THE STABILITY OF ANARCHY AND BREAKDOWN OF PRODUCTION
Kjell Hausken
Defence and Peace Economics, 2006, vol. 17, issue 6, 589-603
Abstract:
In Hirshleifer's (1995) model for unitary actors, combined fighting/production abruptly breaks down when inter-group decisiveness of fighting is above a certain value (above one) or income requirements are not met. Accounting for the collective action problem, this article gives the opposite result that fighting/production is stable also for large decisiveness parameters (above one) and strict income requirements for each agent. The stable fighting/production equilibrium gets gradually easier to perturb off balance for high inter-group decisiveness, high costs of fighting, different fighting efficiencies, and equal group sizes. The equilibrium number of groups that can be sustained decreases in the inter-group decisiveness and increases in the cost of fighting.
Keywords: Production; Fighting; Anarchy; Peace; Collective action (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:defpea:v:17:y:2006:i:6:p:589-603
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DOI: 10.1080/10242690601025492
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