Family Control and the Rent-Seeking Society

Randall Morck and Bernard Yeung ()

No 585, William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series from William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan

Abstract: The small number of very large family-controlled corporate groups in many countries combined with their long continuity of control and ability to act discretely give these organizations a comparative advantage in political rent-seeking. This advantage is a key part of a self-reinforcing system whereby oligarchic family corporate control, political rent seeking, and low general levels of trust combine to stymie growth.

Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2003-02-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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