Sovereign default, domestic banks and financial institutions

Nicola Gennaioli, Alberto Martin and Stefano Rossi

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: We present a model of sovereign debt in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, government defaults are costly because they destroy the balance sheets of domestic banks. In our model, better financial institutions allow banks to be more leveraged, thereby making them more vulnerable to sovereign defaults. Our predictions: government defaults should lead to declines in private credit, and these declines should be larger in countries where financial institutions are more developed and banks hold more government bonds. In these same countries, government defaults should be less likely. Using a large panel of countries, we find evidence consistent with these predictions.

Keywords: Sovereign Risk; Capital Flows; Institutions; Financial Liberalization; Sudden Stops. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F34 F36 G15 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-08, Revised 2012-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks, and Financial Institutions (2014)
Working Paper: Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks and Financial Institutions (2012)
Working Paper: Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks, and Financial Institutions (2012)
Working Paper: Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks and Financial Institutions (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:1170

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