When an empirical prediction E of hypothesis H is observed to be true, such observation is said to
confirm, i.e., support (although not prove) the truth of the hypothesis. But why? What justifies the claim that such evidence supports the hypothesis? The
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When an empirical prediction E of hypothesis H is observed to be true, such observation is said to
confirm, i.e., support (although not prove) the truth of the hypothesis. But why? What justifies the claim that such evidence supports the hypothesis? The widely accepted answer is that it is justified by
induction. More specifically, it is commonly held that the following argument, (1) If H then E; (2) E; (3) Therefore, (probably) H (here referred to as ‘hypothetico-deductive confirmation argument’), is inductively strong. Yet this argument looks nothing like an inductive generalization, i.e., it does not seem inductive in the term’s traditional, enumerative sense. If anything, it has the form of the fallacy of affirming the consequent. This paper aims to solve this puzzle. True, in recent decades, ‘induction’ has been sometimes used more broadly to encompass any non-deductive, i.e.,
ampliative, argument. Applying Bayesian confirmation theory has famously demonstrated that hypothetico-deductive confirmation is indeed inductive in this broader, ampliative sense. Nonetheless, it will be argued here that, despite appearance, hypothetico-deductive confirmation can also be recast as
enumerative induction. Hence, by being enumeratively inductive, the scientific method of hypothetico-deductive confirmation is justified through this traditional, more restrictive type of induction rather than merely by ampliative induction.
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