Welcome To The Zduriencik Era
The M’s have chosen Jack Zduriencik as their new GM. Despite the fact that he’s the oldest of the candidates interviewed and comes with a scouting background, do not assume that this is just more of the same. Zduriencik has been the best regarded scouting director in baseball for the last few years, and the work he did in building the Brewers through the draft was legendary. If you want to know why the Brewers were in the playoffs this year, it’s because Zduriencik hit home run after home run in the draft. This is a good hire.
Now, Jack Z isn’t exactly the new school analytical type we were all hoping for. His strengths are all scouting based, and he won’t be the kind of guy to come in and turn the Mariners into the next Oakland/Cleveland/Boston/Tampa Bay. With Engle, Fontaine, and now Zduriencik, the Mariners are clearly going to try to win with the Atlanta/Minnesota/Anaheim method of just outscouting everyone else on earth and developing so much good talent from within that they can’t help but be competitive.
Guess what? It can work. It’s not the best possible path, but it’s not doomed for failure, either. If Zduriencik can prove to be as adept at evaluating major league talent as he has been at amateur talent, and the M’s commit to a development pipeline that enables the team to grow a roster of homemade all-stars, they could line themselves up to be a very good team.
If they want to be a great team, they should not stop with Z, but hire a strong analytical department to supplement the scouting strength at the top of the front office. The two can work together, but there has to be a real effort on the M’s part here. If they stop with Zduriencik, it’s not enough – if they let him build a good organization with strong analysts surrounding the Big Three scouting types, this could be a player development machine.
Let’s hope for the best. Welcome to Seattle, Z.
Zduriencik it is
Official word is that Zduriencik has got the job. Apparently the key was his record with young talent. Not just identifying it – Engle and Fontaine have done fine with that, though depending on whether they stick around, his ability would be crucial there as well. But more importantly, developing it, which has been an area of frustration with the organizational philosophy.
I guess announcing it by press release instead of having a press conference is how they avoid the wrath of Selig. And also cut down on the media attention while people are off covering the World Series. Press conference is not until the off day Friday.
It’s A Good Start
Whenever the M’s get around to announcing who their new GM is, I’m pretty sure I know what my reaction will be.
“Nice, good hire, now let’s get started with the house cleaning.”
Whether it ends up being LaCava, DiPoto, Zduriencik, or Ng, I think we will have ample reason to be somewhat optimistic about what lays ahead. All have some really strong points in their favor, and they all differ significantly from the crop of people the M’s interviewed the last time around. While none of them fit the Epstein/Friedman/Byrnes mold that perhaps we would have preferred, they all come well spoken of and appear to be qualified to bring about the changes this organization badly needs.
But that last sentence is the key point. If the M’s just see this as a single job opening for a new guy to make decisions on trades and free agent signings, it won’t be enough. None of those four will be able to build a perennial contender with the organization that’s in place right now, because the underlying philosophies of the team have just been completely wrong for the last, oh, 30 years or so. The new GM has to be able to bring about significant change in the way this team runs its baseball operations.
The team needs a new player development plan. The scouts generally do a good job of bringing talent into the organization, but too often, that talent simply doesn’t mature into useful major league players. There’s a lack of cohesion in coaching from one minor league team to the next, and outdated philosophies about how to help kids improve being put into practice far too often. The club’s uber-aggressive promotion of prospects needs to be toned down, because it doesn’t help the club to push raw kids to Triple-A and have them stagnate in Tacoma for several years trying to learn things they should have picked up in A-ball.
The organizational also needs a real analytical department. No, having Mat Olkin on retainer as a consultant doesn’t count. The team needs to find a few of the hundreds of ridiculously smart college graduates who would literally work for free, give them some office space, and tell them to bring the team’s data analysis up to modern times. Create an internship program that brings the best and brightest of the game’s future executives into the organization, creating an in house future GM farm. Mine the newest forms of data, from Pitch F/x to advanced fielding metrics, to catch up with the rest of the American League’s elite in terms of understanding what to value and where advantages can be found.
And, the GM needs the power to say goodbye to the longtime organizational soldiers who simply aren’t going to be part of a transformation of this club. Lee Pelekoudas and Benny Looper (among others) have certainly earned their seniority over the years, and while loyalty is something to be valued, they should be thanked for their years of service and offered a nice retirement package. It’s simply time for a new direction, and the voices of the past don’t need to be continually pushing their antiquated beliefs on the upper management. The new GM needs to be able to build a support staff that will work together to foster new, better ideas about how baseball teams are run without worrying about offending one of the people who screwed up the organization in the first place. Those people don’t need to be in the room anymore. They’ve had their chance to run a baseball team, and they failed at it. It’s time for them to move on.
If the Mariners are really committed to seeing change come to the baseball operations department, this won’t be the last hiring announced before the 2009 season begins. No matter who the new GM is, they should be able to bring fresh voices at all levels of the organization, grabbing the brightest minds from around the game to help rebuild this team into something that actually resembles a forward thinking club. If they stop at just hiring one of LaCava, Ng, Zduriencik, or DiPoto, however, and ask them to fit into the structure already in place, then it really doesn’t matter which one they hire, because it won’t be enough.
A new general manager is a good start in the right direction, but it’s not enough. This needs to be the beginning of real change throughout the way this team runs on a day to day basis, or we’re going to be chasing the Angels, Rangers, and A’s for a long, long time.
Strasburg Alternative No. 2: Dustin Ackley
Stephen Strasburg is the consensus No. 1 pick in next year’s draft. Now, as Dave mentioned in the comments here, history shows that the top guy heading into the season rarely ends up being drafted first overall. Still, the Nationals face a PR nightmare if they don’t draft the player *perceived* to be the best after failing to sign the ninth-overall pick this year, Aaron Crow. So, let’s begin to take a look at some of the alternatives to Strasburg that could be an option for the Mariners with the second-overall pick. In part one of this series, I looked at USC shortstop Grant Green. This time, we’ll look at North Carolina 1B/OF Dustin Ackley…
Simply put, Dustin Ackley is one of the best amateur hitters in the country.
Ackley grew up in Winston-Salem, N.C. and played three years of baseball at South Stokes High School where he helped the Sauras win 1A state championships in 2003 and 2004. His senior year, Ackley played for North Forsyth High School where he was a Louisville Slugger All-American. Ackley has good baseball bloodlines, as his father, John, was a third-round draft pick by the Red Sox in 1979 and played in the organization as a catcher, but never made the big leagues.
Despite being ranked as one of the best high school players in the state by Baseball America in 2006, Dustin went undrafted and headed off to Chapel Hill, where he’s really made a name for himself.
Congrats To Tampa
Their version of 1995 has just gone a step beyond our own. Congrats to Tampa on a remarkable season, and let’s hope the World Series is every bit as exciting as the ALCS.
Power structures and the GM hunt
A short comment on this Hickey piece:
It’s clear that club CEO Howard Lincoln and club president Chuck Armstrong will not allow the new GM to have as free a hand as Bill Bavasi, who was fired on June 16 and replaced on an interim basis by Lee Pelekoudas.
There is the perception, particularly in the blogosphere, that this is a horrible thing. Many of the pundits of the internet don’t like past decisions that Lincoln and Armstrong have made. And, frankly, there’s some reason to feel that way.
Dave’s agreed that Bavasi did, indeed, get to run the org the way he wanted, in response to my general concerns about whether candidates would want to work for those two (I would love, btw, to hear what Woodfork’s reasoning was for telling them he wasn’t interested after that first interview — but we’ll never get that).
But the reality is that the new power structure is simply a return to the old ways. Once Lincoln put Bavasi and then-manager Mike Hargrove ”on the hot seat” after the 2006 season, Bavasi and Hargrove went to their bosses and said if they were on the hot seat, they needed to be able to make their own calls, to live and/or die on their own.
So Armstrong and, to a lesser extent, Lincoln relinquished much of their normal input and let their general manager and his manager make the moves they wanted to make. Although the 2007 season produced a winning record, that philosophy proved to be a loser in the long run.
Let’s take it as a given for a moment that this is entirely true: that the Lincoln/Armstrong braintrust went to Bavasi and Hargrove after 2006 and said “succeed or you’re fired” (and they succeeded and then were fired). And that now they’d like to return to pre-2007 decision making.
The question unasked here is “is this a good thing”? Reading Hickey’s post, I got the feeling it was — that unleashing this new and dangerous GM/manager autonomy got them a good 2007 and a disastrous 2008.
But previous to that up-down, there were three just awful seasons, bad decision piled on bad decision, from 2003 on (and the 2003 roster construction had its problems) as the Bavasi-Armstrong-Lincoln trio decided to focus on role players with proven established professional veteran role experience (and so forth), particularly clubhouse guys — and you know the rest.
Now, my feelings on Gillick would take their own post. And it’s true that they’re clearly looking at some new approaches in the front office. But the M’s are interviewing all assistant GMs at this point: there’s no one there like Gillick who could, in the event of an argument with Lincoln, for instance, say “kiss my previous World Series rings and if you don’t like it I’ll quit and take the best GM job that opens next season.”
It would seem that a hidden qualification for the job is going to be the ability to make those two front-office guys feel involved, warm, and fuzzy about decisions, while still being able to steer the whole ship.
If we see Bloomquist given a two-year, $4m deal I promise not to get angry right away but instead wait to see if the M’s sign twenty awesome minor-league deals while Lincoln and Armstrong are at the press conference.
The Blow It Up Plan
A few weeks ago, I presented a roster construction plan for 2009 that would allow the M’s to potentially compete for the division, going with a reloading rather than rebuilding plan. This is the exact opposite of that.
This roster construction plan is something of a potential road map to rebuilding in a hurry, blowing up the current roster and attempting to win with a whole new core of players going forward. This team will be respectable enough, but it isn’t a 2009 contender. Instead, the focus is on finding players who can help in 2010, and limiting the losing transition to just one year.
Here’s the team, and then explanations of how to get there will follow below.
(Yes, there are 14 pitchers on the roster – three of them would start the year in Triple-A or on the DL and contribute later in the season.)
Trades:
Adrian Beltre, Jarrod Washburn, and J.J. Putz to Milwaukee for J.J. Hardy and Brad Nelson
Erik Bedard and Jose Lopez to Cleveland for Andy Marte, Adam Miller, and Beau Mills
$250,000 to St. Louis for Josh Phelps
Free Agents:
Sign Rocco Baldelli to a 1 year, $3 million contract
Sign Jeremy Affeldt to a 2 year, $8 million contract
Sign Ryan Langerhans to a 1 year, $800,000 contract
Two big trades bring back an all-star caliber shortstop, some interesting young talent at 3B, 1B, and RHP, and a power hitting left-handed first prospect. A couple of free agents sign with a team they know won’t compete for a chance to play a lot (Baldelli and Langerhans) and one for a chance to prove he can be a closer (Affeldt). The Mariners might not be able to offer a winning team, but they can offer opportunities that winning clubs cannot, and are able to bring in some capable talents to fill some key roles.
This roster does several things – gives real chances to talented kids who may be able to show that they can contribute to a winning team in 2009. Nelson, Marte, Baldelli, Morse, and Phelps will get to earn increased playing time with production and health, and odds are that a couple of that group will show that they’re ready to be real contributors going forward. You’re buying low on a bundle of talent and giving them a legitimate chance to show that they’re capable of a full time job in 2010.
This roster also significantly upgrades the defense, putting real athletes in the outfield, and while Marte is no Beltre, the upgrade from Lopez to Hardy is pretty significant. By getting better gloves on the field, you maximize the chances for success from the pitching staff. 2009 needs to be all about increasing the value of players in the organization, and Silva and Batista have nowhere to go but up. With better gloves behind them, you’re increasing the odds that one or both could have decent enough seasons. You’re never going to get them to be good enough to unload their contracts, but you might be able to get to the point where you don’t have to eat nearly as much money. If Silva’s pitch to contact style is backed up with good defense and he can run a 4.25 ERA, you could potentially be able to dump him next winter without having to eat more than $5 million or so. That would be a huge boon to the 2010 roster, and trying to coax some trade value out of Silva should be a priority for the 2009 team.
In Adam Miller, you get a potential closer replacement for Putz if he can stay healthy. The arm is electric, but he needs to stay healthy. A rebuilding team can take a shot at a guy like that, and with Affeldt around establishing himself as a proven closer (and then getting flipped at the deadline for prospects), there’s no need to rush one of the young kids into the 9th inning role.
On paper, this is probably a 75 win team, but it’s a 75 win team with some real upside, and one that will be building towards success in 2010. Just by sheer volume, you’d expect that the team will find a first baseman and a couple of outfielders who establish themselves in 2010, and you allow the kids like Valbuena, Tuiasosopo, Saunders, Halman, and Moore to get more experience in the minors rather than trying to rush them to usher in a youth movement.
The team spends about $75 million on it’s 2009 payroll, and hopefully the new GM can convince the management to take some of those savings and invest them directly into the farm system, both in the draft and through additional international signings.
It’s a rebuild with a purpose, and one that could set the team up for real contention in 2010. The new GM doesn’t need a five year plan – this rebuild can be done in one season, with a goal of winning again in just his second year here.
LaCava, Dipoto, or Ng (or Zduriencik)
Woodfork, Bernazard, and the internals have been eliminated from the GM search, according to Baker and Stone. LaCava and Dipoto are apparently in Seattle for a second interview, and Ng will have hers shortly, now that LA is out of the playoffs.
Smart money is on LaCava. He’s the most experienced of the three, is very tight with Bob Fontaine, and has a great reputation with people who Armstrong is taking advice from. I wouldn’t be surprised if the M’s were introducing LaCava as their new GM early next week.
Baker adds that Jack Zduriencik is the fourth candidate, who didn’t come out in the prior reports because he interviewed Monday, after Milwaukee got eliminated. He’s a tremendous scouting director, responsible for most of the talent the Brewers currently have, but is less statistically inclined than the other three. I wouldn’t be unhappy with Zduriencik, but probably prefer LaCava.
Free Talent Alert – Free Talent Alert
Lee, I know you’re not going to be GM for much longer, but you still have a chance to help this franchise, and that can only look good for you in future endeavors. So, take this as an opportunity, if nothing else, to leave on a good note.
Josh Phelps was designated for assignment by the Cardinals today to clear a spot on their 40 man roster. Really, with this guy named Pujols, they weren’t going to have much use for a 30 year old first baseman anyway, so by DFA’ing him, they’ll be able to find a team that would be more inclined to give him big league at-bats. Because boy has he earned them. Here’s Phelps’ career since 2002, when he got his first shot at the big leagues with the Blue Jays.
2002: 265 AB, .309/.362/.562
2003: 396 AB, .268/.358/.470
2004: 371 AB, .251/.304/.450 (traded to Cleveland mid-season)
2005: 158 AB, .266/.328/.424 (with Tampa)
After a promising start, he didn’t hit well enough to establish himself as an everyday DH, and got the busted prospect tag. So, in 2006, he ended up in Triple-A with the Tigers organization, trying to prove to everyone he was worthy of another shot.
2006: 464 AB, .308./361/.532 (Triple-A)
This was good enough to get him back in the big leagues, so 2007 was split between the Pirates and Yankees.
2007: 157 AB, .306/.399/.503
Remarkably, baseball couldn’t find room for a guy who had just posted a .900 OPS, even as a platoon guy, and he ended up back in Triple-A for 2008, with the Cardinals this time. Seriously.
2008: 461 AB, .291/.368./568 (Triple-A)
Now, if you see any evidence in there, anywhere, that Josh Phelps isn’t a good enough hitter to get at-bats on a major league team, I’d love to see it. He had the equivalent of one mediocre year in 2004-2005 after a couple solid seasons to start, and he’s continued to flash legitimate major league power in a couple minor league stops, as well as hitting the crap out of the ball in the majors when given the chance in 2007.
There’s not any star potential here, as he’s an aggressive free swinger who gets himself out by chasing bad pitches, but he can really hit a fastball, and he crushes left-handed pitching. He’s what the Mariners thought they were getting when they traded Asdrubal Cabrera for Eduardo Perez a few years ago (#$%!). One of the upsides of being a bad team is that you can take shots on guys like Phelps and get good value, because you can offer him a lot more at-bats than a team that needs to maximize their chances of winning in 2009. If he turns himself into a full time player, all the better – you’ve found a first base solution for free.
I know you ignored us when we asked for Nelson Cruz, but hopefully watching him terrorize pitching down the stretch was something of an eye-opener. These undervalued guys can hit, and this team needs more guys who can turn on a fastball. When they’re free, take the opportunity.
Food For Thought
Here’s two pretty similar players with slightly different approaches at bat, but overall, basically the same skills – you pick the one you would rather have. The differences aren’t huge, but they are there.
Player A:
3.0% BB%, 8.5% K%, 52.6% Swing%, 32.1% O-Swing%, 85.5% Contact%, 20.1% LD%, 3.40 Pitches Per PA
Player B:
4.8% BB%, 8.7% K%, 49.4% Swing%, 28.65% O-Swing%, 88.5% Contact%, 21.1% LD%, 3.61 Pitchers Per PA
Player A walks a little less, swing a little more often, swings at a few more pitches out of the strike zone (that’s O-Swing%), makes a little less contact, and swings a bit earlier in the count. Player B is a bit more patient, does a better job of not chasing balls, and puts the bat on the ball more often, while hitting a few more line drives.
Player A is 2007 Kenji Johjima. Player B is 2008 Kenji Johjima.
Yes, Kenji just had a terrible year, and yes, the contract is a pretty big albatross. But as the Mariners prepare for 2009, they had better recognize that if they’re looking for evidence that Johjima’s skills as a hitter disappeared for good in 2008, it’s not there. The only real difference between 2007 Johjima and 2008 Johjima was in his batting average on balls in play – .291 in ’07 versus .233 last year.
Based on his batted ball data, we would have projected his 2007 OPS to be close to .785 – it was .755. Based on his batted ball data, we would have projected his 2008 OPS to be close to .765 – it was .609.
Because he’s slow, he’ll probably never match his batted ball projected OPS, but you’d have to be nuts to think there wasn’t a pretty significant amount of non-skill noise in Johjima’s 2008 results. Filter out that noise, and the 2009 expectation of Johjima’s performance suddenly looks quite a bit better. Let’s not give up on him yet, okay?