Injury Investigations in anti-Dumping and the Super-Additivity Effect: A Theoretical Explanation

No 2001/110, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: Empirical evidence shows that injury investigations in anti-dumping cases conducted by the United States International Trade Commission, the probability of a positive finding is higher when the number of defendant firms is larger, holding constant their total market share. In this paper we offer a theoretical explanation of this finding. We show that the presence of many exporters exacerbates the free-rider problem, which leads every firm to invest less on defense. Thus for the same market share, injury finding is more likely to be positive for many small sellers than a few large sellers.

Keywords: WP; market share; Anti-dumping; cumulation; injury investigation; defendant firm; s. Assuming; dumping margin; additivity effect; representative firm; dumping charge; Protectionism; Antidumping; Imports; Tariffs; Exports (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13
Date: 2001-08-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Injury Investigations in Antidumping and the Super-Additivity Effect: A Theoretical Explanation (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2001/110

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