Decentralizing Aid with Interested Parties

No RP2006-06, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: This paper analyses the decentralization of decisionmaking in aid-giving in a theoretical rent-seeking framework. In this analysis the root donor establishes a necessary criterion for potential recipients: good governance. The potential recipients compete in hierarchal contests for funds. The paper investigates whether, under certain reasonable conditions, fashionable aid procedures will lead to the development of a poverty trap.

Keywords: Decision making; Economic assistance and foreign aid; Economic development; International agencies; Local government (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Decentralizing Aid with Interested Parties (2006)
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