Intention-Based Reciprocity and the Hidden Costs of Control

No 11-115/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: Empirical research suggests that - rather than improving incentives - exerting controlcan reduce workers' performance by eroding motivation. The present paper shows thatintention-based reciprocity can cause such motivational crowding-out if individuals differin their propensity for reciprocity and preferences are private information. Not beingcontrolled might then be considered to be kind, because not everybody reciprocates notbeing controlled with high effort. This argument stands in contrast to existing theoreticalwisdom on motivational crowding-out that is primarily based on signaling models.

Keywords: extrinsic and intrinsic motivation; crowding-out; intention-based reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C70 D63 D82 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Intention-based reciprocity and the hidden costs of control (2013)
Working Paper: Intention-Based Reciprocity and the Hidden Costs of Control (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20110115

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