Paper 2005/161
Multiple forgery attacks against Message Authentication Codes
David A. McGrew and Scott R. Fluhrer
Abstract
Some message authentication codes (MACs) are vulnerable to multiple forgery attacks, in which an attacker can gain information that allows her to succeed in forging multiple message/tag pairs. This property was first noted in MACs based on universal hashing, such as the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of operation for block ciphers. However, we show that CBC-MAC and HMAC also have this property, and for some parameters are more vulnerable than GCM. We present multiple-forgery attacks against these algorithms, then analyze the security against these attacks by using the expected number of forgeries. We compare the different MACs using this measure. This document is a pre-publication draft manuscript.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. unpublished
- Keywords
- message authentication codes
- Contact author(s)
- mcgrew @ cisco com
- History
- 2005-06-04: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2005/161
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2005/161,
author = {David A. McGrew and Scott R. Fluhrer},
title = {Multiple forgery attacks against Message Authentication Codes},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2005/161},
year = {2005},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/161}
}