Paper 2005/190
Security Proof of "Efficient and Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Transport Protocol Based on RSA"
SeongHan Shin, Kazukuni Kobara, and Hideki Imai
Abstract
In this paper, we prove the security of the {\sf RSA-AKE} protocol \cite{SKI05} in the random oracle model. The proof states that the {\sf RSA-AKE} protocol is secure against an adversary who gets the client's stored secret \emph{or} the server's RSA private key.\footnote{The protocol is the same as \cite{SKI05}, but we corrected the security proof partially. The attacks appeared in \cite{TM05} are no longer available in the proof since the adversary has access to either the client's stored secret or the server's private key, not both of them.} To our best knowledge, the {\sf RSA-AKE} protocol is the most efficient among their kinds (i.e., RSA and password based AKE protocols). The other security properties and efficiency measurements of the {\sf RSA-AKE} protocol remain the same as in \cite{SKI05}.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- authenticationkey transport protocolpasswordon-line and off-line attacks
- Contact author(s)
- seonghan shin @ aist go jp
- History
- 2006-05-15: revised
- 2005-06-23: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2005/190
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2005/190,
author = {SeongHan Shin and Kazukuni Kobara and Hideki Imai},
title = {Security Proof of "Efficient and Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Transport Protocol Based on {RSA}"},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2005/190},
year = {2005},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/190}
}