On the impact of managerial bonus systems on firm profit and market competition: the cases of pure profit, sales, market share and relative profits compared
Mathijs Jansen,
Arie van Lier and
Arjen van Witteloostuijn
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Arie van Lier: Utrecht School of Economics, University of Utrecht, Utrecht, The Netherlands, Postal: Utrecht School of Economics, University of Utrecht, Utrecht, The Netherlands
Arjen van Witteloostuijn: Faculty of Applied Economics, Department of Management, University of Antwerpen, Antwerpen, Belgium, Postal: Faculty of Applied Economics, Department of Management, University of Antwerpen, Antwerpen, Belgium
Managerial and Decision Economics, 2009, vol. 30, issue 3, 141-153
Abstract:
By designing remuneration schemes based on a bonus rewarding specific firm-level outcomes, the owners|shareholders of a firm can manipulate the behavior of their managers. In practice, different bonus anchors take center stage: some are profit-based, others use sales as the key yardstick and still different ones focus on relative performance vis-à-vis a peer group. In this paper, we focus on the impact of remuneration schemes on firm-level profitability. The profit effect is investigated for (all possible combinations of) four bonus systems using delegation games. In the context of a linear Cournot model for two or three firms, we model a two- or three-stage decision structure where, in the first stage (or first two stages), an owner decides on the bonus system for his manager and where, in the final stage, the manager takes the daily output decision for her firm. It appears that the bonus system based on relative (profits) performance is superior throughout. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:3:p:141-153
DOI: 10.1002/mde.1437
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