Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complementarities

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the complementarities framework extends to mixed strategies ordered by first-order stochastic dominance. In particular, the mixed extension of a GSC is a GSC, the full set of equilibria is a complete lattice and the extremal equilibria (smallest and largest) are in pure strategies. The framework does not extend when strategy spaces are multi-dimensional. I also update learning results for GSC using stochastic fictitious play.

JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-10-09
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Related works:
Journal Article: Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities (2003)
Working Paper: Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complementarities (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0004006

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