The Average Tree Solution for Multi-choice Forest Games

Sylvain Béal, Aymeric Lardon, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this article we study cooperative multi-choice games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an undirected forest on the player set. Players in the game can cooperate if they are connected in the forest. We introduce a new (single-valued) solution concept which is a generalization of the average tree solution defined and characterized by Herings et al. [2008] for TU-games played on a forest. Our solution is characterized by component efficiency, component fairness and independence on the greatest activity level. It belongs to the precore of a restricted multi-choice game whenever the underlying multi-choice game is superadditive and isotone. We also link our solution with the hierarchical outcomes (Demange, 2004) of some particular TU-games played on trees. Finally, we propose two possible economic applications of our average tree solution.

Keywords: Average tree solution; Communication graph; (pre-)Core; Hierarchical outcomes; Multi-choice games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The average tree solution for multi-choice forest games (2012)
Working Paper: The Average Tree Solution for Multi-choice Forest Games (2012)
Working Paper: The Average Tree Solution for Multi-Choice Forest Games (2011)
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