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Bureaucrats or Politicians?

Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini

No 238, Working Papers from IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University

Abstract: Policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats. This paper investigates the criteria that should lead a society to allocate policy tasks to elected policymakers (politicians) or non elected bureaucrats. Politicians tend to be preferable for tasks that have the following features: they do not involve too much specific technical ability relative to effort; there is uncertainty ex ante about ex post preferences of the public and flexibility is valuable; time inconsistency is not an issue; small but powerful vested interests do not have large stakes in the policy outcome; effective decisions over policies require taking into account policy complementarities and compensating the losers; the policies imply redistributive conflicts among large groups of voters. The reverse apply to the attribution of prerogatives to bureaucrats.

Date: 2003
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https://repec.unibocconi.it/igier/igi/wp/2003/238.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Bureaucrats or Politicians? (2005) Downloads
Working Paper: Bureaucrats or Politicians? (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: Bureaucrats or Politicians? (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: Bureaucrats or Politicians? (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: Bureaucrats or Politicians? (2003) Downloads
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