Back in 2004, the late Doug Pappas came up with a simple way to evaluate how well each team was spending their money: marginal payroll per marginal win. Here’s Doug’s original formula:
(club payroll – (28 x major league minimum)) / ((winning percentage – .300) x 162)
Simple enough, and it managed to give us yet another way to show how great Billy Beane and the A’s were. But while it was a decent first step, it failed even the simplest laugh tests: were the Yankees really one of the bottom ten teams, even when they were running away with their division every year? Are the Marlins consistently one of the best-run teams, just by virtue of not spending much beyond the minimum on payroll? Probably not.
Looking at it now, the biggest problems are fairly obvious. First off, not all wins are created equal-as Nate Silver touched on in Baseball Between the Numbers, a team’s ninetieth win creates significantly more marginal revenue than its seventieth (see chart below). Also, each team has its own marginal revenue curve-the Yankees’ ninetieth win is much more valuable than the Marlins’ ninetieth win, at least in terms of pure revenue potential.
So while Doug’s original formula punished large-market teams for spending significant sums on payroll, the reality is that the Yankees would have to have a brain lapse to cut their payroll below $100 million. The question really should be: How well are they spending their $200 million, and is that the right number, given their competitive position and market size?
Neil deMause was on the right track two years ago when he added Nate’s marginal-revenue-per-win curve to Doug’s method. But we need to go a couple steps further. Here’s how we’ll do it:
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First, we need to know how much marginal revenue each team is likely to bring in, based on its win total and market size. To do this, we’ll use Nate’s MR/MW curve, updated for 2009 revenues. We’ll then assign each team a market-size factor based on its 2007-2008 gate receipts. (We already know that this is the only short-term revenue source that significantly impacts a team’s payroll spending). The Red Sox won 95 games last year, which should generally lead to $108 million in marginal revenue. Multiply that figure by Boston’s market-size factor (2.48), and we get expected revenue of $267 million.
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Next, we’ll use a regression equation (MW = 0.1106*MP + 22.538) to determine how many games a team should win-and, therefore, how much revenue it should bring in-based solely on its payroll. For example, Boston’s $133 million payroll in 2008 should have led to 86 wins. According the win curve, multiplied by the team’s market-size factor, that would create $165 million in marginal revenue.
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Then we just divide these numbers: 267 / 165 = 1.61. In other words, given their payroll and revenue potential, the Red Sox performed about 61 percent better than average in 2008.
Let’s compare the top and bottom teams from 2008, first using Doug’s approach, and then using our new one:
Team | Marginal Payroll | Marginal Wins |
MP / MW |
Marlins | $10,636,500 | 36 | $300,466 |
$32,620,598 | 49 |
$673,979 |
|
Twins | $50,982,767 | 40 | $1,293,979 |
$36,767,126 | 27 |
$1,392,694 |
|
Diamondbacks | $55,002,713 | 34 | $1,646,788 |
—- | —- |
—- |
—- |
$43,761,000 | 11 | $4,207,788 | |
Padres | $62,477,617 | 15 |
$4,338,723 |
Yankees | $197,881,579 | 41 | $4,898,059 |
Tigers | $127,485,197 | 26 | $5,019,102 |
Mariners |
$106,793,982 |
13 | $8,612,418 |
Of the top five teams, only one-the Rays-actually made the playoffs, and of the other four, only the Twins should have even been close. The Marlins, D’backs, and A’s performed reasonably well given their small payrolls, but still only averaged 80 wins.
Let’s see how those results compare to our new method:
Team | Marginal Revenue | Expected MR | MR / ExpMR |
Rays | $51,461,633 | $23,524,473 | 2.19 |
Angels | $115,533,623 | $64,051,489 | 1.80 |
Cubs | $185,744,330 |
$106,445,281 |
1.74 |
$132,870,709 | $78,183,106 | 1.70 | |
Red Sox | $267,185,811 | $165,780,654 |
1.61 |
—- |
—- |
—- | —- |
Yankees | $228,824,384 | $302,239,343 | 0.76 |
Tigers | $46,166,722 |
$67,111,767 |
0.69 |
Padres |
$26,758,423 | $53,501,930 | 0.68 |
Nationals | $26,758,423 | $42,507,738 |
0.63 |
Mariners |
$32,245,120 |
$55,863,187 | 0.58 |
This seems a lot closer to reality. The Rays run away from the pack, with the 100-win Angels and 97-win Cubs coming in a distant second and third, respectively. Instead of punishing large-market teams, the system accounts for their inherent advantage, and judges them on how well they actually use it. The Yankees remain in the bottom five-which is actually identical to the previous list, just with a different order-but it’s no longer their fait accompli, as they would have finished in the top half had they played up to expectations. The Red Sox, for example, finish nineteenth on the old list despite winning 95 games, as compared to fifth on the new list.
If we want to make it even more meritocratic, we can use third-order wins instead of actual wins, in order to strip out some of the luck involved:
Team | 3rd-Order MR | ExpMR | MR3/ExpMR |
Rays | $51,461,633 | $23,524,473 | 2.19 |
Red Sox | $290,486,158 |
$165,780,654 |
1.75 |
$66,790,624 | $39,300,599 | 1.70 | |
Cubs | $175,942,093 | $106,445,281 |
1.65 |
Dodgers |
$128,566,277 |
$100,454,854 | 1.28 |
—- | —- | —- | —- |
Padres | $41,255,570 |
$53,501,930 |
0.77 |
Tigers |
$51,211,783 | $67,111,767 | 0.76 |
Nationals | $30,054,408 | $42,507,738 |
0.71 |
Pirates |
$14,483,537 |
$20,635,720 | 0.70 |
Mariners | $35,986,509 | $55,863,187 | 0.64 |
The Rays remain in front, while the Red Sox, Blue Jays, and Dodgers all move up a few spots.
Here’s the same chart for 2009, assuming each team’s current third-order winning percentage holds:
Team | 3rd-Order MR | ExpMR | MR3/ExpMR |
Rays | $50,733,695 | $24,508,966 |
2.07 |
Dodgers |
$181,196,617 |
$91,143,942 | 1.99 |
Rockies | $58,385,603 | $38,702,035 | 1.51 |
Rangers | $41,117,147 |
$28,721,444 |
1.43 |
Red Sox |
$217,262,599 | $152,072,010 | 1.43 |
—- | —- | —- |
—- |
Royals |
$15,701,747 |
$19,530,582 | 0.80 |
Mets | $94,833,032 | $124,697,984 | 0.76 |
Pirates | $15,300,110 |
$20,216,344 |
0.76 |
$49,817,523 | $66,058,454 | 0.75 | |
Reds | $24,847,828 | $33,316,875 |
0.75 |
You can see the full data here.
If there’s still a piece missing, it’s the value that comes with finishing last. The first pick in the draft is worth a lot more than the fifth or the tenth or the fifteenth, so a team that wins 59 games, as the Nationals did last year, should have that factored into its marginal revenue figures. But we’ll leave that for another day.
For now, some other notes on the data we do have:
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Andrew Friedman and the Rays are clearly the class of Major League Baseball right now. Ignore their actual 2009 record; first-, second-, and third-order wins have them as the second-best team in the American League, and they’re only trailing a team that will spend three and a half times as much on payroll. Combine that with a runaway victory in 2008, in both actual and third-order MR/ExpMR, and it’s hard to argue they’re not the best around right now.
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The Yankees are currently twelfth in MR3/ExpMR (we seriously need a name for this, if anyone has any ideas), but only 27th in the classic MP/MW-despite being on pace to win 101 games. I think the new method is a pretty fair approximation; the marginal returns clearly diminish very quickly after about $120-$130 million (which is where the Red Sox usually are), and the Yankees could obviously win a lot of games with a $150 million payroll, if managed correctly. That they’re about average seems right-when you spend fifty percent more than anybody else, you probably should win 101 games.
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The Mets are a disaster.
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The Pirates, Royals, Orioles, and Nationals would definitely benefit if we included the value of their ensuing draft picks. Of those teams, I’d guess that the Pirates are the only one that actually understood this coming into the season.
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It doesn’t surprise me that the Nationals aren’t in the bottom five-they’ve tracked well ahead of their actual record all year, and they actually aren’t that far behind the Mets in the adjusted standings.
Now, about that name…
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I've noticed this disconnect. He isn't responsible for the divsion he plays is and while some of his contracts are horrid he still comes in above the line on efficiency and did very well last year.
In fact I think I'll send this in as a request for the next BP roundtable - compare your perceptions of Riccardi as GM to the results he has achieved - I think he may be getting the short end of the publicity stick.
Now if they can just find a GM to believe in the Juan Pierre pixie dust...
I wanted to call it organizational OROI (O-Roy!) but not only is that stupid, but I hope someday someone will make this include the entire organization just not the majors so we should reserve the O for that ;-)
In other words, if the Rays stick with their small budget, I'd expect their MR3/ExpMR to do something like y=sin x, while the Red sox seem to have achieved a sustainably high MR3/ExpMR. Perhaps a more accurate measure would be an average MR3/ExpMR over several years to account for past advantages (or to adjust for a previous GM's albatross contracts).
Flags fly forever, consistently being average gets boring.
By the way, using actual wins and the data provided, the best GMs in 2008 and YTD 2009 are those of the Angels and the Phillies, followed by the GMs of the Rays, Red Sox, Marlins and Cardinals.
Can you clarify that last sentence?
After all, you have not seen the Royals, Orioles or Nationals tear apart their roster like the Pirates did this year. Of the 3 teams I mentioned, only the Orioles seem to be actually trying to build something sustainable. The Royals and Nationals seem poised to,well, stay bad for quite some time.
Strasburg might be awesome, but I can't shake the feeling that by the time he is a front-line talent he will be pitching somewhere other than Washington.
This is how you build a team, even if they are not winning.
annual is kind of a throw-in.
"For example, Boston's $133 million payroll in 2008 should have led to 86 wins."
Ignoring the issue of Dice-K's posting fee, it seems like the Sox spent a lot more money than average to secure just 5 more expected wins than average.
scaled-to-market assessment of return per team
not too satisfied with what t stands for, but both should acro to S.M.A.R.T.
I think this is really great analysis. Any more backward looking in the works? I would consider this a great litmus test of the legacy of certain GM's.
On the other hand, I trust the work of the great nate, but how sticky are marginal earnings? Are the shea faithful really going to spend 30 million less to see this team than they would have to see that team we paid for? Thats not an excuse for ineffectiveness, but it portends seriously for a team like the ray's future.
Payroll xW
20,000,000 63.7
30,000,000 69.1
40,000,000 72.9
50,000,000 75.8
60,000,000 78.2
70,000,000 80.2
80,000,000 82.0
90,000,000 83.5
100,000,000 84.9
110,000,000 86.2
120,000,000 87.3
130,000,000 88.4
140,000,000 89.3
150,000,000 90.2
160,000,000 91.1
170,000,000 91.9
180,000,000 92.6
190,000,000 93.4
200,000,000 94.0
210,000,000 94.7
220,000,000 95.3
Also, I'm not sure that there's a conclusion to this analysis: is the GM who uses his resources most economically efficiently necessarily the best GM?
ARe the best CEOs the most efficient?
Aren't there other things involved?
Assuming those teams must fork over substantially more signing bonus money than teams behind them in the draft, should we somehow incorporate signing bonus money into the "team payroll" being analyzed?
(And yes, I do realize many teams of late ignore the "guidelines" and offer draft picks substantially "over slot", somewhat negating the higher bonuses theoretically attached to the Rays of the late 90s/early 00s)
I get that making the playoffs is more valuable to big markets vs. small, but curious to just the probability for making it.
As for an acronym, I like something that includes efficiency. Perhaps something like WRE for Win-Revenue Efficiency or OWRE Organizational Win-Revenue Efficiency pronounced like the word "ore" or like "over" but with a "W" instead of a "V"
But are all $ created equal? Does a $ mean the same to the Yankees as the Rays?
This is all well and good - but it completely ignores that fact.
There's so much uncertainty in baseball, a good GM might think "I've got an 85-win team (50th percentile forecast!). So the hump-backed MR curve says getting a 5-win player will add about $20M to my revenues. Woo-hoo; I go out and sign that guy."
But then random variation inperformance, or injuries, keep the team from its 50th percentile forecast, and it wins... maybe 85 anyway. The GM looks like a boob, but was just unlucky. You can also get the breaks and look like a genius on the other side of the randomness mountain.
Expected marginal revenues MR (as opposed to realized, after the fact MR) are probably best classified as either "non-contender status MR" or "contender status MR." The idea that a GM can and should make fine delinieations about MR for each win from 85 to 95 seems unrealistic, given how much "variance happens."
"First, we need to know how much marginal revenue each team is likely to bring in, based on its win total and market size. To do this, we'll use Nate's MR/MW curve, updated for 2009 revenues. We'll then assign each team a market-size factor based on its 2007-2008 gate receipts."
Wouldn't basing market size on gate receipts be a poor indicator of market size where big markets have bad teams? The fact that last year's receipts affect this year's management decisions notwithstanding, it would seem that the potential for marginal profits from a boost in attendance would be greater in a place like DC, where half the stadium is empty almost every night. I would think, therefore, that using gate receipts as an indicator of market size would actually understate the revenue-generating potential of improvements in attendance.
One straightforward method to evaluate GMs is just on revenue growth. This method penalizes them for their success in that regard.
I think there's something squishy about what exactly we're taking the measure of. If profit is the goal, measure that and forget about wins. If efficient use of payroll for competitive advantage is the sine qua non, this method is inferior to the previous. If efficient use of available payroll is more fair, put in a factor for revenue pct used.
This method is neither fish nor fowl.
If you want to know how well a Front Office is doing, it's all in the TOME.
You can politely say that you are building on the work of your predecessors, which both acknowledges your intellectual debt while obviously implying that you intend to make an improvement. When you know that a writer (a) died prematurely and (b) had a loyal following, you ought to think twice before writing that one of his better-known formulas "failed even the simplest laugh test." Just do your own work without running down others' work.
Maybe it just rubbed me the wrong way: it doesn't look like anyone else commented on it.
ExpWins = (P + 2*L) / (P + 5*L) * 162
Where P is team payroll and L is league-average payroll. I think I saw something recently where Tom may have changed his preferred weights on the L's.
Some reading is here:
http://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2009/1/20/684880/non-linear-cost-per-win-an
http://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2009/1/21/729767/non-linear-cost-per-win-pa
http://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2009/1/22/729822/non-linear-cost-per-win-pa