[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/
You seem to have javascript disabled. Please note that many of the page functionalities won't work as expected without javascript enabled.
 
 
Sign in to use this feature.

Years

Between: -

Subjects

remove_circle_outline
remove_circle_outline
remove_circle_outline
remove_circle_outline
remove_circle_outline
remove_circle_outline
remove_circle_outline
remove_circle_outline
remove_circle_outline

Journals

Article Types

Countries / Regions

remove_circle_outline
remove_circle_outline
remove_circle_outline
remove_circle_outline

Search Results (209)

Search Parameters:
Keywords = attack graph

Order results
Result details
Results per page
Select all
Export citation of selected articles as:
24 pages, 5495 KiB  
Article
Generative Image Steganography via Encoding Pose Keypoints
by Yi Cao, Wentao Ge, Chengsheng Yuan and Quan Wang
Appl. Sci. 2025, 15(1), 58; https://doi.org/10.3390/app15010058 - 25 Dec 2024
Viewed by 371
Abstract
Existing generative image steganography methods typically encode secret information into latent vectors, which are transformed into the entangled features of generated images. This approach faces two main challenges: (1) Transmission can degrade the quality of stego-images, causing bit errors in information extraction. (2) [...] Read more.
Existing generative image steganography methods typically encode secret information into latent vectors, which are transformed into the entangled features of generated images. This approach faces two main challenges: (1) Transmission can degrade the quality of stego-images, causing bit errors in information extraction. (2) High embedding capacity often reduces the accuracy of information extraction. To overcome these limitations, this paper presents a novel generative image steganography via encoding pose keypoints. This method employs an LSTM-based sequence generation model to embed secret information into the generation process of pose keypoint sequences. Each generated sequence is drawn as a keypoint connectivity graph, which serves as input with an original image to a trained pose-guided person image generation model (DPTN-TA) to generate an image with the target pose. The sender uploads the generated images to a public channel to transmit the secret information. On the receiver’s side, an improved YOLOv8 pose estimation model extracts the pose keypoints from the stego-images and decodes the embedded secret information using the sequence generation model. Extensive experiments on the DeepFashion dataset show that the proposed method significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods in information extraction accuracy, achieving 99.94%. It also achieves an average hiding capacity of 178.4 bits per image. This method is robust against common image attacks, such as salt and pepper noise, median filtering, compression, and screenshots, with an average bit error rate of less than 0.87%. Additionally, the method is optimized for fast inference and lightweight deployment, enhancing its real-world applicability. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section Computing and Artificial Intelligence)
Show Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1
<p>Overall framework of steganography.</p>
Full article ">Figure 2
<p>Distribution heatmap of the original keypoint.</p>
Full article ">Figure 3
<p>Sequence generation process.</p>
Full article ">Figure 4
<p>Structure of the DPTN-TA. It contains a self-reconstruction branch for auxiliary source-to-source task, and a transformation branch for main source-to-target task. These two branches share partial weights and are communicated by a pose transformer module.</p>
Full article ">Figure 5
<p>Structure of the improved YOLOv8n-Pose.</p>
Full article ">Figure 6
<p>Part of the backbone network module.</p>
Full article ">Figure 7
<p>Structure of RepConv at different stages.</p>
Full article ">Figure 8
<p>Marking sequence of pose keypoints.</p>
Full article ">Figure 9
<p>Examples of different image attacks.</p>
Full article ">Figure 10
<p>Robustness comparison under different attitude estimation networks.</p>
Full article ">Figure 11
<p>Promotional Tweet Example with Stego-Images.</p>
Full article ">Figure 12
<p>Generation Results Across Different Epochs.</p>
Full article ">
16 pages, 4300 KiB  
Article
A Simple Green Method for the Determination of Hydrogen Peroxide and Fe(III)/Fe(II) Species Based on Monitoring the Decolorization Process of Polymethine Dye Using an Optical Immersion Probe
by Arina Skok, Yaroslav Bazel and Maksym Fizer
Chemosensors 2024, 12(12), 270; https://doi.org/10.3390/chemosensors12120270 - 19 Dec 2024
Viewed by 406
Abstract
We have found that the dye 1,3,3-trimethyl-2-((1′E,3′E,5′E)-5’-(1″,3″,3″-trimethylindol-(2′E)-ylidene)-penta-1″,3″-dien-1″-yl)-3H-indol-1-ium (DTMI-5) can be successfully used for the simple green determination of H2O2 and Fe(III)/Fe(II) species. The dye is characterized by a successful combination of spectral, protolytic, and redox properties, [...] Read more.
We have found that the dye 1,3,3-trimethyl-2-((1′E,3′E,5′E)-5’-(1″,3″,3″-trimethylindol-(2′E)-ylidene)-penta-1″,3″-dien-1″-yl)-3H-indol-1-ium (DTMI-5) can be successfully used for the simple green determination of H2O2 and Fe(III)/Fe(II) species. The dye is characterized by a successful combination of spectral, protolytic, and redox properties, and the process of its decolorization in the Fenton reaction is monitored using an optical immersion probe. Theoretical calculations of the reactive sites in the DTMI-5 molecule under free radical attack reveal that the methine groups of the penta-1′,3′-dien-1′-yl linker serve as the primary reactive centers in Fe3+ or Fenton-type oxidation conditions. Density functional theory (DFT) calculations indicate that the redox potentials of the examined structures range from 0.34 to 1.65 eV. The experimentally observed broad peak at 340–360 nm, which appears after the interaction of DTMI-5 with the Fenton reagent, is attributed to the formation of aldehyde-type oxidation products, whose theoretical CIS(D) absorption maxima were 358.1 and 337.4 nm. The influence of various factors on the course of the reaction was experimentally investigated. The most important analytical characteristics of the methods, such as linearity intervals of calibration graphs, precision, LOD and LOQ values, selectivity coefficients, etc., were determined. The developed methods were applied to model and real samples (water, oxidation emulsion, and fertilizer). Full article
Show Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1
<p>The alternative structures of <b>DTMI-5</b> expected in water solution: (<b>a</b>) 1,3,3-trimethyl-2-((1′E,3′E,5′E)-5′-(1″,3″,3″-trimethylindol-(2″E)-ylidene)-penta-1′,3′-dien-1′-yl)-3H-indol-1-ium (<b>DTMI-5</b>); (<b>b</b>) 1,3,3-trimethyl-2-((1′E,3′E,5′E)-5′-(1″,3″,3″-trimethylindol-(2″Z)-ylidene)-penta-1′,3′-dien-1′-yl)-3H-indol-1-ium (<b>DTMI-5-Z</b>); (<b>c</b>) 1,3,3-trimethyl-2-((1′Z,3′E,5′E)-5′-(1″,3″,3″-trimethylindol-(2″Z)-ylidene)-penta-1′,3′-dien-1′-yl)-3H-indol-1-ium (<b>DTMI-5-ZZ</b>).</p>
Full article ">Figure 2
<p>ALIE (<b>a</b>) and RFF (<b>b</b>) isosurfaces. Red/pink colors indicate high values, whereas blue/cyan areas indicate minima. The values of ALIE (in eV) and Hirshfeld population-based RFF indexes (in elementary charge units) are shown.</p>
Full article ">Figure 3
<p>Proposed mechanisms of oxidation of <b>DTMI-5</b> (<b>a</b>). Considered products are: dication radical <b>DCR</b> (<b>b</b>); products of oxidative hydroxylation of double bonds between carbons 3 and 4 <b>A34-1</b> (<b>c</b>), and between carbons 5 and 6 <b>A56-1</b> (<b>d</b>); corresponding α-hydroxy ketones <b>A34-2</b> (<b>e</b>) and <b>A56-2</b> (<b>f</b>); consequent rotamer structures <b>A34-3</b> (<b>g</b>) and <b>A56-3</b> (<b>h</b>); finally, tautomeric α-hydroxy enol structures <b>A34-4</b> (<b>i</b>) and <b>A56-4</b> (<b>j</b>).</p>
Full article ">Figure 4
<p>Proposed mechanisms of oxidation of <b>DTMI-5</b> to shorter-chain aldehydes: <b>AN4</b> (<b>b</b>), <b>AC1</b> (<b>c</b>), <b>AN2</b> (<b>d</b>), <b>AC3</b> (<b>e</b>), <b>AN0</b> (<b>f</b>), <b>AC5</b> (<b>g</b>), and zwitterion <b>ICZ</b> (<b>a</b>).</p>
Full article ">Figure 5
<p>Kinetic curves of the Fenton reaction under different concentrations of hydrogen peroxide (<b>a</b>) and Fe(II) (<b>b</b>) or Fe(III) (<b>c</b>). Furthermore, 7 µM <b>DTMI-5</b>, 0.035 M HCl, 200 rpm, 70 µM Fe(II) (<b>a</b>) and 0.1 mM H<sub>2</sub>O<sub>2</sub> (<b>b</b>,<b>c</b>).</p>
Full article ">Figure 6
<p>Kinetic curves of the <b>DTMI-5</b> reaction with Fe(III) (<b>a</b>) and calibration curve for Fe(III) determination (<b>b</b>); 7 µM <b>DTMI-5</b>, 0.035 M HCl, 200 rpm.</p>
Full article ">
12 pages, 3956 KiB  
Article
Relationship Between Elastic, Chemical, and Thermal Properties of SiO2 Flint Aggregate
by Lahcen Khouchaf and Abdelhamid Oufakir
Molecules 2024, 29(24), 5898; https://doi.org/10.3390/molecules29245898 - 13 Dec 2024
Viewed by 395
Abstract
Understanding the relationship between elastic, chemical, and thermal properties is essential for the prevention of the behavior of SiO2 flint aggregates during their application. In fact, the elastic properties of silica depend on chemical and heat treatment. In order to identify the [...] Read more.
Understanding the relationship between elastic, chemical, and thermal properties is essential for the prevention of the behavior of SiO2 flint aggregates during their application. In fact, the elastic properties of silica depend on chemical and heat treatment. In order to identify the crystallite sizes for natural SiO2 before and after chemical treatment samples, Williamson–Hall plots and Scherer’s formulas are used. The silica nanofibers obtained and their microstructure changes under thermal and chemical treatment are characterized using different techniques (XRD, VP-SEM, TEM, FTIR, TDA, and TGA). Both the strains (ε) and the crystallite sizes (DW–H) are obtained from the slope and from the βcosθ-intercept of a graph, respectively. The crystalline quality is improved upon heating, as shown by the decrease in the FWHM of the SiO2(101) peaks, which is confirmed by Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR). The microstrain estimated at 1.50 × 10−4 units for natural SiO2 is smaller than that for SiO2 after chemical attack which is estimated at 2.01 × 10−4 units. Based on the obtained results, SiO2 characterized with controlled micromechanical, thermal, and chemical properties may be used as a filler to improve the performance properties of the strength, microstructure, and durability of some composites. Full article
Show Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1
<p>VP-SEM micrographs of the SiO<sub>2</sub> aggregate: (<b>a</b>) natural sample, (<b>b</b>) after chemical treatment, and (<b>c</b>) after heat treatment.</p>
Full article ">Figure 2
<p>HR-TEM images of SiO<sub>2</sub> nanofibers on the surface after chemical treatment.</p>
Full article ">Figure 3
<p>XRD patterns of natural, chemical, and thermal treatments samples.</p>
Full article ">Figure 4
<p>Evolution of the main peak (101) of chemical and thermal treatment samples.</p>
Full article ">Figure 5
<p>(<b>a</b>) β cosθ versus sinθ (W–H plot) for natural SiO<sub>2</sub> and (<b>b</b>) β cosθ versus sinθ (W–H plot) for attacked SiO<sub>2</sub> samples.</p>
Full article ">Figure 6
<p>Plots of β cosθ versus 4sinθ/E (<b>a</b>) for natural SiO<sub>2</sub> and (<b>b</b>) after chemical treatment.</p>
Full article ">Figure 7
<p>Plots of β cosθ versus 4sinθ/(E/2)<sup>1/2</sup> (W–H plot) for the natural (<b>a</b>) and attacked SiO<sub>2</sub> samples (<b>b</b>).</p>
Full article ">Figure 8
<p>FTIR spectra of natural, chemical, and thermal treatment samples.</p>
Full article ">Figure 9
<p>The intensity ratio between the Si-OH bands located around 555 cm<sup>−1</sup> and the structural band located around 500 cm<sup>−1</sup>.</p>
Full article ">Figure 10
<p>Preparation protocol diagram: (<b>a</b>) chemical attack and heat treatment and (<b>b</b>) heat treatment procedure of the samples.</p>
Full article ">
20 pages, 1270 KiB  
Article
Detect Insider Threat with Associated Session Graph
by Junmei Ding, Peng Qian, Jing Ma, Zhiqiang Wang, Yueming Lu and Xiaqing Xie
Electronics 2024, 13(24), 4885; https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13244885 - 11 Dec 2024
Viewed by 369
Abstract
Insider threats pose significant risks to organizational security, often leading to severe data breaches and operational disruptions. While foundational, traditional detection methods suffer from limitations such as labor-intensive rule creation, lack of scalability, and vulnerability to evasion by sophisticated attackers. Recent advancements in [...] Read more.
Insider threats pose significant risks to organizational security, often leading to severe data breaches and operational disruptions. While foundational, traditional detection methods suffer from limitations such as labor-intensive rule creation, lack of scalability, and vulnerability to evasion by sophisticated attackers. Recent advancements in graph-based approaches have shown promise by leveraging behavior analysis for threat detection. However, existing methods frequently oversimplify session behaviors and fail to extract fine-grained features, which are critical for identifying subtle malicious activities. In this paper, we propose a novel approach that integrates session graphs to capture multi-level fine-grained behavioral features. First, seven heuristic rules are defined to transform user activities across different hosts and sessions into an associated session graph while extracting features at both the activity and session levels. Furthermore, to highlight critical nodes in the associated session graph, we introduce a graph node elimination technique to normalize the graph. Finally, a graph convolutional network is employed to extract features from the normalized graph and generate behavior detection results. Extensive experiments on the CERT insider threat dataset demonstrate the superiority of our approach, achieving an accuracy of 99% and an F1-score of 99%, significantly outperforming state-of-the-art models. The ASG method also reduces false positive rates and enhances the detection of subtle malicious behaviors, addressing key limitations of existing graph-based methods. These findings highlight the potential of ASG for real-world applications such as enterprise network monitoring and anomaly detection, and suggest avenues for future research into adaptive learning mechanisms and real-time detection capabilities. Full article
Show Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1
<p>User behavior modeling methods based on time (<b>a</b>) and session (<b>b</b>), where PC-9436 represents the host of the malicious administrator, PC-5866 denotes the supervisor’s machines, and other PCs are used by regular employees; (<b>c</b>) shows the extracted attributes of user activities.</p>
Full article ">Figure 2
<p>The overall architecture of the proposed <span class="html-small-caps">ASG-ITD</span> for insider threat detection.</p>
Full article ">Figure 3
<p>Abstract representation of the abnormal behavior patterns in AB-I; Data represents the start time of the behavior, PC is the computer performing activities, User denotes the executor, and the horizontal arrow (→) indicates the direction of activities.</p>
Full article ">Figure 4
<p>Abstract representation of the abnormal behavior patterns in AB-II; Data represents the start time of a user session, PC is the computer performing the activities, User denotes the executor, and the horizontal arrow (→) indicates the direction of edges.</p>
Full article ">Figure 5
<p>Abstract representation of the abnormal behavior patterns in AB-III; Data represents the start time of a user session. PC is the computer performing activities, User denotes the executor, and the horizontal arrow (→) indicates the direction of edges.</p>
Full article ">Figure 6
<p>The associated graph construction and normalization phase: (<b>a</b>) aggregating heterogeneous logs, (<b>b</b>) associated graph construction, and (<b>c</b>) graph normalization.</p>
Full article ">Figure 7
<p>Effect of different learning rates on (<b>a</b>–<b>f</b>) ACC, PR, F1, AUC, TPR, and FPR, respectively; (<b>g</b>,<b>h</b>) show the average execution time by epoch for the three types of anomalous behavior.</p>
Full article ">Figure 7 Cont.
<p>Effect of different learning rates on (<b>a</b>–<b>f</b>) ACC, PR, F1, AUC, TPR, and FPR, respectively; (<b>g</b>,<b>h</b>) show the average execution time by epoch for the three types of anomalous behavior.</p>
Full article ">
17 pages, 4345 KiB  
Article
A Container Escape Detection Method Based on a Dependency Graph
by Kai Chen, Yufei Zhao, Jing Guo, Zhimin Gu, Longxi Han and Keyi Tang
Electronics 2024, 13(23), 4773; https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13234773 - 3 Dec 2024
Viewed by 582
Abstract
With the rapid advancement in edge computing, container technology has gained widespread adoption. This is due to its lightweight isolation mechanisms, high portability, and fast deployment capabilities. Despite these advantages, container technology also introduces significant security risks. One of the most critical is [...] Read more.
With the rapid advancement in edge computing, container technology has gained widespread adoption. This is due to its lightweight isolation mechanisms, high portability, and fast deployment capabilities. Despite these advantages, container technology also introduces significant security risks. One of the most critical is container escape. However, current detection research is incomplete. Many methods lack comprehensive detection coverage or fail to fully reconstruct the attack process. To address these gaps, this paper proposes a container escape detection method based on a dependency graph. The method uses various nodes and edges to describe diverse system behaviors. This approach enables the detection of a broader range of attack types. It also effectively captures the contextual relationships between system events, facilitating attack traceability and reconstruction. We design a method to identify container processes on the dependency graph through label generation and propagation. Based on this, container escape detection is implemented using file access control within the graph. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method in detecting container escapes. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section Computer Science & Engineering)
Show Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1
<p>The Overall Architecture Diagram.</p>
Full article ">Figure 2
<p>Container Startup Process.</p>
Full article ">Figure 3
<p>The Container Attribute Label Generation and Propagation Flowchart.</p>
Full article ">Figure 4
<p>Container Escape Model.</p>
Full article ">Figure 5
<p>Container Escape Detection Model.</p>
Full article ">Figure 6
<p>Container Startup Process.</p>
Full article ">Figure 7
<p>Provenance Graph for Privileged Container Escape Detection. (<b>a</b>) Full Provenance Graph; (<b>b</b>) Subgraph of Container Events.</p>
Full article ">Figure 8
<p>Core Steps of Privileged Container Escape in the Provenance Graph.</p>
Full article ">Figure 9
<p>Provenance Graph for CVE-2019-5736 Escape Detection. (<b>a</b>) Full Provenance Graph; (<b>b</b>) Subgraph of Container Events.</p>
Full article ">Figure 10
<p>Core Steps of CVE-2019-5736 Escape in the Provenance Graph.</p>
Full article ">Figure 11
<p>Provenance Graph for CVE-2022-0847 Escape Detection. (<b>a</b>) Full Provenance Graph; (<b>b</b>) Subgraph of Container Events.</p>
Full article ">Figure 12
<p>Core Steps of CVE-2022-0847 Escape in the Provenance Graph.</p>
Full article ">
28 pages, 10529 KiB  
Article
Guaranteed Performance Resilient Security Consensus Control for Nonlinear Networked Control Systems Under Asynchronous DoS Cyber Attacks and Applications on Multi-UAVs Networks
by Chuhan Zhou, Ying Wang, Yun Sun and Chaoqi Fu
Drones 2024, 8(12), 715; https://doi.org/10.3390/drones8120715 - 29 Nov 2024
Viewed by 404
Abstract
This paper investigates the guaranteed performance resilient security consensus control of nonlinear networked control systems (NCSs) subject to asynchronous denial-of-service (DoS) cyber attacks, where the communication channel disruptions and recoveries occur randomly. The main works of this paper are outlined as follows: (1) [...] Read more.
This paper investigates the guaranteed performance resilient security consensus control of nonlinear networked control systems (NCSs) subject to asynchronous denial-of-service (DoS) cyber attacks, where the communication channel disruptions and recoveries occur randomly. The main works of this paper are outlined as follows: (1) a rigorous quantitative modeling of asynchronous DoS cyber attacks is formulated, leveraging connectivity analysis and the graph theory; (2) an innovative guaranteed performance function is introduced, which imposes constraints on the system’s convergence behavior while alleviating restrictions on initial tracking errors; (3) to address the challenge of estimating unmeasurable system states arising from the output-feedback scheme, a novel fuzzy state observer is devised; and (4) based on the aforementioned designs, a switching guaranteed performance resilient security consensus controller is proposed. This controller is tailored to the network connectivity characteristics of NCSs, ensuring resilient convergence of the system despite asynchronous DoS attacks. Notably, consensus tracking errors are maintained within predefined performance bounds. The experiment results of numerical simulation and hardware-in-the-loop simulation of multiple unmanned aerial vehicles (multi-UAVs) networks illustrate the effectiveness and practicality of proposed control scheme. Full article
Show Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1
<p>Schematic of possible network topologies under different DoS attack modes: (<b>a</b>) CS-DoS attack; (<b>b</b>) CB-DoS attack with isolated leader; (<b>c</b>) CB-DoS attack with isolated follower (The blue nodes indicate agents not involved in the attacks, the browns nodes indicate the agent affected by the attacks, and the nodes marked with a green shadow represent the isolated agents.)</p>
Full article ">Figure 2
<p>Design framework of guaranteed performance resilient security consensus control scheme (GPC: guaranteed performance control).</p>
Full article ">Figure 3
<p>Sketch of the evolution of <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>V</mi> <mo>(</mo> <mi>t</mi> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </semantics></math> under asynchronous DoS attack. (<b>a</b>) The value of <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>V</mi> <mo>(</mo> <mi>t</mi> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </semantics></math> decreases during DoS-inactive intervals. Conversely, it may increase during DoS-active intervals. (<b>b</b>) Over the entire time horizon, <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>V</mi> <mo>(</mo> <mi>t</mi> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </semantics></math> exhibits a resilient attenuation trend, and eventually achieves globally resilient stability by using the proposed control strategy.</p>
Full article ">Figure 4
<p>Possible network topology of the NCS under synchronous DoS cyber attacks, where <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi mathvariant="script">G</mi> <mn>0</mn> </msub> </semantics></math>, <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi mathvariant="script">G</mi> <mn>1</mn> </msub> </semantics></math>, <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi mathvariant="script">G</mi> <mn>3</mn> </msub> </semantics></math> represent a connectivity-sustained DoS cyber attack, and <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi mathvariant="script">G</mi> <mn>2</mn> </msub> </semantics></math> represents a connectivity-broken DoS cyber attack (0: Leader, 1–4: follower agents).</p>
Full article ">Figure 5
<p>Curves of consensus tracking errors <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mi>e</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <mi>t</mi> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </semantics></math> with guaranteed control performance <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mi>ζ</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <mi>t</mi> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </semantics></math> [<a href="#B26-drones-08-00715" class="html-bibr">26</a>].</p>
Full article ">Figure 6
<p>Curves of fuzzy adaptive parameters <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mover accent="true"> <mi>γ</mi> <mo>^</mo> </mover> <mrow> <mi>i</mi> <mo>,</mo> <mi>m</mi> </mrow> </msub> </semantics></math>.</p>
Full article ">Figure 7
<p>Curves of resilient security consensus controller <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mi>u</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <mi>t</mi> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </semantics></math>.</p>
Full article ">Figure 8
<p>Fuzzy approximation of unknown nonlinear functions <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mi>F</mi> <mrow> <mi>i</mi> <mo>,</mo> <mi>m</mi> </mrow> </msub> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <mi>t</mi> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </semantics></math>.</p>
Full article ">Figure 9
<p>Curves of consensus tracking errors <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mi>e</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <mi>t</mi> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </semantics></math> with guaranteed control performance <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mi>ζ</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <mi>t</mi> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </semantics></math> under proposed method and [<a href="#B15-drones-08-00715" class="html-bibr">15</a>].</p>
Full article ">Figure 10
<p>Curves of resilient security consensus controller <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mi>u</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <mi>t</mi> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </semantics></math> under proposed method and [<a href="#B15-drones-08-00715" class="html-bibr">15</a>].</p>
Full article ">Figure 11
<p>Network topologies of the multi-UAV network (Blue nodes: follower UAVs, Red node: Leader UAV, yellow dashed lines: normal communication links, and white dashed lines: attacked communication links) and the software/hardware relationships.</p>
Full article ">Figure 12
<p>The constructed semi-physical hardware-in-the-loop simulation platform.</p>
Full article ">Figure 13
<p>Flight trajectories of the follower UAVs among the distributed formation.</p>
Full article ">Figure 14
<p>Curves of formation flight states of all UAVs under asynchronous DoS attacks: flight velocity <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mi>V</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <mi>t</mi> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </semantics></math>, flight path angle <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mi>θ</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <mi>t</mi> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </semantics></math>, and heading angle <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mi>ψ</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <mi>t</mi> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </semantics></math> (Part I).</p>
Full article ">Figure 15
<p>Curves of consensus tracking errors of all UAVs under asynchronous DoS attacks: flight velocity <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mi>V</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <mi>t</mi> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </semantics></math>, flight path angle <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mi>θ</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <mi>t</mi> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </semantics></math>, and heading angle <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mi>ψ</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <mi>t</mi> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </semantics></math> (Part I).</p>
Full article ">Figure 16
<p>Curves of resilient security consensus control signal vectors <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mi>u</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> <mo>=</mo> <msup> <mrow> <mo>[</mo> <msub> <mi>a</mi> <mrow> <mi>T</mi> <mi>i</mi> </mrow> </msub> <mo>,</mo> <msub> <mi>a</mi> <mrow> <mi>ϕ</mi> <mi>i</mi> </mrow> </msub> <mo>,</mo> <msub> <mi>a</mi> <mrow> <mi>θ</mi> <mi>i</mi> </mrow> </msub> <mo>]</mo> </mrow> <mi mathvariant="normal">T</mi> </msup> </mrow> </semantics></math> (Part I).</p>
Full article ">Figure 17
<p>Curves of consensus tracking errors of all UAVs under asynchronous DoS attacks: flight velocity <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mi>V</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <mi>t</mi> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </semantics></math>, flight path angle <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mi>θ</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <mi>t</mi> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </semantics></math>, and heading angle <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mi>ψ</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <mi>t</mi> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </semantics></math> (Part II).</p>
Full article ">
19 pages, 6034 KiB  
Article
GMN+: A Binary Homologous Vulnerability Detection Method Based on Graph Matching Neural Network with Enhanced Attention
by Zheng Zhao, Tianhao Zhang, Xiaoya Fan, Qian Mao, Dafeng Wang and Qi Zhao
Appl. Sci. 2024, 14(22), 10762; https://doi.org/10.3390/app142210762 - 20 Nov 2024
Viewed by 767
Abstract
The widespread reuse of code in the open-source community has led to the proliferation of homologous vulnerabilities, which are security flaws propagated across diverse software systems through the reuse of vulnerable code. Such vulnerabilities pose serious cybersecurity risks, as attackers can exploit the [...] Read more.
The widespread reuse of code in the open-source community has led to the proliferation of homologous vulnerabilities, which are security flaws propagated across diverse software systems through the reuse of vulnerable code. Such vulnerabilities pose serious cybersecurity risks, as attackers can exploit the same weaknesses across multiple platforms. Deep learning has emerged as a promising approach for detecting homologous vulnerabilities in binary code due to their automated feature extraction and high efficiency. However, existing deep learning methods often struggle to capture deep semantic features in binary code, limiting their effectiveness. To address this limitation, this paper presents GMN+, which is a novel graph matching neural network with enhanced attention for detecting homologous vulnerabilities. This method comprehensively considers the information contained in instructions and incorporates types of input instruction. Masked Language Modeling and Instruction Type Prediction are developed as pre-training tasks to enhance the ability of GMN+ in extracting semantic information from basic blocks. GMN+ utilizes an attention mechanism to focus concurrently on the critical semantic information within functions and differences between them, generating robust function embeddings. Experimental results indicate that GMN+ outperforms state-of-the-art methods in various tasks and achieves notable performance in real-world vulnerability detection scenarios. Full article
Show Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1
<p>Architecture of the GMN+ model.</p>
Full article ">Figure 2
<p>An example of instruction normalization and instruction type extraction. (<b>a</b>) Original assembly instructions; (<b>b</b>) Normalized instructions; (<b>c</b>) Instruction types.</p>
Full article ">Figure 3
<p>BERT input embedding.</p>
Full article ">Figure 4
<p>Graph Learner of GMN+.</p>
Full article ">Figure 5
<p>Comparison of ROC curves for different methods across architectures.</p>
Full article ">Figure 6
<p>Comparison of ROC curves for different methods across optimization levels.</p>
Full article ">Figure 7
<p>Comparative results of homologous function search using various methods.</p>
Full article ">Figure 8
<p>Comparison of time overhead for different methods.</p>
Full article ">Figure 9
<p>The performance of GMN+ variants with different blocks in the Semantic Learner.</p>
Full article ">Figure 10
<p>The performance of GMN+ variants with different blocks in the Graph Learner.</p>
Full article ">Figure 11
<p>Comparison of detection results of different methods on real-world vulnerability detection tasks.</p>
Full article ">
14 pages, 2915 KiB  
Article
Missing Data Imputation Based on Causal Inference to Enhance Advanced Persistent Threat Attack Prediction
by Xiang Cheng, Miaomiao Kuang and Hongyu Yang
Symmetry 2024, 16(11), 1551; https://doi.org/10.3390/sym16111551 - 19 Nov 2024
Viewed by 634
Abstract
With the continuous development of network security situations, the types of attacks increase sharply, but can be divided into symmetric attacks and asymmetric attacks. Symmetric attacks such as phishing and DDoS attacks exploit fixed patterns, resulting in system crashes and data breaches that [...] Read more.
With the continuous development of network security situations, the types of attacks increase sharply, but can be divided into symmetric attacks and asymmetric attacks. Symmetric attacks such as phishing and DDoS attacks exploit fixed patterns, resulting in system crashes and data breaches that cause losses to businesses. Asymmetric attacks such as Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), a highly sophisticated and organized form of cyber attack, because of its concealment and complexity, realize data theft through long-term latency and pose a greater threat to organization security. In addition, there are challenges in the processing of missing data, especially in the application of symmetric and asymmetric data filling, the former is simple but not flexible, and the latter is complex and more suitable for highly complex attack scenarios. Since asymmetric attack research is particularly important, this paper proposes a method that combines causal discovery with graph autoencoder to solve missing data, classify potentially malicious nodes, and reveal causal relationships. The core is to use graphic autoencoders to learn the underlying causal structure of APT attacks, with a special focus on the complex causal relationships in asymmetric attacks. This causal knowledge is then applied to enhance the robustness of the model by compensating for data gaps. In the final phase, it also reveals causality, predicts and classifies potential APT attack nodes, and provides a comprehensive framework that not only predicts potential threats, but also provides insight into the logical sequence of the attacker’s actions. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Symmetry and Asymmetry in Cybersecurity)
Show Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1
<p>System architecture.</p>
Full article ">Figure 2
<p>This is a model figure.</p>
Full article ">Figure 3
<p>Causal diagram of partial variables.</p>
Full article ">Figure 4
<p>Multi-stage data interpolation graph.</p>
Full article ">Figure 5
<p>Error value of interpolation method under different missing rates.</p>
Full article ">Figure 6
<p>Evaluation.</p>
Full article ">
23 pages, 3006 KiB  
Article
Security Challenges in Energy Flexibility Markets: A Threat Modelling-Based Cyber-Security Analysis
by Zeeshan Afzal, Mathias Ekstedt, Nils Müller and Preetam Mukherjee
Electronics 2024, 13(22), 4522; https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13224522 - 18 Nov 2024
Viewed by 623
Abstract
Flexibility markets are crucial for balancing the decentralised and renewable-driven energy landscape. This paper presents a security evaluation of a flexibility market system using a threat modelling approach. A reference architecture for a typical flexibility market system is proposed, and attack graph-driven simulations [...] Read more.
Flexibility markets are crucial for balancing the decentralised and renewable-driven energy landscape. This paper presents a security evaluation of a flexibility market system using a threat modelling approach. A reference architecture for a typical flexibility market system is proposed, and attack graph-driven simulations are performed to analyse potential attack pathways where malicious actors might infiltrate the system and the vulnerabilities they might exploit. Key findings include the identification of high-risk areas, such as the Internet links between market actors. To mitigate these risks, the paper proposes and evaluates multiple protection scenarios in reducing the identified attack vectors. The findings underline the importance of multi-layered security strategies to safeguard flexibility markets from increasingly sophisticated cyber threats. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Anomaly Detection and Prevention in the Smart Grid)
Show Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1
<p>Reference architecture model for a flexibility market.</p>
Full article ">Figure 2
<p>Component description of the technical architecture.</p>
Full article ">Figure 3
<p>Overview of coreLang [<a href="#B37-electronics-13-04522" class="html-bibr">37</a>].</p>
Full article ">Figure 4
<p>Model view for FAO.</p>
Full article ">Figure 5
<p>Attack path for full access on an SM application.</p>
Full article ">Figure 6
<p>Attack path for accessing Core Zone LAN in Aggregator.</p>
Full article ">Figure 7
<p>Attack path for DoS on SCADA Core Zone LAN.</p>
Full article ">Figure 8
<p>Alternate attack path for DoS attack on SCADA Core Zone LAN.</p>
Full article ">Figure 9
<p>Attack path for denying an RTU in a substation.</p>
Full article ">Figure 10
<p>Attack path for gaining full access on an SM application.</p>
Full article ">Figure 11
<p>Attack path for DoS on SCADA Core LAN using social engineering.</p>
Full article ">Figure 12
<p>Attack path for hardware supply chain attack on SM.</p>
Full article ">Figure 13
<p>Attack Path for Man in the Middle on an SM.</p>
Full article ">Figure 14
<p>Supply chain attack on SCADA Core Zone.</p>
Full article ">Figure 15
<p>Attack path for denying RTU in substations.</p>
Full article ">
24 pages, 2294 KiB  
Article
Fast Algorithm for Cyber-Attack Estimation and Attack Path Extraction Using Attack Graphs with AND/OR Nodes
by Eugene Levner and Dmitry Tsadikovich
Algorithms 2024, 17(11), 504; https://doi.org/10.3390/a17110504 - 4 Nov 2024
Viewed by 847
Abstract
This paper studies the security issues for cyber–physical systems, aimed at countering potential malicious cyber-attacks. The main focus is on solving the problem of extracting the most vulnerable attack path in a known attack graph, where an attack path is a sequence of [...] Read more.
This paper studies the security issues for cyber–physical systems, aimed at countering potential malicious cyber-attacks. The main focus is on solving the problem of extracting the most vulnerable attack path in a known attack graph, where an attack path is a sequence of steps that an attacker can take to compromise the underlying network. Determining an attacker’s possible attack path is critical to cyber defenders as it helps identify threats, harden the network, and thwart attacker’s intentions. We formulate this problem as a path-finding optimization problem with logical constraints represented by AND and OR nodes. We propose a new Dijkstra-type algorithm that combines elements from Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm and the critical path method. Although the path extraction problem is generally NP-hard, for the studied special case, the proposed algorithm determines the optimal attack path in polynomial time, O(nm), where n is the number of nodes and m is the number of edges in the attack graph. To our knowledge this is the first exact polynomial algorithm that can solve the path extraction problem for different attack graphs, both cycle-containing and cycle-free. Computational experiments with real and synthetic data have shown that the proposed algorithm consistently and quickly finds optimal solutions to the problem. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section Algorithms for Multidisciplinary Applications)
Show Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1
<p>The flow chart of the proposed algorithm.</p>
Full article ">Figure 2
<p>(<b>a</b>) Example 1 adapted from [<a href="#B41-algorithms-17-00504" class="html-bibr">41</a>]. (<b>b</b>) Extracted minimum-length attack path.</p>
Full article ">Figure 3
<p>(<b>a</b>) Acyclic attack graph equipped with the node times. (<b>b</b>) Extracted minimum-length attack path for Example 2.</p>
Full article ">Figure 4
<p>(<b>a</b>) Attack graph with cycles. (<b>b</b>) Extracted minimum-length attack path.</p>
Full article ">Figure 5
<p>(<b>a</b>) The unweighted attack graph with cycles. (<b>b</b>) Extracted minimum-length attack path.</p>
Full article ">Figure 6
<p>Attack graph with cycles without an attack path.</p>
Full article ">Figure 7
<p>The extended attack graph with the start node (adapted from [<a href="#B20-algorithms-17-00504" class="html-bibr">20</a>]).</p>
Full article ">Figure 8
<p>Extracted minimum-length attack path for the attack graph in <a href="#algorithms-17-00504-f007" class="html-fig">Figure 7</a>.</p>
Full article ">Figure 9
<p>A scheme of defenders’ response to a malicious attack.</p>
Full article ">
12 pages, 2304 KiB  
Article
L-GraphSAGE: A Graph Neural Network-Based Approach for IoV Application Encrypted Traffic Identification
by Shihe Zhang, Ruidong Chen, Jingxue Chen, Yukun Zhu, Manyuan Hua, Jiaying Yuan and Fenghua Xu
Electronics 2024, 13(21), 4222; https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13214222 - 28 Oct 2024
Viewed by 756
Abstract
Recently, with a crucial role in developing smart transportation systems, the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), with all kinds of in-vehicle devices, has undergone significant advancement for autonomous driving, in-vehicle infotainment, etc. With the development of these IoV devices, the complexity and volume of [...] Read more.
Recently, with a crucial role in developing smart transportation systems, the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), with all kinds of in-vehicle devices, has undergone significant advancement for autonomous driving, in-vehicle infotainment, etc. With the development of these IoV devices, the complexity and volume of in-vehicle data flows within information communication have increased dramatically. To adapt these changes to secure and smart transportation, encrypted communication realization, real-time decision-making, traffic management enhancement, and overall transportation efficiency improvement are essential. However, the security of a traffic system under encrypted communication is still inadequate, as attackers can identify in-vehicle devices through fingerprinting attacks, causing potential privacy breaches. Nevertheless, existing IoV traffic application models for encrypted traffic identification are weak and often exhibit poor generalization in some dynamic scenarios, where route switching and TCP congestion occur frequently. In this paper, we propose LineGraph-GraphSAGE (L-GraphSAGE), a graph neural network (GNN) model designed to improve the generalization ability of the IoV application of traffic identification in these dynamic scenarios. L-GraphSAGE utilizes node features, including text attributes, node context information, and node degree, to learn hyperparameters that can be transferred to unknown nodes. Our model demonstrates promising results in both UNSW Sydney public datasets and real-world environments. In public IoV datasets, we achieve an accuracy of 94.23%(↑0.23%). Furthermore, our model achieves an F1 change rate of 0.20%(↑96.92%) in α train, β infer, and 0.60%(↑75.00%) in β train, α infer when evaluated on a dataset consisting of five classes of data collected from real-world environments. These results highlight the effectiveness of our proposed approach in enhancing IoV application identification in dynamic network scenarios. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Graph-Based Learning Methods in Intelligent Transportation Systems)
Show Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1
<p>Packet change scenarios caused by route switching.</p>
Full article ">Figure 2
<p>Distribution of feature vectors between <math display="inline"><semantics> <mi>α</mi> </semantics></math> and <math display="inline"><semantics> <mi>β</mi> </semantics></math> environments. The t-SNE [<a href="#B18-electronics-13-04222" class="html-bibr">18</a>] method was used to project high-dimensional feature vectors extracted by algorithm [<a href="#B8-electronics-13-04222" class="html-bibr">8</a>] into 2D vectors. Dahua data collected from <math display="inline"><semantics> <mi>α</mi> </semantics></math> and <math display="inline"><semantics> <mi>β</mi> </semantics></math> environments are shown in <a href="#electronics-13-04222-t001" class="html-table">Table 1</a>.</p>
Full article ">Figure 3
<p>An overview of the L-GraphSAGE system architecture. For each IoV device, there are four phases. In the traffic collection phase, traffic collection and noise filtering are carried out. The flow processing phase uses DPKT to generate tuples and uses the algorithm in [<a href="#B8-electronics-13-04222" class="html-bibr">8</a>] to generate the tuple’s 123-dimensional features. The LineGraph building phase uses (IP, Port) as a node and edges as points to build the (IP, Port) graph, and then converts the points of the (IP, Port) graph to edges, and the edges to points, to build the line graph. In the model training phase, the constructed line graph is put into the model for training. Each of the five IoV device classes is trained on its model.</p>
Full article ">Figure 4
<p>Model generalization on five IoV devices’ data collection.</p>
Full article ">
29 pages, 11207 KiB  
Article
Airfoil Optimization Using Deep Learning Models and Evolutionary Algorithms for the Case Large-Endurance UAVs Design
by Evgenii Minaev, Jose Gabriel Quijada Pioquinto, Valentin Shakhov, Evgenii Kurkin and Oleg Lukyanov
Drones 2024, 8(10), 570; https://doi.org/10.3390/drones8100570 - 10 Oct 2024
Viewed by 1005
Abstract
This article presents the development of the AZTLI-NN network and the evaluation of this network as a set of evolutionary algorithms in airfoil optimization tasks. AZTLI-NN has the characteristic of predicting the aerodynamic coefficients of the airfoils in the form of images (graphs [...] Read more.
This article presents the development of the AZTLI-NN network and the evaluation of this network as a set of evolutionary algorithms in airfoil optimization tasks. AZTLI-NN has the characteristic of predicting the aerodynamic coefficients of the airfoils in the form of images (graphs of the aerodynamic coefficients as a function of the angle of attack) from parameter vectors corresponding to the parameterization method CST. This feature allows the network to achieve good performance when generalizing the predictions of the aerodynamic coefficients, being on par with neural networks that have the aerodynamic coefficients encoded in the form of structured data, and has the ability to handle a wide range of usage airfoils in general aviation. In addition, a case of how AZTLI-NN together with an adaptive evolutionary algorithm and population size reduction methods achieve good performance in finding the airfoil that provides the highest possible endurance value is shown, so this work is considered as an option in the early stages of the design for the selection of airfoils in the design of large-endurance UAVs. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section Drone Design and Development)
Show Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1
<p>Architecture of the GAN used to create new airfoils.</p>
Full article ">Figure 2
<p>(<b>a</b>) Dimensions of the control volume, c is the chord length of the airfoil; (<b>b</b>) general view of the mesh; (<b>c</b>) grouping of surfaces.</p>
Full article ">Figure 3
<p>Aerodynamic coefficients of the NACA 0012 airfoil.</p>
Full article ">Figure 4
<p>Creation of the output data (output images) representing the aerodynamic coefficients of the airfoils (red for c<sub>l</sub> vs. α, green for c<sub>d</sub> vs. α and blue for c<sub>l</sub><sup>1.5</sup>/cd vs. α).</p>
Full article ">Figure 5
<p>Methodology of design of a neural network to predict aerodynamic coefficients [<a href="#B21-drones-08-00570" class="html-bibr">21</a>].</p>
Full article ">Figure 6
<p>Final architecture of the neural network AZTLI-NN used to predict aerodynamic coefficients of the airfoils.</p>
Full article ">Figure 7
<p>General architecture of a VAE.</p>
Full article ">Figure 8
<p>Architecture of the encoder.</p>
Full article ">Figure 9
<p>Architecture of the decoder.</p>
Full article ">Figure 10
<p>Airfoils reconstructed using the CST method (black), original coordinates are shown in green. The blue graph indicates the local deviations on the upper surface, while the red one indicates the local deviations on the lower surface. (<b>a</b>) Eppler 407 airfoil, (<b>b</b>) FX 61140 airfoil, (<b>c</b>) NACA 23016 airfoil, and (<b>d</b>) TSAGI 12 airfoil.</p>
Full article ">Figure 11
<p>Sample of airfoils obtained with a GAN using information from real airfoils.</p>
Full article ">Figure 12
<p>Reconstruction of the graph of c<sub>l</sub> vs. α by PCA using different numbers of PCs.</p>
Full article ">Figure 13
<p>Reconstruction of the graph of c<sub>d</sub> vs. α by PCA using different numbers of PCs.</p>
Full article ">Figure 14
<p>Reconstruction of the graph of c<sub>l</sub><sup>1.5</sup>/c<sub>d</sub> vs. α by PCA using different numbers of PCs.</p>
Full article ">Figure 15
<p>Statistical distribution of MAE in the reconstruction of graphs with a VAE. Stage of training.</p>
Full article ">Figure 16
<p>Statistical distribution of MAE in the reconstruction of graphs with a VAE. Stage of testing.</p>
Full article ">Figure 17
<p>Example of graph reconstruction of the aerodynamic coefficients of an airfoil by using a VAE.</p>
Full article ">Figure 18
<p>Analysis of the performance in the reading of aerodynamic coefficients in the graphs reconstructed by the VAE.</p>
Full article ">Figure 19
<p>The Architecture of MLP.</p>
Full article ">Figure 20
<p>Performance analysis of prediction of aerodynamic coefficients using AZTLI-NN (database size = 500).</p>
Full article ">Figure 21
<p>Performance analysis of prediction of aerodynamic coefficients using AZTLI-NN (database size = 1000).</p>
Full article ">Figure 22
<p>Performance analysis of prediction of aerodynamic coefficients using AZTLI-NN (database size = 1500).</p>
Full article ">Figure 23
<p>Aerodynamic coefficients of the FX 66-S-161 airfoil obtained with a laminar wind tunnel, with OpenFOAM, and with AZTLI-NN.</p>
Full article ">Figure 24
<p>Better airfoils obtained in the optimization tests. Red—standard DE, green—L-SHADE, blue—CAPR-SHADE.</p>
Full article ">
20 pages, 1748 KiB  
Article
Harnessing Unsupervised Insights: Enhancing Black-Box Graph Injection Attacks with Graph Contrastive Learning
by Xiao Liu, Junjie Huang, Zihan Chen, Yi Pan, Maoyi Xiong and Wentao Zhao
Appl. Sci. 2024, 14(20), 9190; https://doi.org/10.3390/app14209190 - 10 Oct 2024
Viewed by 674
Abstract
Adversarial attacks on Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have emerged as a significant threat to the security of graph learning. Compared with Graph Modification Attacks (GMAs), Graph Injection Attacks (GIAs) are considered more realistic attacks, in which attackers perturb GNN models by injecting a [...] Read more.
Adversarial attacks on Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have emerged as a significant threat to the security of graph learning. Compared with Graph Modification Attacks (GMAs), Graph Injection Attacks (GIAs) are considered more realistic attacks, in which attackers perturb GNN models by injecting a small number of fake nodes. However, most existing black-box GIA methods either require comprehensive knowledge of the dataset and the ground-truth labels or a large number of queries to execute the attack, which is often unfeasible in many scenarios. In this paper, we propose an unsupervised method for leveraging the rich knowledge contained in the graph data themselves to enhance the success rate of graph injection attacks on the initial query. Specifically, we introduce GraphContrastive Learning-based Graph Injection Attack (GCIA), which consists of a node encoder, a reward predictor, and a fake node generator. The Graph Contrastive Learning (GCL)-based node encoder transforms nodes for low-dimensional continuous embedding, the reward predictor acts as a simplified surrogate for the target model, and the fake node generator produces fake nodes and edges based on several carefully designed loss functions, utilizing the node encoder and reward predictor. Extensive results demonstrate that the proposed GCIA method achieves a first query success rate of 91.2% on the Reddit dataset and improves the success rate to over 99.7% after 10 queries. Full article
Show Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1
<p>The flow chart of a single query in the Graph Contrastive Learning-based Graph Injection Attack (GCIA) method. The node encoder is trained from graph data in an unsupervised way using graph contrastive learning. Before querying, the GCIA method optimizes the fake nodes by (a) maximizing the changes in the embedding representation of the target node, and (b) minimizing the classification execution of the reward predictor for its initial category. After querying, the GCIA method retrains the reward predictor using the query results to ensure the model’s output is aligned well with the results from the target model. In the next iteration, the GCIA method generates new fake nodes based on the updated reward predictor.</p>
Full article ">Figure 2
<p>Misclassification rates of various attack methods in Setup 2. The horizontal coordinate corresponds to the different attack methods with different fake node numbers, while the vertical coordinate illustrates the associated misclassification rates. The blue, orange, and green bars denote the conditions in which the fake node number <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mo>Δ</mo> <mi>v</mi> </msub> </semantics></math> is 1, 2, or 3, respectively, with each fake node directly connected to the target node. (<b>a</b>) Result in GCN model with Cora dataset, (<b>b</b>) result in GCN model with PubMed dataset, (<b>c</b>) result in GAT model with Cora dataset, (<b>d</b>) result in GAT model with PubMed dataset.</p>
Full article ">Figure 3
<p>Misclassification rates of various attack methods in Setup 3. The horizontal coordinate corresponds to the different attack methods with different fake edge numbers, while the vertical coordinate illustrates the associated misclassification rates. The blue, orange, and green bars denote the conditions in which the fake edge number <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mo>Δ</mo> <mi>e</mi> </msub> </semantics></math> is 1, 2, and 3, respectively. (<b>a</b>) Result in GCN model with Cora dataset, (<b>b</b>) result in GCN model with PubMed dataset, (<b>c</b>) result in GAT model with Cora dataset, (<b>d</b>) result in GAT model with PubMed dataset.</p>
Full article ">Figure 4
<p>Misclassification rates of various attack methods in Setup 4. The experiments are conducted on the GAT model using the Cora dataset. The horizontal coordinate corresponds to the different fake node numbers, while the vertical coordinate illustrates the different fake edge numbers. The orange circles denote the GCIA method, while blue circles signify the G<sup>2</sup>A2C method. The radius of each circle corresponds to the misclassification rate induced by the attack, which has been proportionately scaled for clearer visual representation.</p>
Full article ">Figure 5
<p>Visualization of the node embeddings from the node encoder and GCN model. Circles denote the nodes on the graph, squares denote the target node, triangle denotes the target node in the 1st query, stars denote the target node in the 2nd query, and their color indicates the labels of the nodes. (<b>a</b>) Node embeddings from node encoder, (<b>b</b>) node embeddings from GCN model.</p>
Full article ">
23 pages, 2789 KiB  
Article
TCα-PIA: A Personalized Social Network Anonymity Scheme via Tree Clustering and α-Partial Isomorphism
by Mingmeng Zhang, Liang Chang, Yuanjing Hao, Pengao Lu and Long Li
Electronics 2024, 13(19), 3966; https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13193966 - 9 Oct 2024
Viewed by 694
Abstract
Social networks have become integral to daily life, allowing users to connect and share information. The efficient analysis of social networks benefits fields such as epidemiology, information dissemination, marketing, and sentiment analysis. However, the direct publishing of social networks is vulnerable to privacy [...] Read more.
Social networks have become integral to daily life, allowing users to connect and share information. The efficient analysis of social networks benefits fields such as epidemiology, information dissemination, marketing, and sentiment analysis. However, the direct publishing of social networks is vulnerable to privacy attacks such as typical 1-neighborhood attacks. This attack can infer the sensitive information of private users using users’ relationships and identities. To defend against these attacks, the k-anonymity scheme is a widely used method for protecting user privacy by ensuring that each user is indistinguishable from at least k1 other users. However, this approach requires extensive modifications that compromise the utility of the anonymized graph. In addition, it applies uniform privacy protection, ignoring users’ different privacy preferences. To address the above challenges, this paper proposes an anonymity scheme called TCα-PIA (Tree Clustering and α-Partial Isomorphism Anonymization). Specifically, TCα-PIA first constructs a similarity tree to capture subgraph feature information at different levels using a novel clustering method. Then, it extracts the different privacy requirements of each user based on the node cluster. Using the privacy requirements, it employs an α-partial isomorphism-based graph structure anonymization method to achieve personalized privacy requirements for each user. Extensive experiments on four public datasets show that TCα-PIA outperforms other alternatives in balancing graph privacy and utility. Full article
Show Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1
<p>An overview of TC<math display="inline"><semantics> <mi>α</mi> </semantics></math>-PIA.</p>
Full article ">Figure 2
<p>Example of triangles involving the node: (<b>a</b>) Original graph. (<b>b</b>) The 1-neighborhood subgraph of <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>2</mn> </msub> </semantics></math> containing two participating triangles <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>1</mn> </msub> <mo>,</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>2</mn> </msub> <mo>,</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>3</mn> </msub> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </semantics></math> and <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>2</mn> </msub> <mo>,</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>3</mn> </msub> <mo>,</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>5</mn> </msub> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </semantics></math> and one overlapping edge <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>2</mn> </msub> <mo>,</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>3</mn> </msub> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </semantics></math>.</p>
Full article ">Figure 3
<p>Example of similarity tree construction (setting <span class="html-italic">k</span> = 3): (<b>a</b>) Two branches, <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mo>{</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>2</mn> </msub> <mo>,</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>6</mn> </msub> <mo>,</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>7</mn> </msub> <mo>,</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>4</mn> </msub> <mo>,</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>8</mn> </msub> <mo>,</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>9</mn> </msub> <mo>}</mo> </mrow> </semantics></math> and <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mo>{</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>3</mn> </msub> <mo>,</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>5</mn> </msub> <mo>,</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>1</mn> </msub> <mo>}</mo> </mrow> </semantics></math>, where <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>2</mn> </msub> </semantics></math> and <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>3</mn> </msub> </semantics></math> have no parent nodes. (<b>b</b>) Connect the nodes <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>2</mn> </msub> </semantics></math> and <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>3</mn> </msub> </semantics></math> to the root node. (<b>c</b>) After branch unification, we obtain three independent branches, corresponding to three clusters: <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mi>C</mi> <mn>1</mn> </msub> <mo>=</mo> <mrow> <mo>{</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>7</mn> </msub> <mo>,</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>8</mn> </msub> <mo>,</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>9</mn> </msub> <mo>}</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </semantics></math>, <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mi>C</mi> <mn>2</mn> </msub> <mo>=</mo> <mrow> <mo>{</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>2</mn> </msub> <mo>,</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>6</mn> </msub> <mo>,</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>4</mn> </msub> <mo>}</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </semantics></math>, and <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mi>C</mi> <mn>3</mn> </msub> <mo>=</mo> <mrow> <mo>{</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>3</mn> </msub> <mo>,</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>5</mn> </msub> <mo>,</mo> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>1</mn> </msub> <mo>}</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </semantics></math>.</p>
Full article ">Figure 4
<p>Mapping relationship.</p>
Full article ">Figure 5
<p><math display="inline"><semantics> <mi>α</mi> </semantics></math>-partial isomorphism: (<b>a</b>) Original graph <span class="html-italic">G</span>. (<b>b</b>) Select the seed node with the largest number of neighbors and maximum <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>α</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> </semantics></math> value in each cluster. (<b>c</b>) Establish the mapping relationship between the 1-neighborhood subgraph of a node and the 1-neighborhood subgraph of the seed node in each cluster. (<b>d</b>) Modify the 1-neighborhood subgraph structure of a node to achieve <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>α</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> </semantics></math>-partial isomorphism by referencing the 1-neighborhood structure of the seed node. (<b>e</b>) Anonymized graph <math display="inline"><semantics> <msup> <mi>G</mi> <mo>∼</mo> </msup> </semantics></math>. (<b>f</b>) Merge the fake nodes to obtain the final anonymized graph <math display="inline"><semantics> <msup> <mi>G</mi> <mo>*</mo> </msup> </semantics></math>.</p>
Full article ">Figure 6
<p>Edge modification strategy: (<b>a</b>) A degree reduction/edge deletion strategy for when there is an edge between <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>1</mn> </msub> </semantics></math> and <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>2</mn> </msub> </semantics></math>. (<b>b</b>) A degree reduction/edge deletion strategy for when there is no edge between <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>1</mn> </msub> </semantics></math> and <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>2</mn> </msub> </semantics></math>. (<b>c</b>) A degree increase/edge addition strategy for when there is no edge between <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>1</mn> </msub> </semantics></math> and <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>2</mn> </msub> </semantics></math>. (<b>d</b>) A degree increase/edge addition strategy for when there is an edge between <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>1</mn> </msub> </semantics></math> and <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>2</mn> </msub> </semantics></math>. (<b>e</b>) An edge swapping strategy for when there is no edge between <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>1</mn> </msub> </semantics></math> and <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>2</mn> </msub> </semantics></math>. (<b>f</b>) An edge swapping strategy for when there is an edge between <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>1</mn> </msub> </semantics></math> and <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>v</mi> <mn>2</mn> </msub> </semantics></math>.</p>
Full article ">Figure 7
<p>Comparison of IL on complete graphs.</p>
Full article ">Figure 8
<p>Comparison of the change in ACC on complete graphs.</p>
Full article ">Figure 9
<p>Comparison of the change in APL on complete graphs.</p>
Full article ">Figure 10
<p>Comparison of the error rate of EC on complete graphs.</p>
Full article ">Figure 11
<p>Comparison of fake node schemes on the error rate of EC.</p>
Full article ">Figure 12
<p>Comparison of IL on random graphs.</p>
Full article ">Figure 13
<p>Comparison of the change in ACC on random graphs.</p>
Full article ">Figure 14
<p>Comparison of the change in APL on random graphs.</p>
Full article ">Figure 15
<p>Comparison of the error rate of EC on random graphs.</p>
Full article ">Figure 16
<p>Comparison of anonymity schemes with different clustering algorithms.</p>
Full article ">
27 pages, 544 KiB  
Article
Unsupervised Learning for Lateral-Movement-Based Threat Mitigation in Active Directory Attack Graphs
by David Herranz-Oliveros, Marino Tejedor-Romero, Jose Manuel Gimenez-Guzman and Luis Cruz-Piris
Electronics 2024, 13(19), 3944; https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13193944 - 6 Oct 2024
Viewed by 1162
Abstract
Cybersecurity threats, particularly those involving lateral movement within networks, pose significant risks to critical infrastructures such as Microsoft Active Directory. This study addresses the need for effective defense mechanisms that minimize network disruption while preventing attackers from reaching key assets. Modeling Active Directory [...] Read more.
Cybersecurity threats, particularly those involving lateral movement within networks, pose significant risks to critical infrastructures such as Microsoft Active Directory. This study addresses the need for effective defense mechanisms that minimize network disruption while preventing attackers from reaching key assets. Modeling Active Directory networks as a graph in which the nodes represent the network components and the edges represent the logical interactions between them, we use centrality metrics to derive the impact of hardening nodes in terms of constraining the progression of attacks. We propose using Unsupervised Learning techniques, specifically density-based clustering algorithms, to identify those nodes given the information provided by their metrics. Our approach includes simulating attack paths using a snowball model, enabling us to analytically evaluate the impact of hardening on delaying Domain Administration compromise. We tested our methodology on both real and synthetic Active Directory graphs, demonstrating that it can significantly slow down the propagation of threats from reaching the Domain Administration across the studied scenarios. Additionally, we explore the potential of these techniques to enable flexible selection of the number of nodes to secure. Our findings suggest that the proposed methods significantly enhance the resilience of Active Directory environments against targeted cyber-attacks. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Machine Learning for Cybersecurity: Threat Detection and Mitigation)
Show Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1
<p>Example of an AD graph model illustrating some typical relationships between network actors.</p>
Full article ">Figure 2
<p>The distribution of centrality metrics along the DRG nodes.</p>
Full article ">Figure 3
<p>TTC-DA for different hardening–placement techniques.</p>
Full article ">Figure 4
<p>TTC-DA for different hardening–placement techniques, including <span class="html-italic">ULgl</span> hyperparameter variation (<span class="html-italic">ULgl’</span>).</p>
Full article ">Figure 5
<p>Histogram (<b>left</b>) and CCDF (<b>right</b>) of outlier scores given by HDBSCAN-GLOSH for each graph.</p>
Full article ">
Back to TopTop