Electoral Competition and Public Spending on Education: Evidence from African Countries

David Stasavage
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David Stasavage: London School of Economics

Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Electoral competition can have a significant influence on government decisions regarding public spending. In this paper I examine whether the move to multiparty elections in many African countries in the last ten years has been associated with a clear change in priorities for public spending on education. In particular, I argue that the need to obtain an electoral majority may have prompted governments to devote greater resources to primary schools. I test this hypothesis using panel data on electoral competition and education spending in thirty-five African countries over the period 1980-1999. The results strongly support the hypothesis and are robust to controls for both unobserved country effects and other determinants of spending.

JEL-codes: D6 D7 H (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2004-09-08
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 26
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0409006

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