Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons

Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié

No 159, CEIS Research Paper from Tor Vergata University, CEIS

Abstract: We consider an exchange economy in which a seller can trade an endowment of a divisible good whose quality she privately knows. Buyers compete in menus of non-exclusive contracts, so that the seller may choose to trade with several buyers. In this context, we show that an equilibrium always exists and that aggregate equilibrium allocations are generically unique. Although the good offered by the seller is divisible, aggregate equilibrium allocations exhibit no fractional trades. In equilibrium, goods of relatively low quality are traded at the same price, while goods of higher quality may end up not being traded at all if the adverse selection problem is severe. This provides a novel strategic foundation for Akerlof’s (1970) results, which contrasts with standard competitive screening models postulating enforceability of exclusive contracts. Latent contracts that are issued but not traded in equilibrium turn out to be an essential feature of our construction.

Keywords: Adverse Selection; Competing Mechanisms; Non-Exclusivity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 71 pages
Date: 2010-05-28, Revised 2010-05-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-cta
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https://ceistorvergata.it/RePEc/rpaper/RP159.pdf Main text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Nonexclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons (2011)
Working Paper: Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons (2009)
Working Paper: Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons (2009)
Working Paper: Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons (2009)
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