, as a general matter, what conduct is on
or off limits”). By vesting “[a]ll legislative Powers” in Congress, the
Constitution ensures that elected representatives—not federal judges or
petitioners—can codify the public interest. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 609–10 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(“When Congress itself has struck the balance, has defined the weight to
be given the competing interests, a court of equity is not justified in
ignoring that pronouncement . . . .”).
II. Congress Has Made Clear That Building LNG Facilities Is

Strongly in the Public Interest.
In the Natural Gas Act (NGA), Congress said that building LNG
facilities is strongly in the public interest of the United States. NGA § 3
sets up a “general presumption favoring authorization” of LNG facilities.
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. FERC, 67 F.4th 1176, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 2023)
(Alaska LNG). To that end, Congress dictated that FERC “shall” approve
an application to export natural gas “unless, after opportunity for
hearing, it finds that the proposed exportation . . . will not be consistent
with the public interest.” 15 U.S.C. § 717b(a). And for LNG exports to
countries with which the United States has a free-trade agreement, the
presumption is conclusive—such exports “shall be deemed to be
5
consistent with the public interest” and applications “shall be granted
without modification or delay.” 15 U.S.C. § 717b(c); see City of Oberlin,
Ohio v. FERC, 39 F.4th 719, 727 (D.C. Cir. 2022).
Congress imposed these presumptions to “encourage the orderly
development of plentiful supplies of electricity and natural gas at
reasonable prices.” NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662, 669–70
(1976). And Congress vested FERC with “exclusive authority to approve
or deny an application for the siting, construction, expansion, or
operation of an LNG terminal.” 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e). The Commission’s
job is to approve LNG facilities unless they are clearly “not . . . consistent”
with the public interest. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(a). It is not the Court’s job to
make the public-interest determination for FERC by deciding that
environmental whimsy is more important than building LNG facilities.
The regulators at FERC did their job correctly here; the panel,
however, incorrectly used the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
to reach a different outcome, inconsistent with Congress’s directives.
III. NEPA Demands Processes, Not Outcomes.
Although Congress promotes building LNG facilities, it also
requires federal regulators—here, FERC regulators—to consider and
6
explain the environmental consequences of building and running the
facilities. NEPA imposes this procedural requirement to enable
“productive harmony” between economic and environmental goals.
42 U.S.C. § 4331(a); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490
U.S. 332, 350 (1989). NEPA requires agencies simply to consider and
explain the environmental impacts of “major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C). The statute does not give Courts or interest groups a license
to elevate their own desires over the public interest. But the panel here
took exactly this prohibited step.
IV. The Panel Mistakenly Put Other Interests over the Public
Interest.
In this case, the federal regulators at FERC did what Congress
asked them to do: they considered and explained the environmental
effects of their decision to fulfill the public interest. Then they approved
the construction of these much-needed LNG facilities in South Texas. The
panel should have let FERC’s decision stand.
Instead, the panel used NEPA to elevate other interests over the
public interest dictated by Congress. Most critically, the panel barely
mentioned the NGA’s presumption in favor of exporting LNG, much less
7
tried to reconcile that statutory mandate with its use of NEPA to vacate
FERC’s approval. That mistaken approach has infected the proceedings
throughout this case. See, e.g., Vecinos para el Bienestar de la Comunidad
Costera v. FERC, 6 F.4th 1321, 1325–26 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (“[B]efore
authorizing the construction and operation of a proposed LNG facility or
pipeline, the Commission must conduct an environmental review under
NEPA,” and only then determine “whether a proposed project comports
with the public interest.”).
By largely omitting mention of Congress’s distinctly strong interest
in approving LNG applications, the panel mistakenly allowed its inflated
view of NEPA’s procedural requirements to take preeminence over core,
substantive policy decisions made by Congress.
V. Vacatur Was the Wrong Remedy.
Compounding its error, the panel chose the wrong remedy. The
panel vacated the most recent approval of the Rio Grande LNG project.
Panel Op. 33–34. This action halts the project while FERC supplements
its environmental impact statement. According to the federal
8
government’s own data, those statements take 4.5 years on average. 2
Such a lengthy pause risks unravelling the whole project, with
devastating effects for South Texas’s economy and the Nation’s energy
independence.
Moreover, this new precedent threatens existing projects by
opening the door for interest groups to replace congressionally mandated
public interests with their own policy goals. Not only does the panel’s
holding set back these properly approved projects by several more years,
but also it threatens their ability to compete in a challenging
international market and chills investment in future projects, with
corresponding risks for the Nation’s security and economy.
The panel took this drastic step even though FERC followed this
Court’s commands in Vecinos I to consider “environmental justice” effects
across a broader area. Panel Op. 7–8, 11. Vecinos I did not order the
supplemental environmental impact statement, yet the panel here
concluded FERC ran afoul of NEPA by “not prepar[ing] [this] analysis in
the form of a supplemental environmental statement.” Panel Op. 11.
2CEQ, Environmental Impact Statement Timelines (2010-2018) (June

12, 2022), https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/nepa-
practice/CEQ_EIS_Timeline_Report_2020-6-12.pdf.
9
In doing so, the panel transformed the test for vacatur, ensuring
that project after project will, at the very least, face the risk of vacatur
for procedural NEPA issues. Generally, courts determine whether to
vacate after assessing: (1) “the seriousness of the order’s deficiencies (and
thus the extent of doubt whether the agency chose correctly)” and (2) “the
disruptive consequences of an interim change that may itself be
changed.” Allied-Signal v. NRC, 988 F.2d 146, 150–51 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
Until now, this Court would have concluded that (1) putting
“environmental justice” analysis in the supposedly “wrong” form is not a
serious problem that jeopardizes the Rio Grande LNG project, and (2) the
disruption from vacating a multi-billion-dollar energy project would be
significant, and thus, the court would remand without vacatur.
That is what this Court did in Vecinos I when it refused to vacate:
“[B]oth factors weigh against vacatur.” Id. at 1332. The Court found it
reasonably likely that on remand the Commission would reach the same
ultimate result while redressing any failure of explanation with regard
to its analyses of the projects’ impacts on climate change and
environmental justice communities, and its determinations of public
interest and convenience under Sections 3 and 7 of the NGA. Id. The
10
Court also credited Intervenors’ “assertion that vacating the orders
would needlessly disrupt completion of the projects.” Id.
Indeed, this Court has regularly remanded without vacating in
NEPA cases. See, e.g., Healthy Gulf v. FERC, 107 F.4th 1033, 1047–48
(D.C. Cir. 2024); Oglala Sioux Tribe v. NRC, 896 F.3d 520, 538 (D.C. Cir.
2018) (Garland, J.); Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d
190, 206–07 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Thomas, J.).
The panel here embraced a new test, however, reshaping the
“seriousness” prong of Allied-Signal. If “an agency bypasses a
fundamental procedural step,” the first prong of the Allied-Signal
analysis “asks ‘not whether the ultimate action could be justified, but
whether the agency could, with further explanation, justify its decision
to skip that procedural step.’” Panel Op. 33 (quoting Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 985 F.3d 1032, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 2021)).
So courts now must focus on whether the agency must undergo a new and
significant procedural step on remand (a longer NEPA essay), and then
vacatur follows even if there is no question that the agency can and will
ultimately approve the project again on remand.
Such an intrusive judicial review is inconsistent with NEPA, which
11
is purely procedural and contains no cause of action. When Congress
enacted NEPA, most potential plaintiffs lacked standing anyway. The
Supreme Court’s recognition of standing to sue based on members’
“[a]esthetic and environmental well-being” in Sierra Club v. Morton was
still a couple of years off. 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972). Thus, it is not
surprising that judicial review of NEPA compliance “was barely
discussed” at the time of enactment. David R. Mandelker et al., NEPA
Law & Litigation § 2:5 (2d ed. 2024).
Given this backdrop, the opposition’s position that remanding
without vacatur in a case like this one would subvert NEPA’s purpose.
Congress likely never envisioned judicial review of NEPA compliance at
all, let alone grinding every project with a NEPA defect to a halt, years
after approvals were already issued.
No revisionist view of “remand without vacatur” supports the
panel’s test, either. First, judicial review in this case is under the NGA,
not the APA. See 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b). So, while some claim the APA’s
instruction that courts “set aside” unlawful agency action compels
vacatur in the APA context, see, e.g., Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 490
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (Randolph, J., dissenting), this Court can remand
12
without vacatur under the NGA’s more flexible remedial language,
15 U.S.C. § 717r(b), (d)(3).
Second, even under the APA, “[r]emand without vacatur is
essentially a shorthand way of vacating a rule and staying the vacatur
pending the agency’s completion of an additional required action.” Corner
Post v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserv. Sys., 144 S. Ct. 2440, 2466 n.6
(2024) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); accord 5 U.S.C. § 706 (requiring
courts to consider whether a supposed administrative-procedure error
was actually “prejudicial” before setting aside an agency action).
So even if there were any FERC procedural error here, remand
without vacatur would make the most sense, because at most the agency
need only “provide additional explanation.” Corner Post, 144 S. Ct. at
2466 n.6 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
VI. En Banc Review Is Warranted.
The panel opinion conflicts with this Court’s precedent holding that
federal regulators and judges cannot wield NEPA flyspecks to undercut
Congress’s strong public interest in building LNG facilities. Alaska LNG,
67 F.4th at 1180–81. That intra-Circuit disagreement, without more, is
sufficient ground for en banc review. See Fed. R. App. P. 35(a)(1).
13
The case also presents a “question of exceptional importance.” See
Fed. R. App. P 35(a)(2). Building LNG facilities is in the public interest,
sometimes irrebuttably so. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(a). Congress established this
strong regime for LNG production to promote domestic economic growth.
Its effects are particularly felt in Texas, Louisiana, and other energy-
producing States, given the abundant energy resources in such States
and their access to global markets. This regime is intended to reduce
America’s reliance on imported energy from foreign adversaries and
protect the Nation’s security, particularly at a time when our allies and
partners are seeking trusted and reliable sources of LNG. Respectfully,
federal courts cannot overcome such critical, congressionally established
public interests by insisting on more paperwork.
CONCLUSION
The Court should grant panel rehearing or rehearing en banc.
14
October 28, 2024 Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Ivan L. London

Ivan L. London
MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION
2596 South Lewis Way
Lakewood, Colorado 80227
Tele: (303) 292-2021
Fax: (877) 349-7074
ilondon@mslegal.org
R. Trent McCotter
Michael Buschbacher
Andrew W. Smith
BOYDEN GRAY PLLC
800 Connecticut Ave. NW, Suite 900
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 706-5488
tmccotter@boydengray.com
Counsel for Amici Curiae
15
CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED

CASES
Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rules 28(a)(1) and 35, Amici hereby
submit this certificate.
A. Parties and Amici
The parties who have appeared before the Court are listed in
Petitioners’ D.C. Circuit Rule 28(a)(1) certificate.
B. Rulings Under Review
Petitioners seek review of two orders of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission: Rio Grande LNG, LLC, 183 FERC ¶ 61,046
(April 21, 2023), R. 3011, JA1-176; and Rio Grande LNG, LLC, 185 FERC
¶ 61,080 (October 27, 2023), R. 3080, JA177-238.
Intervenors seek rehearing of the panel decision issued by this
Court on August 6, 2024.
C. Related Cases
The related cases are listed in FERC’s D.C. Circuit Rule 28(a)(1)
certificate.
16
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMIT,

TYPEFACE REQUIREMENTS, AND TYPE-STYLE
REQUIREMENTS
1. This document complies with the Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4) [the

word limit of Fed. R. App. P. (insert Rule citation; e.g., 5(c)(1))]
because, excluding the parts of the document exempted by Fed. R.
App. P. 32(f) [and (insert applicable Rule citation, if any)]:
 this document contains 2,600 words, or
 this brief uses a monospaced typeface and contains [state the

number of] lines of text.
2. This document complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R.

App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(6) because:
 this document has been prepared in a proportionally spaced

typeface using Microsoft 365 in 14-point Century Schoolbook, or
 this document has been prepared in a monospaced typeface

using [state name and version of word-processing program] with
[state number of characters per inch and name of type style].
(s) Ivan L. London
Attorney for U.S. SENATOR TED CRUZ, REPRESENTATIVE DAN

CRENSHAW, AND BIPARTISAN COALITION OF 13 OTHER
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Dated: October 28, 2024
17
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
I hereby certify, pursuant to District of Columbia Circuit Rule
29(d), that the foregoing brief is filed as a separate brief because of the
unique perspective that Amici Curiae, as members of Congress, have on
the legal and practical significance of the panel’s errors.
/s/ Ivan L. London

Ivan L. London
18
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this date, I electronically filed the foregoing
document with the Clerk of this Court by using the CM/ECF system,
which will serve all parties automatically.
/s/ Ivan L. London

Ivan L. London
19

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USCA Case #23-1174 Document #2082376 Filed: 10/28/2024 Page 1 of 25

ORAL ARGUMENT HELD ON MAY 17, 2024

On Petition for Review of Orders of the

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE U.S. SENATOR TED CRUZ,

Ivan L. London R. Trent McCotter

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................ ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................iii

IDENTITIES AND INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE............................. 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................................... 3

I. Congress Codifies the Public Interest .............................................. 4

II. Congress Has Made Clear That Building LNG Facilities Is

III. NEPA Demands Processes, Not Outcomes ...................................... 6

V. Vacatur Was the Wrong Remedy...................................................... 8

VI. En Banc Review Is Warranted ....................................................... 13

Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey,

City of Oberlin, Ohio v. FERC,

Corner Post v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserv. Sys.,

Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. FERC,

Healthy Gulf v. FERC,

Loving v. United States,

NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n,

Oglala Sioux Tribe v. NRC,

Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,

Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,

Sierra Club v. Morton,

Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,

Trump v. United States,

Vecinos para el Bienestar de la Comunidad Costera v. FERC,

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,

Constitutional Provisions and Statutes

U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 .................................................................. 4

5 U.S.C. § 706 ............................................................................. 13

15 U.S.C. § 717b(a) ..................................................................... 5, 6, 14

15 U.S.C. § 717b(e) ..................................................................... 6

15 U.S.C. § 717r(b)...................................................................... 12, 13

15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(3) ................................................................. 13

42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) ..................................................................... 7

42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) ................................................................ 7

D.C. Cir. R. 26.1 .......................................................................... i

D.C. Cir. R. 28(a)(1) .................................................................... 16

D.C. Cir. R. 29(d) ........................................................................ 18

D.C. Cir. R. 35 ............................................................................. 16

Fed. R. App. P. 26.1 .................................................................... i

Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4) .............................................................. 17

Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) .............................................................. 17

Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) .............................................................. 17

Fed. R. App. P. 32(f).................................................................... 17

Fed. R. App. P. 35(a)(1) .............................................................. 13

Fed. R. App. P 35(a)(2) ............................................................... 14

IDENTITIES AND INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 1

Crenshaw, and a bipartisan coalition of 13 other members of Congress.

The full list of Amici appears below.

Among his several assignments, Senator Cruz is Ranking Member

on the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation

and the Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution.

Representative Crenshaw is on the House Energy and Commerce

As members of Congress, Amici have a strong interest in ensuring

Congress passed the Act to encourage the development of natural gas

resources and infrastructure, considering such development to be in the

public interest. Congress accordingly imposed strong—and sometimes