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18 pages, 3287 KiB  
Article
Characterising Payload Entropy in Packet Flows—Baseline Entropy Analysis for Network Anomaly Detection
by Anthony Kenyon, Lipika Deka and David Elizondo
Future Internet 2024, 16(12), 470; https://doi.org/10.3390/fi16120470 - 16 Dec 2024
Viewed by 225
Abstract
The accurate and timely detection of cyber threats is critical to keeping our online economy and data safe. A key technique in early detection is the classification of unusual patterns of network behaviour, often hidden as low-frequency events within complex time-series packet flows. [...] Read more.
The accurate and timely detection of cyber threats is critical to keeping our online economy and data safe. A key technique in early detection is the classification of unusual patterns of network behaviour, often hidden as low-frequency events within complex time-series packet flows. One of the ways in which such anomalies can be detected is to analyse the information entropy of the payload within individual packets, since changes in entropy can often indicate suspicious activity—such as whether session encryption has been compromised, or whether a plaintext channel has been co-opted as a covert channel. To decide whether activity is anomalous, we need to compare real-time entropy values with baseline values, and while the analysis of entropy in packet data is not particularly new, to the best of our knowledge, there are no published baselines for payload entropy across commonly used network services. We offer two contributions: (1) we analyse several large packet datasets to establish baseline payload information entropy values for standard network services, and (2) we present an efficient method for engineering entropy metrics from packet flows from real-time and offline packet data. Such entropy metrics can be included within feature subsets, thus making the feature set richer for subsequent analysis and machine learning applications. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Privacy and Security Issues with Edge Learning in IoT Systems)
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Figure 1

Figure 1
<p>Simplified illustration of information entropy for a fixed set of eight symbols. Lowest entropy is achieved with a monotonic set of repeating symbols (each with probability 1 of being predicted). Highest entropy is achieved when the full symbol set is used, with each symbol appearing randomly with equal probability.</p>
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<p>Common well-known TCP and UDP, ‘well-known’ ports for plaintext and cryptographic services. Here, y = yes, n = no, and p = partial. Client applications that wish to use encrypted services typically start by exchanging cryptographic keys so that the rest of the conversation is secure. Note that some protocols use partially encrypted messaging, where typically the initial exchange is in plaintext. These variations in use will be clearly reflected in payload entropy values.</p>
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<p>Early analysis of entropy values from several content types, derived from [<a href="#B6-futureinternet-16-00470" class="html-bibr">6</a>]. <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msubsup> <mrow> <mi>H</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>N</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>M</mi> <mi>L</mi> <mi>E</mi> </mrow> </msubsup> </mrow> </semantics></math> is the sample entropy of a word of length N, MLE stands for Maximum Likelihood Estimator, and H<sub>N</sub> is the sample entropy. As a point of reference, <a href="#futureinternet-16-00470-f004" class="html-fig">Figure 4</a> and <a href="#futureinternet-16-00470-f005" class="html-fig">Figure 5</a> provide a more recent analysis of similar content types, where for example, email has an average entropy ranging between 5.40 (POP3) and 5.92 (SMTP).</p>
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<p>Two phase analysis for calculating service baseline metrics for payload entropy. Packets are first grouped into logical flows to ensure that we are tracking entropy changes for each discrete flow duration. All flow entropy values are then grouped by service types, and overall baseline entropy metrics are calculated. Note that the contribution of each dataset is weighted by sample size (to avoid the case where a smaller anomalous dataset distorts the overall metrics).We also ignore samples that are clearly labelled as anomalous in datasets such as those used in intrusion detection, since these samples may include values outside the expected baseline range.</p>
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<p>Datasets used in entropy calculations. The majority of samples were taken from the full UNB 2017 dataset (containing over 56 million packets), although several other datasets were tested to assess consistency. These datasets are documented in [KEN20]. The original flow summaries provided with some of these sources were not used since they lacked essential payload features, and in some, there were issues with the original flow recovery. Therefore, we reconstructed all flows and exposed additional entropy metadata. In the table, ‘samples’ indicates observations that matched a specific service type. Note that by ‘sample’, we mean the number of actual packets used in the analysis, given that network packet traces may contain packets that are either in error or not relevant to analysis.</p>
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<p>Mean and standard deviation for payload entropy values averaged over multiple traffic sources, by flow direction (outbound and inbound, with respect to session initiation). Note that encrypted services such as SSH, SSL, and HTTPS have average entropy values closer to 8.0, whereas unencrypted services such as Telnet, LDAP, and NetBios have low entropy values, indicating that the payload has a larger proportion of plaintext data. These data were aggregated across multiple deployment contexts (enterprise, network backbone, industrial, etc.). To account for the wide variations in sample sizes for specific protocols between packet traces, we weighed the means by sample size, so that potential outliers in small packet traces do not influence the overall mean results disproportionately.</p>
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<p>Illustrates the effects of symbolic content on entropy values using four raw text files. The three special ‘symbol_test’ files have limited symbolic alphabets. symbol_test_mono comprises only 1 repeated symbol, with a corresponding entropy close to zero. symbol_test_duo contains two repeated symbols, with a corresponding entropy close to 1. symbol_test_full contains a richer alphabet of 96 symbols (A–Z, a–z, plus punctuation, etc.), with corresponding entropy rising above 6. The final example is a text representation of a book, which has a lower entropy than symbol_test_full because of the frequent symbol repetitions typical in written language (some letters and sequences are far more common than others). Encrypted versions of these files also exhibit wide entropy variations in lower values due to the lack of symbol variety in the source data.</p>
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<p>Common file types and entropy values. ‘Plaintext’ here means unencrypted. On the right, we also see corresponding entropies for AES 256 encrypted files. We use just the 256 block size as an illustrative, since a larger block size does not significantly improve the results, given these are close to 8.0 already. Note that zip compressed files and encrypted files tend to have entropies close to 8.</p>
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11 pages, 844 KiB  
Article
Clarifying the Actual Situation of Old-Old Adults with Unknown Health Conditions and Those Indifferent to Health Using the National Health Insurance Database (KDB) System
by Mio Kitamura, Takaharu Goto, Tetsuo Ichikawa and Yasuhiko Shirayama
Geriatrics 2024, 9(6), 156; https://doi.org/10.3390/geriatrics9060156 - 6 Dec 2024
Viewed by 427
Abstract
Background/Objectives: This study aimed to investigate the actual situation of individuals with unknown health conditions (UHCs) and those indifferent to health (IH) among old-old adults (OOAs) aged 75 years and above using the National Health Insurance Database (KDB) system. Methods: A [...] Read more.
Background/Objectives: This study aimed to investigate the actual situation of individuals with unknown health conditions (UHCs) and those indifferent to health (IH) among old-old adults (OOAs) aged 75 years and above using the National Health Insurance Database (KDB) system. Methods: A total of 102 individuals with no history of medical examinations were selected from the KDB system in a city in Japan. Data were collected through home visit interviews and blood pressure monitors distributed by public health nurses (PHNs) from Community Comprehensive Support Centers (CCSCs). The collected data included personal attributes, health concern levels, and responses to a 15-item OOA questionnaire. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with seven PHNs. The control group consisted of 76 users of the “Kayoinoba” service (Kayoinoba users: KUs). Results: Of the 83 individuals who could be interviewed, 50 (49.0%) were classified as UHCs and 11 (10.8%) were classified as IH, including 5 from the low health concern group and 6 who refused to participate. In the word cloud generated from the PHNs’ interviews, the words and phrases “community welfare commissioner”, “community development”, “blood pressure monitor”, “troublesome”, “suspicious”, and “young” were highlighted. In the comparison of health assessments between UHCs and KUs, “body weight loss” and “cognitive function” were more prevalent among KUs, and “smoking” and “social participation” were more prevalent among UHCs. Conclusions: The home visit activities of CCSCs utilizing the KDB system may contribute to an understanding of the actual situation of UHCs, including IHs, among OOAs. UHCs (including patients with IH status) had a higher proportion of risk factors related to smoking and lower social participation than KUs. Full article
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<p>Flowchart and results of the home visit interview survey. a: Individuals who received medical examinations. b: Individuals whose receipt of medical examinations was unclear. c: Individuals with unknown health conditions (UHCs). d: Individuals who were classified as “unknown” due to missing data, absence from their residence, or institutionalization. e: Individuals who refused intervention and for whom intervention was deemed difficult (categorized as IH). f: Individuals with high health concern whose receipt of medical examinations was unclear. g: Individuals with low health concern whose receipt of medical examinations was unclear (categorized as IH). h: UHCs with high health concern. i: UHCs with low health concern (categorized as IH).</p>
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<p>The word cloud generated from the interview survey of public health nurses.</p>
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15 pages, 438 KiB  
Article
Using Generative AI Models to Support Cybersecurity Analysts
by Štefan Balogh, Marek Mlynček, Oliver Vraňák and Pavol Zajac
Electronics 2024, 13(23), 4718; https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13234718 - 28 Nov 2024
Viewed by 416
Abstract
One of the tasks of security analysts is to detect security vulnerabilities and ongoing attacks. There is already a large number of software tools that can help to collect security-relevant data, such as event logs, security settings, application manifests, and even the (decompiled) [...] Read more.
One of the tasks of security analysts is to detect security vulnerabilities and ongoing attacks. There is already a large number of software tools that can help to collect security-relevant data, such as event logs, security settings, application manifests, and even the (decompiled) source code of potentially malicious applications. The analyst must study these data, evaluate them, and properly identify and classify suspicious activities and applications. Fast advances in the area of Artificial Intelligence have produced large language models that can perform a variety of tasks, including generating text summaries and reports. In this article, we study the potential black-box use of LLM chatbots as a support tool for security analysts. We provide two case studies: the first is concerned with the identification of vulnerabilities in Android applications, and the second one is concerned with the analysis of security logs. We show how LLM chatbots can help security analysts in their work, but point out specific limitations and security concerns related to this approach. Full article
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<p>Use of MobSF in AI-assisted analysis.</p>
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<p>AI-analyzer component.</p>
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<p>The architecture of security logs analyzer.</p>
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27 pages, 573 KiB  
Article
Machine Learning-Based Methodologies for Cyber-Attacks and Network Traffic Monitoring: A Review and Insights
by Filippo Genuario, Giuseppe Santoro, Michele Giliberti, Stefania Bello, Elvira Zazzera and Donato Impedovo
Information 2024, 15(11), 741; https://doi.org/10.3390/info15110741 - 20 Nov 2024
Viewed by 945
Abstract
The number of connected IoT devices is increasing significantly due to their many benefits, including automation, improved efficiency and quality of life, and reducing waste. However, these devices have several vulnerabilities that have led to the rapid growth in the number of attacks. [...] Read more.
The number of connected IoT devices is increasing significantly due to their many benefits, including automation, improved efficiency and quality of life, and reducing waste. However, these devices have several vulnerabilities that have led to the rapid growth in the number of attacks. Therefore, several machine learning-based intrusion detection system (IDS) tools have been developed to detect intrusions and suspicious activity to and from a host (HIDS—Host IDS) or, in general, within the traffic of a network (NIDS—Network IDS). The proposed work performs a comparative analysis and an ablative study among recent machine learning-based NIDSs to develop a benchmark of the different proposed strategies. The proposed work compares both shallow learning algorithms, such as decision trees, random forests, Naïve Bayes, logistic regression, XGBoost, and support vector machines, and deep learning algorithms, such as DNNs, CNNs, and LSTM, whose approach is relatively new in the literature. Also, the ensembles are tested. The algorithms are evaluated on the KDD-99, NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB15, IoT-23, and UNB-CIC IoT 2023 datasets. The results show that the NIDS tools based on deep learning approaches achieve better performance in detecting network anomalies than shallow learning approaches, and ensembles outperform all the other models. Full article
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Graphical abstract

Graphical abstract
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<p>(<b>a</b>) LSTM and (<b>b</b>) GRU units.</p>
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13 pages, 3721 KiB  
Article
Suspicious Financial Activity in the Context of In-Game Asset Exchange Marketplace
by Emil Eminov and Stephen V. Flowerday
J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2024, 4(4), 938-950; https://doi.org/10.3390/jcp4040043 - 5 Nov 2024
Viewed by 981
Abstract
In this study, we investigated the expanding problem of suspicious activity when using online in-game asset trading platforms. The decentralized structures and anonymity offered by these platforms provide a basis for suspicious actions, creating a threat to the virtual economy. By evaluating 18,157 [...] Read more.
In this study, we investigated the expanding problem of suspicious activity when using online in-game asset trading platforms. The decentralized structures and anonymity offered by these platforms provide a basis for suspicious actions, creating a threat to the virtual economy. By evaluating 18,157 rows of anonymized transaction data from 38 unique sellers with the help of the interquartile range approach and network analysis, we were able to identify suspicious activities. The results highlight suspicious online activities of individual transactions. This research contributes by identifying new, concerning trends and unraveling complex networks by analyzing in-game asset transaction data. It also assists in informing experts and lawmakers about new suspicious activities. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section Security Engineering & Applications)
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<p>Buyer–seller network.</p>
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<p>Five or more anonymized transactions in one day with Seller 1 (including the transaction count).</p>
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<p>Detailed transactions over time for high-volume buyers from Seller 1 (anonymized).</p>
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<p>Detailed network of transactions with high-volume buyers (anonymized).</p>
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<p>Anonymized network graph of U-turn transactions.</p>
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<p>A second anonymized network graph of U-turn transactions.</p>
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<p>Anonymized view of daily transactions for one seller.</p>
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18 pages, 4998 KiB  
Article
Predicting the Impact of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks in Long-Term Evolution for Machine (LTE-M) Networks Using a Continuous-Time Markov Chain (CTMC) Model
by Mohammed Hammood Mutar, Ahmad Hani El Fawal, Abbass Nasser and Ali Mansour
Electronics 2024, 13(21), 4145; https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13214145 - 22 Oct 2024
Viewed by 1007
Abstract
The way we connect with the physical world has completely changed because of the advancement of the Internet of Things (IoT). However, there are several difficulties associated with this change. A significant advancement has been the emergence of intelligent machines that are able [...] Read more.
The way we connect with the physical world has completely changed because of the advancement of the Internet of Things (IoT). However, there are several difficulties associated with this change. A significant advancement has been the emergence of intelligent machines that are able to gather data for analysis and decision-making. In terms of IoT security, we are seeing a sharp increase in hacker activities worldwide. Botnets are more common now in many countries, and such attacks are very difficult to counter. In this context, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks pose a significant threat to the availability and integrity of online services. In this paper, we developed a predictive model called Markov Detection and Prediction (MDP) using a Continuous-Time Markov Chain (CTMC) to identify and preemptively mitigate DDoS attacks. The MDP model helps in studying, analyzing, and predicting DDoS attacks in Long-Term Evolution for Machine (LTE-M) networks and IoT environments. The results show that using our MDP model, the system is able to differentiate between Authentic, Suspicious, and Malicious traffic. Additionally, we are able to predict the system behavior when facing different DDoS attacks. Full article
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Figure 1
<p>Limited bandwidth of LTE-M carrier in LTE-A carrier with a Resource Element (RE) and Resource Block (RB).</p>
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<p>Authentic, Suspicious, and Malicious requests.</p>
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<p>MDP flow chart upon the arrival of Authentic, Suspicious, or Malicious requests. Where “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>C</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mn>1</mn> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the threshold of the Authentic phase, “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>C</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mn>2</mn> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the threshold of the Suspicious phase, and “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>D</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the number of ongoing Malicious Delete Requests.</p>
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<p>Representation of the MDP model as a set of generic states, where “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>i</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math>” represents the number of ongoing services for Read Request (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>), “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>j</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the number of ongoing services for Modify Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>M</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>), “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>C</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mn>1</mn> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the threshold of the Authentic phase, “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>C</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mn>2</mn> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the threshold of suspicious phase, and “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>D</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the number of ongoing Malicious Delete Requests.</p>
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<p>Representation of the MDP model as a set of states (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>C</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mn>1</mn> </mrow> </msub> <mo>=</mo> <mn>2</mn> </mrow> </semantics></math> and <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>C</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mn>2</mn> </mrow> </msub> <mo>=</mo> <mn>3</mn> </mrow> </semantics></math>), where “S(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>)” is the state with certain <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>i</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math> and <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>j</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math> requests, “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>i</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math>” represents the number of ongoing services for Read Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>), “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>j</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the number of ongoing services for Modify Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>M</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>), “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>C</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mn>1</mn> </mrow> </msub> <mo>=</mo> <mn>2</mn> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the threshold of the Authentic phase, “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>C</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mn>2</mn> </mrow> </msub> <mo>=</mo> <mn>3</mn> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the threshold of the suspicious phase, and “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>D</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the number of ongoing Malicious Delete Requests.</p>
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<p>Transitioning from S(0,0) in the “Initial phase” to different states in the “Authentic phase”; “S(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>)” represents different states, where “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>i</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the number of ongoing services for Read Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>) and “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>j</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the number of ongoing services for Modify Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>M</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>).</p>
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<p>Transitioning from the “Authentic phase” to the “Initial phase” or the “Suspicious phase”; “S(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>)” represents different states, where “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>i</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the number of ongoing services for Read Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>) and “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>j</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the number of ongoing services for Modify Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>M</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>).</p>
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<p>Transitioning from the “Malicious phase” to the “Suspicious phase”; “S(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>)” represents different states, where “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>i</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the number of ongoing services for Read Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>) and “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>j</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the number of ongoing services for Modify Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>M</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>).</p>
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<p>The probability values for each state S(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>) in the normal cycle, where “S(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>)” represents different states, <span class="html-italic">π</span>(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>) is the steady-state probability, “<span class="html-italic">i</span>” is the number of ongoing services for Read Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>), and “<span class="html-italic">j</span>” is the number of ongoing services for Modify Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>M</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>).</p>
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<p>The probability values for each state S(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>) in the Suspicious scenario, where “S(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>)” represents different states, <span class="html-italic">π</span>(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>) is the steady-state probability, “<span class="html-italic">i</span>” is the number of ongoing services for Read Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>), and “<span class="html-italic">j</span>” is the number of ongoing services for Modify Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>M</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>).</p>
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<p>The probability values for each state S(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>) in the attack scenario, where “S(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>)” represents different states, <span class="html-italic">π</span>(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>) is the steady-state probability, “<span class="html-italic">i</span>” is the number of ongoing services for Read Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>), and “<span class="html-italic">j</span>” is the number of ongoing services for Modify Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>M</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>).</p>
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18 pages, 1400 KiB  
Review
Advanced Imaging for Localized Prostate Cancer
by Patrick Albers and Adam Kinnaird
Cancers 2024, 16(20), 3490; https://doi.org/10.3390/cancers16203490 - 15 Oct 2024
Viewed by 1004
Abstract
Background/Objectives: Prostate cancer is a prevalent malignancy often presenting without early symptoms. Advanced imaging technologies have revolutionized its diagnosis and management. This review discusses the principles, benefits, and clinical applications of multiparametric magnetic resonance imaging (mpMRI), micro-ultrasound (microUS), and prostate-specific membrane antigen positron [...] Read more.
Background/Objectives: Prostate cancer is a prevalent malignancy often presenting without early symptoms. Advanced imaging technologies have revolutionized its diagnosis and management. This review discusses the principles, benefits, and clinical applications of multiparametric magnetic resonance imaging (mpMRI), micro-ultrasound (microUS), and prostate-specific membrane antigen positron emission tomography–computed tomography (PSMA PET/CT) in localized prostate cancer. Methods: We conducted a comprehensive literature review of recent studies and guidelines on mpMRI, microUS, and PSMA PET/CT in prostate cancer diagnosis, focusing on their applications in biopsy-naïve patients, those with previous negative biopsies, and patients under active surveillance. Results: MpMRI has demonstrated high sensitivity and negative predictive value in detecting clinically significant prostate cancer (csPCa). MicroUS, a newer technology, has shown promising results in early studies, with sensitivity and specificity comparable to mpMRI. PSMA PET/CT has emerged as a highly sensitive and specific imaging modality, particularly valuable for staging and detecting metastatic disease. All three technologies have been incorporated into urologic practice for prostate cancer diagnosis and management, with each offering unique advantages in different clinical scenarios. Conclusions: Advanced imaging techniques, including mpMRI, microUS, and PSMA PET/CT, have significantly improved the accuracy of prostate cancer diagnosis, staging, and management. These technologies enable more precise targeting of suspicious lesions during biopsy and therapy planning. However, further research, especially randomized controlled trials, is needed to fully establish the optimal use and inclusion of these imaging modalities in various stages of prostate cancer care. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Contemporary Diagnosis and Management of Prostate Cancer)
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<p>Prostate Risk Identification Using Micro-Ultrasound (PRI-MUS) score.</p>
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<p>Comparison of mpMRI and PSMA-PET images showing concordance and discordance between the imaging techniques and pathology. (Arrows point to areas of suspected prostate cancer on imaging and confirmed diagnosis on pathology; (<b>A</b>) shows an MRI lesion on patient 1’s left mid gland, (<b>B</b>) shows suspected prostate cancer by <sup>18</sup>F-PSMA-1007 in patient 1’s left mid gland, (<b>C</b>) shows prostate cancer found by pathology review in the left mid gland of the prostate, (<b>D</b>) shows an MRI lesion on patient 2’s right apex, (<b>E</b>) shows suspected bilateral prostate cancer by <sup>18</sup>F-PSMA-1007 in patient 2, (<b>F</b>) shows bilateral prostate cancer found on pathology review of the specimen).</p>
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12 pages, 1550 KiB  
Brief Report
Concordance of Chest Radiography and Chest Computed Tomography Findings in Patients with Hematologic Malignancy and Invasive Mucormycosis: What Are the Prognostic Implications?
by Sebastian Wurster, Sung-Yeon Cho, Hazim Allos, Alexander Franklin, Dierdre B. Axell-House, Ying Jiang and Dimitrios P. Kontoyiannis
J. Fungi 2024, 10(10), 703; https://doi.org/10.3390/jof10100703 - 9 Oct 2024
Viewed by 884
Abstract
Invasive pulmonary mucormycosis (IPM) is a deadly opportunistic mold infection in patients with hematological malignancies (HM). Radiologic imaging is essential for its timely diagnosis. Here, we compared IPM lesions visualized by chest computed tomography (CCT) and chest X-ray (CXR) and determined the prognostic [...] Read more.
Invasive pulmonary mucormycosis (IPM) is a deadly opportunistic mold infection in patients with hematological malignancies (HM). Radiologic imaging is essential for its timely diagnosis. Here, we compared IPM lesions visualized by chest computed tomography (CCT) and chest X-ray (CXR) and determined the prognostic significance of discordant imaging. Therefore, we reviewed 44 consecutive HM patients with probable/proven IPM at MD Anderson Cancer Center in 2000–2020 who had concurrent CCT and CXR studies performed. All 44 patients had abnormal CCTs and 39 (89%) had anormal CXR findings at IPM diagnosis. However, only 26 patients (59%) showed CCT-matching IPM-suspicious lesions on CXR. Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation II score > 18 at IPM diagnosis and breakthrough infection to Mucorales-active antifungals were the only independent risk factors for 42-day and/or 84-day mortality. Absence of neutropenia at IPM diagnosis, neutrophil recovery in neutropenic patients, and surgical revision of mucormycosis lesions were protective factors. Although not reaching significance on multivariable analysis, visualization of CCT-matching lesions on CXR was associated with significantly increased 84-day mortality (log-rank test, p = 0.033), possibly as a surrogate of extensive lesions and tissue necrosis. This observation supports the exploration of radiologic lesion kinetics as a prognostic staging tool in IPM patients. Full article
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<p>Representative radiologic images from patients with (1) an IPM-suspicious CCT but normal CXR, (2) IPM-suspicious CCT with abnormal but discordant CXR, and (3) matching IPM-suspicious lesions on CCT and CXR. Patient 1: (<b>A</b>,<b>B</b>) CCTs showing a 2 cm solid nodule in the left lower lobe (yellow arrowhead). Other CCT images not included in this figure revealed ground glass opacities with nodules in the right lower lobe, indicative of multifocal infection. (<b>C</b>) Largely normal CXR without signs of pneumonia. Patient 2: (<b>D</b>,<b>E</b>) CCTs showing bilateral ill-defined ground glass opacities (brown arrowheads) and nodules predominating in the upper lobes, one of which is cavitating (blue arrowheads). (<b>F</b>) CXR not revealing the lesions seen on CCT but showing linear opacities in the right middle lobe (green arrowhead) and slightly increased opacity in the right apex. Patient 3: (<b>G</b>,<b>H</b>) CCT showing bilateral pneumonia with multifocal consolidation and opacities (e.g., in the area highlighted with purple arrowheads) and nodules/consolidations with reverse halo morphology (red arrowheads). (<b>I</b>) CXR showing bilateral airspace disease with numerous opacities and nodules that are consistent with the CCT findings. Abbreviations: CCT = chest computed tomography; CXR = chest X-ray; IPM = invasive pulmonary mucormycosis.</p>
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<p>Concordance of CCT and CXR findings. Numbers of patients by type of mucormycosis-suspicious CCT finding, subdivided by concordance of lesions visualized on CXR. Percentages on the right represent the proportion of patients with matching CXR lesions of the same type among those who showed the respective CCT feature. Abbreviations: CCT = chest computed tomography; CXR = chest X-ray.</p>
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<p>CCT-matching lesions on CXR are associated with worse 84-day mortality outcomes in patients with hematological malignancies and IPM. Kaplan–Meier survival curves for days 0–84 after IPM symptom onset in all patients included in this study (<b>A</b>, <span class="html-italic">n</span> = 44) or only those with neutropenia (absolute neutrophil count &lt; 500) at IPM diagnosis (<b>B</b>, <span class="html-italic">n</span> = 31), subdivided by presence or absence of CCT-matching IPM lesions on CXR. Error bands denote 95% confidence intervals. Mantel–Cox log-rank test. Abbreviations: CCT = chest computed tomography; CXR = chest X-ray; IPM = invasive pulmonary mucormycosis.</p>
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27 pages, 13890 KiB  
Article
A Fast Multi-Scale of Distributed Batch-Learning Growing Neural Gas for Multi-Camera 3D Environmental Map Building
by Chyan Zheng Siow, Azhar Aulia Saputra, Takenori Obo and Naoyuki Kubota
Biomimetics 2024, 9(9), 560; https://doi.org/10.3390/biomimetics9090560 - 16 Sep 2024
Viewed by 961
Abstract
Biologically inspired intelligent methods have been applied to various sensing systems in order to extract features from a huge size of raw sensing data. For example, point cloud data can be applied to human activity recognition, multi-person tracking, and suspicious person detection, but [...] Read more.
Biologically inspired intelligent methods have been applied to various sensing systems in order to extract features from a huge size of raw sensing data. For example, point cloud data can be applied to human activity recognition, multi-person tracking, and suspicious person detection, but a single RGB-D camera is not enough to perform the above tasks. Therefore, this study propose a 3D environmental map-building method integrating point cloud data measured via multiple RGB-D cameras. First, a fast multi-scale of distributed batch-learning growing neural gas (Fast MS-DBL-GNG) is proposed as a topological feature extraction method in order to reduce computational costs because a single RGB-D camera may output 1 million data. Next, random sample consensus (RANSAC) is applied to integrate two sets of point cloud data using topological features. In order to show the effectiveness of the proposed method, Fast MS-DBL-GNG is applied to perform topological mapping from several point cloud data sets measured in different directions with some overlapping areas included in two images. The experimental results show that the proposed method can extract topological features enough to integrate point cloud data sets, and it runs 14 times faster than the previous GNG method with a 23% reduction in the quantization error. Finally, this paper discuss the advantage and disadvantage of the proposed method through numerical comparison with other methods, and explain future works to improve the proposed method. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Biomimetics in Intelligent Sensor)
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<p>The GNG topological map in the experimental dataset. As can be seen from the figure, when GNG learns a position and color, the connections appear very messy. (<b>a</b>) Original point cloud. (<b>b</b>) The GNG topology is learned using the position. (<b>c</b>) The GNG topology is learned using the position and color.</p>
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<p>Map building methods for path planning. (<b>a</b>) A real environment. (<b>b</b>) A grid map. (<b>c</b>) A polygonal map.</p>
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<p>Topological map building. (<b>a</b>) Environmental map. (<b>b</b>) Roadmap.</p>
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<p>An example of topological path planning in a polygonal map. (<b>a</b>) Visibility graph. (<b>b</b>) Voronoi diagram.</p>
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<p>The overall process of fast MS-DBL-GNG. The network is first initialized by creating multiple starting points in the point cloud. Then, based on the initialization, the point cloud data are rearranged and split into multi-scale mini-batches. For each mini-batch, it learns twice. During the learning process, it first resets the temporary variables and then learns the mini-batch in a batch matrix calculation manner. After learning is completed, the temporary variables are used to update the network node weights and edges. Then, it calculates the total number of nodes that should be added and, next, adds them to the network. The process is repeated until all multi-scale mini-batches are gone through.</p>
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<p>An example of distributed initialization for three starting points. The circles are data, and the asterisks are nodes. First, a node is randomly selected in the last batch of data as the first starting point. Then, the third closest node is selected and connected. After that, the first <span class="html-italic">B</span> data surrounding it are deleted. The next starting point is selected in the area farthest from the current starting point. The same process is repeated until all three points are initialized.</p>
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<p>The fast multi-scale batch-learning process. Data are learned from a small scale (<b>left</b>) to a full batch (<b>right</b>). However, this study avoid learning the full batch and instead learn the same mini-batch twice in each learning phase.</p>
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<p>The example procedure for balancing the data distribution in each mini-batch, where <math display="inline"><semantics> <mi>η</mi> </semantics></math> is 3, and <span class="html-italic">L</span> is 2. First, divide each set of data <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mover accent="true"> <mi mathvariant="bold-italic">X</mi> <mo>^</mo> </mover> <mi>t</mi> </msub> </semantics></math> into <math display="inline"><semantics> <msup> <mn>2</mn> <mi>L</mi> </msup> </semantics></math> groups and then rearrange the data to data <math display="inline"><semantics> <mi mathvariant="bold-italic">X</mi> </semantics></math>.</p>
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<p>The overall system architecture for automatic calibration using topological mapping. First, set up two Orbbec cameras in the environment to observe two different and partially overlapping areas. Then, extract RGB point clouds based on the intrinsic parameters, depth, and RGB color provided via the cameras. Use the proposed method, fast MS-DBL-GNG, to extract topological maps from each point cloud. These topological maps are then used to extract histogram features, followed by calibration using RANSAC and Color-ICP. Through calibration, extrinsic parameters are obtained and used to calibrate the point cloud to the world coordinate system.</p>
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<p>The challenge of calibrating three or more point clouds is that the two selected point clouds do not have any overlapping areas. In addition, there is no camera arrangement ID between these cameras.</p>
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<p>Each point cloud is first merged with the best matching point cloud. Duplicate merges are removed. And then, the matching is performed again until all point clouds have been used.</p>
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<p>Two different view setups used for the experiments.</p>
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<p>Examples of photos taken from two view types. From left to right, the first two are view type 1, and the second two are view type 2.</p>
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<p>Examples of point clouds taken from two view types. From left to right, the first two are view type 1, and the second two are view type 2.</p>
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<p>The different learning phase results.</p>
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<p>Several examples of topological maps extracted from point clouds using fast MS-DBL-GNG. From left to right, the first two are view type 1, and the second two are view type 2.</p>
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<p>The examples of calibrated point cloud results for view type 1 (<b>left</b>) and view type 2 (<b>right</b>).</p>
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<p>Example point cloud for multi-camera calibration. All of these views are related from left to right or right to left.</p>
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<p>The example of point clouds from four camera views calibrated using the proposed method.</p>
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<p>Example of topological map usage for two calibration point clouds. It is easy to distinguish which ones are walkable through the topological map (the blue-colored topological map). From the walkable path, it can be seen that it does not cover the area close to the table, which is an advantage for the robot to navigate. This is a concept of intelligence sensors that provide the required information appropriately to the target. (<b>a</b>) Calibrated with two point clouds. (<b>b</b>) Merged from two topological maps. (<b>c</b>) Extracted walkable area of topological maps.</p>
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17 pages, 2194 KiB  
Article
A Multidimensional Framework Incorporating 2D U-Net and 3D Attention U-Net for the Segmentation of Organs from 3D Fluorodeoxyglucose-Positron Emission Tomography Images
by Andreas Vezakis, Ioannis Vezakis, Theodoros P. Vagenas, Ioannis Kakkos and George K. Matsopoulos
Electronics 2024, 13(17), 3526; https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13173526 - 5 Sep 2024
Viewed by 684
Abstract
Accurate analysis of Fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG)-Positron Emission Tomography (PET) images is crucial for the diagnosis, treatment assessment, and monitoring of patients suffering from various cancer types. FDG-PET images provide valuable insights by revealing regions where FDG, a glucose analog, accumulates within the body. While [...] Read more.
Accurate analysis of Fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG)-Positron Emission Tomography (PET) images is crucial for the diagnosis, treatment assessment, and monitoring of patients suffering from various cancer types. FDG-PET images provide valuable insights by revealing regions where FDG, a glucose analog, accumulates within the body. While regions of high FDG uptake include suspicious tumor lesions, FDG also accumulates in non-tumor-specific regions and organs. Identifying these regions is crucial for excluding them from certain measurements, or calculating useful parameters, for example, the mean standardized uptake value (SUV) to assess the metabolic activity of the liver. Manual organ delineation from FDG-PET by clinicians demands significant effort and time, which is often not feasible in real clinical workflows with high patient loads. For this reason, this study focuses on automatically identifying key organs with high FDG uptake, namely the brain, left cardiac ventricle, kidneys, liver, and bladder. To this end, an ensemble approach is adopted, where a three-dimensional Attention U-Net (3D AU-Net) is employed for robust three-dimensional analysis, while a two-dimensional U-Net (2D U-Net) is utilized for analysis in the coronal plane. The 3D AU-Net demonstrates highly detailed organ segmentations, but also includes many false positive regions. In contrast, 2D U-Net achieves higher reliability with minimal false positive regions, but lacks the 3D details. Experiments conducted on a subset of the public AutoPET dataset with 60 PET scans demonstrate that the proposed ensemble model achieves high accuracy in segmenting the required organs, surpassing current state-of-the-art techniques, and supporting the potential utilization of the proposed methodology in accelerating and enhancing the clinical workflow of cancer patients. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Artificial Intelligence in Image Processing and Computer Vision)
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<p>Architecture of 3D Attention U-Net. Each block in the diagram is colored according to its operation type. The output size of the feature maps from each block is specified below it. The skip connections between the encoder and the decoder parts of the network, indicated with the blue arrows, also contain an Attention Gate, denoted with the circled A.</p>
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<p>Architecture of 2D U-Net. Differences between its 3D counterpart in <a href="#electronics-13-03526-f001" class="html-fig">Figure 1</a> include the fewer dimensions as indicated below each block, as well as the absence of the Attention Gate in the skip connections indicated by the blue arrows.</p>
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<p>Example of the proposed approach process for the case of brain segmentation. Green color indicates the ground truth, while blue indicates network predictions. (<b>a</b>) depicts the ground truth segmentation. (<b>b</b>) depicts the 2D U-Net output, which, while successful in localizing the brain region, fails to accurately capture the brain’s geometry. (<b>c</b>) The 3D Attention U-Net output provides a more complete segmentation of the full brain geometry, but additionally introduces several false positive segmentation masks. (<b>d</b>) The final output merges the results of the 2D and 3D U-Net counterparts, preserving only the correct brain segmentation.</p>
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<p>Comparison of the ensemble method with the individual models and ground truth, displayed in the coronal plane. (<b>a</b>) shows the output of 2D U-Net, (<b>b</b>) shows the output of 3D Attention U-Net, (<b>c</b>) displays the output of the ensemble method, and (<b>d</b>) presents the ground truth. The masks are color coded as follows: red for the left ventricle of the heart, blue for the liver and brain, yellow for the bladder, and green for the kidneys. Overlapping colors, particularly in (<b>b</b>), indicate false positive regions. The final ensemble method output, shown in (<b>c</b>), eliminates false positives closely resembling the ground truth.</p>
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<p>Comparison of the ensemble method with individual models and the ground truth, displayed in the sagittal view. (<b>a</b>) shows the output of 2D U-Net, (<b>b</b>) shows the output of 3D Attention U-Net, (<b>c</b>) displays the output of the ensemble method, and (<b>d</b>) presents the ground truth. The masks are color coded as follows: red for the left ventricle, blue for the liver and brain, yellow for the bladder, and green for the kidneys. The bladder and liver are not present in this specific slice, yet their color-coded masks are visible, indicating some falsely segmented regions. False positive regions are evident in (<b>a</b>,<b>b</b>). The final ensemble output, shown in (<b>c</b>), reduces the false positives, and closely resembles the ground truth but fails to include the kidney mask.</p>
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30 pages, 5185 KiB  
Article
A Hybrid Framework for Maritime Surveillance: Detecting Illegal Activities through Vessel Behaviors and Expert Rules Fusion
by Vinicius D. do Nascimento, Tiago A. O. Alves, Claudio M. de Farias and Diego Leonel Cadette Dutra
Sensors 2024, 24(17), 5623; https://doi.org/10.3390/s24175623 - 30 Aug 2024
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 899
Abstract
Maritime traffic is essential for global trade but faces significant challenges, including navigation safety, environmental protection, and the prevention of illicit activities. This work presents a framework for detecting illegal activities carried out by vessels, combining navigation behavior detection models with rules based [...] Read more.
Maritime traffic is essential for global trade but faces significant challenges, including navigation safety, environmental protection, and the prevention of illicit activities. This work presents a framework for detecting illegal activities carried out by vessels, combining navigation behavior detection models with rules based on expert knowledge. Using synthetic and real datasets based on the Automatic Identification System (AIS), we structured our framework into five levels based on the Joint Directors of Laboratories (JDL) model, efficiently integrating data from multiple sources. Activities are classified into four categories: illegal fishing, suspicious activity, anomalous activity, and normal activity. To address the issue of a lack of labels and integrate data-driven detection with expert knowledge, we employed a stack ensemble model along with active learning. The results showed that the framework was highly effective, achieving 99% accuracy in detecting illegal fishing and 92% in detecting suspicious activities. Furthermore, it drastically reduced the need for manual checks by specialists, transforming experts’ tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge through the models and allowing continuous updates of maritime domain rules. This work significantly contributes to maritime surveillance, offering a scalable and efficient solution for detecting illegal activities in the maritime domain. Full article
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<p>A summarized process for detecting illegal activities in the maritime domain.</p>
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<p>Vessel trajectory example.</p>
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<p>An instance of spoofing. The SOG given by the AIS is 3.2 knots. However, when we compute the speed using the coordinates and the time taken to move between them, we obtain a speed of 92 knots.</p>
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<p>An example of an encounter at sea between vessels. The green points represent the trajectory of Vessel 1, while the red points represent Vessel 2. The blue squares represent FPSO areas. The image shows that the vessel had an encounter outside the FPSO area.</p>
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<p>The image shows an example of gap detection in a vessel’s trajectory. The blue points reflect the vessel’s trajectory. The red squares indicate where the vessel should have transmitted the AIS signal, while the green squares represent where the vessel did transmit. The red squares represent transmission gaps.</p>
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<p>A fishing trajectory example.</p>
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<p>In the picture, we can see rules established by the expert based on his expertise. For example, the expert establishes kinematic rules for specific areas (e.g., MPA and FPSO areas), vessel identification characteristics, the distance from the shore where certain activities occur, and so on.</p>
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<p>Levels of the JDL-based framework process.</p>
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<p>Experts evaluate trajectories through an interface at the impact assessment level. The user can have a situational awareness of a trajectory with vessel information, navigation behaviors presented by the trajectory, and whether the trajectory triggers the rules created by the expert.</p>
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<p>The active learning training process in the framework.</p>
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<p>The maritime monitoring framework processing trajectories after training. Online data stream processing can make use of this procedure.</p>
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<p>Confusion matrix of the predictions of the metamodel.</p>
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<p>This figure shows the SHAP graphics for the metamodel predictions. The SHAP shows the contributions of each dimension to the class prediction.</p>
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<p>All trajectories inferred by the framework plotted on the map.</p>
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<p>The image presents a real-world example of an anomalous activity that the framework has identified. An unidentified vessel with trajectory gaps and a sinuous path close to EEZ boundaries.</p>
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<p>The image shows suspicious activity detected by the framework. The vessel represented by the green points is encountering the vessel represented by the red points at 70 NM off the coast.</p>
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<p>The figure shows trajectories detected as suspicious by the framework. The red points represent the trajectories of foreign fishing vessels along the northern coast of Brazil.</p>
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<p>The figure shows a situation detected as suspicious activity by the framework. A vessel anchored within a marine protected area.</p>
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12 pages, 1579 KiB  
Case Report
Concurrent Chronic Exertional Compartment Syndrome and Popliteal Artery Entrapment Syndrome
by Tiffany R. Bellomo, Connie Hsu, Pavan Bolla, Abhisekh Mohapatra and Dana Helice Kotler
Diagnostics 2024, 14(16), 1825; https://doi.org/10.3390/diagnostics14161825 - 21 Aug 2024
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 922
Abstract
Exertional leg pain occurs with notable frequency among athletes and poses diagnostic challenges to clinicians due to overlapping symptomatology. In this case report, we delineate the clinical presentation of a young collegiate soccer player who endured two years of progressive bilateral exertional calf [...] Read more.
Exertional leg pain occurs with notable frequency among athletes and poses diagnostic challenges to clinicians due to overlapping symptomatology. In this case report, we delineate the clinical presentation of a young collegiate soccer player who endured two years of progressive bilateral exertional calf pain and ankle weakness during athletic activity. The initial assessment yielded a diagnosis of chronic exertional compartment syndrome (CECS), predicated on the results of compartment testing. However, her clinical presentation was suspicious for concurrent type VI popliteal artery entrapment syndrome (PAES), prompting further radiographic testing of magnetic resonance angiography (MRA). MRA revealed severe arterial spasm with plantarflexion bilaterally, corroborating the additional diagnosis of PEAS. Given the worsening symptoms, the patient underwent open popliteal entrapment release of the right leg. Although CECS and PAES are both known phenomena that are observed in collegiate athletes, their co-occurrence is uncommon owing to their different pathophysiological underpinnings. This case underscores the importance for clinicians to be aware that the successful diagnosis of one condition does not exclude the possibility of a secondary, unrelated pathology. This case also highlights the importance of dynamic imaging modalities, including point-of-care ultrasound, dynamic MRA, and dynamic angiogram. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Recent Advances in the Diagnosis and Prognosis of Sports Injuries)
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<p>Timeline of patient’s symptoms, testing, and treatment.</p>
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<p>Magnetic resonance angiography of bilateral popliteal arteries.</p>
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<p>Diagnostic angiogram of bilateral popliteal arteries. (<b>A</b>) Right popliteal artery with normal flow. (<b>B</b>) Right popliteal artery compressed during plantarflexion. (<b>C</b>) Left popliteal artery with normal flow. (<b>D</b>) Left popliteal artery compressed during plantarflexion.</p>
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17 pages, 6217 KiB  
Article
Machine-Learning-Enabled Diagnostics with Improved Visualization of Disease Lesions in Chest X-ray Images
by Md Fashiar Rahman, Tzu-Liang (Bill) Tseng, Michael Pokojovy, Peter McCaffrey, Eric Walser, Scott Moen, Alex Vo and Johnny C. Ho
Diagnostics 2024, 14(16), 1699; https://doi.org/10.3390/diagnostics14161699 - 6 Aug 2024
Viewed by 1350
Abstract
The class activation map (CAM) represents the neural-network-derived region of interest, which can help clarify the mechanism of the convolutional neural network’s determination of any class of interest. In medical imaging, it can help medical practitioners diagnose diseases like COVID-19 or pneumonia by [...] Read more.
The class activation map (CAM) represents the neural-network-derived region of interest, which can help clarify the mechanism of the convolutional neural network’s determination of any class of interest. In medical imaging, it can help medical practitioners diagnose diseases like COVID-19 or pneumonia by highlighting the suspicious regions in Computational Tomography (CT) or chest X-ray (CXR) film. Many contemporary deep learning techniques only focus on COVID-19 classification tasks using CXRs, while few attempt to make it explainable with a saliency map. To fill this research gap, we first propose a VGG-16-architecture-based deep learning approach in combination with image enhancement, segmentation-based region of interest (ROI) cropping, and data augmentation steps to enhance classification accuracy. Later, a multi-layer Gradient CAM (ML-Grad-CAM) algorithm is integrated to generate a class-specific saliency map for improved visualization in CXR images. We also define and calculate a Severity Assessment Index (SAI) from the saliency map to quantitatively measure infection severity. The trained model achieved an accuracy score of 96.44% for the three-class CXR classification task, i.e., COVID-19, pneumonia, and normal (healthy patients), outperforming many existing techniques in the literature. The saliency maps generated from the proposed ML-GRAD-CAM algorithm are compared with the original Gran-CAM algorithm. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence in Diagnostics)
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<p>The framework of CXR image classification and lesion visualization; (<b>a</b>) image preprocessing with ROI cropping and augmentation, (<b>b</b>) multi-class classification with modified VGG16 architecture, and (<b>c</b>) the integration of the ML-GRAD-CAM algorithm for visualization.</p>
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<p>A patch-based U-Net segmentation network [<a href="#B38-diagnostics-14-01699" class="html-bibr">38</a>] was used for transfer learning. Cropped patches were fed into the network to segment individual patches and later merged together to obtain the whole lung region segmentation.</p>
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<p>Cropping ROI from CXR: (<b>a</b>) original CXR image, (<b>b</b>) segmented mask with tight rectangular bbox, (<b>c</b>) bounding box around the lung region with additional 10 pixels (green), and (<b>d</b>) cropped ROI.</p>
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<p>The CNN model for CXR image classification.</p>
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<p>Architecture of multi-layer Grad-CAM (ML Grad-CAM).</p>
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<p>History of the model training by epoch (<b>left</b>) training and validation accuracy and (<b>right</b>) training and validation loss.</p>
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<p>Confusion matrix: (<b>a</b>) using whole CXR images unbalanced; (<b>b</b>) using whole CXR images balanced (without ROI cropping); and (<b>c</b>) using ROI CXR images balanced.</p>
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<p>Comparison of heatmaps for COVID-19 CXR images. The rows show three randomly selected images from the COVID-19 test dataset. Column 1 shows the original images with potential suspected lung regions, column 2 shows the heatmap from the Grad-CAM algorithm, and the last column shows the heatmap obtained from the proposed ML Grad-CAM algorithm.</p>
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<p>Comparison of heatmaps for normal CXR images. The rows show three randomly selected images from the normal test dataset. Column 1 shows the original images, column 2 shows the heatmap from the Grad-CAM algorithm, and the last column shows the heatmap obtained from the proposed ML Grad-CAM algorithm.</p>
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<p>Comparison of heatmaps for pneumonia CXR images. The rows show three randomly selected images from the Pneumonia test dataset. Column 1 shows the original images with potential suspected lung regions, column 2 shows the heatmap from the Grad-CAM algorithm, and the last column shows the heatmap obtained from the proposed ML Grad-CAM algorithm.</p>
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<p>Distribution of SAI Scores for (<b>a</b>) COVID-19 CXRs, (<b>b</b>) normal CXRs, and (<b>c</b>) pneumonia CXRs.</p>
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<p>Examples of CXR images with their corresponding heatmaps and SAI values. The first row shows examples of COVID-19 classes with their corresponding heatmap and SAI values. Similarly, the second and third rows show examples of the normal and pneumonia classes, respectively.</p>
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17 pages, 4274 KiB  
Article
Improved Brain Tumor Segmentation in MR Images with a Modified U-Net
by Hiam Alquran, Mohammed Alslatie, Ali Rababah and Wan Azani Mustafa
Appl. Sci. 2024, 14(15), 6504; https://doi.org/10.3390/app14156504 - 25 Jul 2024
Viewed by 1993
Abstract
Detecting brain tumors is crucial in medical diagnostics due to the serious health risks these abnormalities present to patients. Deep learning approaches can significantly improve localization in various medical issues, particularly brain tumors. This paper emphasizes the use of deep learning models to [...] Read more.
Detecting brain tumors is crucial in medical diagnostics due to the serious health risks these abnormalities present to patients. Deep learning approaches can significantly improve localization in various medical issues, particularly brain tumors. This paper emphasizes the use of deep learning models to segment brain tumors using a large dataset. The study involves comparing modifications to U-Net structures, including kernel size, number of channels, dropout ratio, and changing the activation function from ReLU to Leaky ReLU. Optimizing these parameters has notably enhanced brain tumor segmentation in MR images, achieving a Global Accuracy of 99.4% and a dice similarity coefficient of 90.2%. The model was trained, validated, and tested on many magnetic resonance images, with a training time not exceeding 19 min on a powerful GPU. This approach can be extended in medical care and hospitals to assist radiologists in identifying tumor locations and suspicious regions, thereby improving diagnosis and treatment effectiveness. The software could also be integrated into MR equipment protocols. Full article
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<p>Comprehensive image segmentation workflow encompasses all stages, from data preparation to model evaluation and visualization.</p>
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<p>Multiple MRI brain images depicting tumors with corresponding masks from a 2D brain tumor segmentation dataset [<a href="#B44-applsci-14-06504" class="html-bibr">44</a>]. (<b>a</b>) Original MRI image showing a tumor. (<b>b</b>) Binary mask highlighting the tumor region. (<b>c</b>) Additional MRI scan. (<b>d</b>) Corresponding binary mask indicating the tumor.</p>
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<p>The Enhanced U-Net structure with new activation and pooling functions besides changing the number of channels, kernel size, and the dropout ratio layer.</p>
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<p>The graphical representation of the metrics in brain tumor segmentation.</p>
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<p>The graphical representation of metrics by various modifications on the original U-Net structure.</p>
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<p>(<b>a</b>) The original test image. (<b>b</b>) The corresponding label.</p>
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<p>The heat map of segmentation results for (<b>a</b>) ResNet-18, (<b>b</b>) ResNet_50, (<b>c</b>) MobileNet, (<b>d</b>) Unet_P1, (<b>e</b>) U-Net_P2, (<b>f</b>) U-Net_P3, (<b>g</b>) U-Net_P4, (<b>h</b>) U-Net_P5, and (<b>i</b>) U-Net_Enhanced.</p>
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<p>The heat map of segmentation results for (<b>a</b>) ResNet-18, (<b>b</b>) ResNet_50, (<b>c</b>) MobileNet, (<b>d</b>) Unet_P1, (<b>e</b>) U-Net_P2, (<b>f</b>) U-Net_P3, (<b>g</b>) U-Net_P4, (<b>h</b>) U-Net_P5, and (<b>i</b>) U-Net_Enhanced.</p>
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<p>Testing the modified version on small tumors, (<b>a</b>) the original image, (<b>b</b>) the ground truth tumor, (<b>c</b>) the predicted tumor using the enhanced model, and (<b>d</b>) the color representation of the exact affected region in the brain.</p>
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19 pages, 1079 KiB  
Article
An Approach for Anomaly Detection in Network Communications Using k-Path Analysis
by Mamadou Kasse, Rodolphe Charrier, Alexandre Berred, Cyrille Bertelle and Christophe Delpierre
J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2024, 4(3), 449-467; https://doi.org/10.3390/jcp4030022 - 19 Jul 2024
Viewed by 1008
Abstract
In this paper, we present an innovative approach inspired by the Path-scan model to detect paths with k adjacent edges (k-path) exhibiting unusual behavior (synonymous with anomaly) within network communications. This work is motivated by the challenge of identifying malicious activities [...] Read more.
In this paper, we present an innovative approach inspired by the Path-scan model to detect paths with k adjacent edges (k-path) exhibiting unusual behavior (synonymous with anomaly) within network communications. This work is motivated by the challenge of identifying malicious activities carried out in vulnerable k-path in a small to medium-sized computer network. Each observed edge (time series of the number of events or the number of packets exchanged between two computers in the network) is modeled using the three-state observed Markov model, as opposed to the Path-scan model which uses a two-state model (active state and inactive state), to establish baselines of behavior in order to detect anomalies. This model captures the typical behavior of network communications, as well as patterns of suspicious activity, such as those associated with brute force attacks. We take a perspective by analyzing each vulnerable k-path, enabling the accurate detection of anomalies on the k-path. Using this approach, our method aims to enhance the detection of suspicious activities in computer networks, thus providing a more robust and accurate solution to ensure the security of computer systems. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Intrusion/Malware Detection and Prevention in Networks—2nd Edition)
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<p>Representation of an intrusion.</p>
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<p>Flow event collection process.</p>
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<p>(<b>a</b>) Event count per minute between 9:00 and 9:30; (<b>b</b>) Packet count per minute between 9:00 and 9:30.</p>
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<p>(<b>a</b>) represents the graphical depiction of a computer network of a small to medium-sized enterprise, and (<b>b</b>) illustrates the graphical representation of the network using active paths during a 30-min period. In (<b>b</b>), we have depicted an example of a <span class="html-italic">four-path</span> in red, and an example of a <span class="html-italic">three-path</span> in green.</p>
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<p>Zones of different states.</p>
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<p>Graphical representation of <math display="inline"><semantics> <mi>γ</mi> </semantics></math>.</p>
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<p>Scenario No. 1: In green, the evolution of the number of times a model predicts “normal” behavior across the series of 100 tests is observed. In blue, the expected values for “normal” behaviors are depicted. (<b>a</b>) <span class="html-italic">Path-scan</span> model associated with the observed Markov model; (<b>b</b>) Three-state model using the number of packets exchanged per minute.</p>
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<p>Scenario No. 1: <span class="html-italic">Path-scan</span> model associated with the observed Markov model.</p>
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<p>Scenario No. 1: Three-state model using the number of packets exchanged per minute.</p>
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<p>Scenario No. 2: In green, the evolution of the number of times a model predicts “normal” behavior across the series of 50 tests is observed. In red, the evolution of the number of times a model predicts “abnormal” behavior across the series of 50 tests is presented. In blue, the expected values for “abnormal” and “normal” behaviors are depicted. (<b>a</b>) <span class="html-italic">Path-scan</span> model associated with the observed Markov model; (<b>b</b>) Three-state model using the number of packets exchanged per minute.</p>
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<p>Scenario No. 2: <span class="html-italic">Path-scan</span> model associated with the observed Markov model.</p>
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<p>Scenario No. 2: Three-state model using the number of packets exchanged per minute.</p>
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