Tax evasion, social norms and economic growth

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper proposes a theoretical model to account for the most relevant micro- and macroeconomic empirical facts in the tax evasion literature. To do so, we integrate tax morale into a dynamic overlapping generations model of capital income tax evasion. Tax morale is modeled as a social norm for tax compliance. It is shown that accounting for such nonpecuniary costs of evasion may not only explain (i) why some taxpayers never evade even if the gamble is profitable, and (ii) how a higher tax rate can increase evasion, but also that (iii) the share of evaded taxes over GDP decreases with the stage of economic development and (iv) that tax morale is positively correlated with the level of GDP per capita as suggested by recent empirical evidence. Finally, a higher tax rate increases aggregate evasion as well as the number of evaders in the economy when taxpayers decisions are interdependent.

Keywords: tax evasion; social norms; overlapping generations; economic growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 H26 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-07-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa, nep-dge, nep-fdg, nep-iue, nep-pbe, nep-pub and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: Tax evasion, social norms, and economic growth (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:48427

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