Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks

Messan Agbaglah

Cahiers de recherche from Departement d'économique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke

Abstract: We introduce the game in cover function form, which is a bargaining game of sequential offers for endogenous overlapping coalitions. This extension of games in partition function form removes the restriction to disjoint coalitions. We discuss the existence of equilibria, and we develop an algorithm to compute equilibrium outcomes, under some conditions. We define the key properties that overlapping coalition structures must verify to uniquely identify networks. We show that each network is defined as an equilibrium outcome of a game in cover function form. Our results bridge the two strands of literature devoted to the formation networks and coalitions.

Keywords: Overlapping coalitions; Bargaining; Network formation; Coalition formation; Game in cover function form; Symmetric game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D62 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2014-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-ger, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://gredi.recherche.usherbrooke.ca/wpapers/GREDI-1402.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks (2017)
Working Paper: Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks (2010)
Working Paper: Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:shr:wpaper:14-02

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