Bargaining Versus Fighting

Stergios Skaperdas

No 60705, Working Papers from University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics

Abstract: I examine the determinants of conflict and settlement by embedding probabilistic contests in a bargaining framework. Different costly enforcement efforts (e.g., arming, litigation expenditures) induce different disagreement points and Pareto frontiers. After examining the incentives for settlement, I demonstrate how different division rules and bargaining norms have real, economic effects. I then analyze some sources of conflict. I emphasize long-term, strategic considerations by examining an illustrative model and discussing particular historical examples.

Keywords: Conflict; Negotiation; War; Settlement; Arming; Litigation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C78 D63 D70 D74 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2006-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Related works:
Journal Article: BARGAINING VERSUS FIGHTING (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:irv:wpaper:060705

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