Cited By
View all- Du RFoo EBoyd C(2018)Designing a secure e-tender submission protocolElectronic Commerce Research10.1007/s10660-008-9017-x8:3(115-142)Online publication date: 17-Dec-2018
Implementing private Vickrey auctions
Pages 796 - 800
Abstract
Vickrey auctions have the interesting property of eliminating any incentive for bidders to bid values that are different from their reserve prices (i.e., the true value they give to the item being auctioned). For several reasons, it is desirable that bidders keep private their reserve price. In [2] a protocol to implement a Vickrey auction was presented. Its main feature is that bids are kept private without the necessity of any trusted third party. In particular, after the auction is finished only the value of the second highest bid and the identity of the highest bidder are publicly revealed. However, in that paper several questions about the applicability of the protocol were left unanswered. In particular, all the presentation was theoretical and no implementation was provided. Besides, the analysis of collusion risk was too brief. In this paper we address these issues in a deeper way. In addition, we present and analyze an implementation of the protocol, and we consider its practical applicability.
References
[1]
H. Lipmaa, N. Asokan, and V. Niemi. Secure Vickrey auctions without threshold trust. In Annual Conference on Financial Cryptography, LNCS 2357, pages 87--101. Springer, 2002.
[2]
N. Lopez, M. Núñez. I. Rodriguez, and F. Rubio. Improving privacy in Vickrey auctions. ACM SIGEcom Exchanges, 5(1):1--12, 2004.
[3]
M. Naor, B. Pinkas, and R. Sumner. Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design. In ACM Conference, on Electronic Commerce, pages 129--139. ACM Press, 1999.
[4]
T. Sandholm and V. Lesser. On automated contracting in multi-enterprise manufacturing. In Distributed Enterprise: Advanced Systems and Tools, pages 33--42, 1995.
[5]
W, Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 16:8--37, 1961.
Index Terms
- Implementing private Vickrey auctions
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Published In
March 2005
1814 pages
ISBN:1581139640
DOI:10.1145/1066677
- Conference Chair:
- Hisham M. Haddad,
- Editor:
- Lorie M. Liebrock,
- Program Chairs:
- Andrea Omicini,
- Roger L. Wainwright
Copyright © 2005 ACM.
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Association for Computing Machinery
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Published: 13 March 2005
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View all- Du RFoo EBoyd C(2018)Designing a secure e-tender submission protocolElectronic Commerce Research10.1007/s10660-008-9017-x8:3(115-142)Online publication date: 17-Dec-2018
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