Corruption, uncertainty and growth

R Djumashev
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ratbek Dzhumashev

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Corruption in the public sector erodes tax compliance and leads to higher tax evasion. Moreover, corrupt public officials abuse their public power to extort bribes from the private agents. In both types of interaction with the public sector, the private agents are bound to face uncertainty with respect to their disposable incomes. To analyse effects of this uncertainty, a stochastic dynamic growth model with the public sector is examined. It is shown that deterministic excessive red tape and corruption deteriorate the growth potential through income redistribution and public sector inefficiencies. Most importantly, it is demonstrated that the increase in corruption via higher uncertainty exerts adverse effects on capital accumulation, thus leading to lower growth rates.

Keywords: Corruption; growth; public goods; tax evasion; uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D92 E20 E60 G11 H26 H41 O16 O41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-06-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-dge, nep-mac, nep-pol and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3716/1/MPRA_paper_3716.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: CORRUPTION, UNCERTAINTY AND GROWTH (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:3716

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