A recursive core for cooperative games with overlapping coalitions

Messan Agbaglah

Cahiers de recherche from Departement d'économique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke

Abstract: This paper develops an extension of the recursive core to the setting of overlapping coalitions. We show that the cooperative game theoretical traditional way of separating a deviant coalition from the game played by the ones left behind is no more satisfactory. We therefore introduce a new paradigm with which we obtain the overlapping coalition structure core whose allocations are Pareto-efficient.

Keywords: Overlapping coalitions; Cover function game; Recursive core; Residual game; Optimistic; Pessimistic; Efficiency. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2014-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:shr:wpaper:14-07

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